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 My dissertation addresses ethics in social professions through a conceptual and 
empirical study of how professional boundaries and codes organize relationship.  Central 
research questions include:  “How might one’s sense of responsibility to another person 
shrink under professional codes, procedures or good boundaries?  Does professionalism 
lower the stakes of professional relationship by restricting involvement and avoiding 
risk?”  After developing an interdisciplinary, theoretical account of professionalism and 
normative ethics, I bring care ethics and postmodern critique together to challenge the 
foundations of professional ethics.  While providing important protections, professional 
norms and codes of ethics narrow the scope of what is “ethical” and limit ethical 
possibility.  Emphases on “do no harm” and risk-aversion lower the stakes of professional 
relationship.  My queer reading of ethics code discloses how professional ethics are 
treated as stable knowledge.  I argue that professionalism ascribes the condition of being 
ethical rather than promoting active social processes and pragmatic ways of doing ethics. 
   My qualitative study of professional teachers and social workers who became 
“parents” to youth they met in professional contexts grounds my theoretical and 
philosophical inquiry in experiential narrative.  I describe an ethical periphery where 
practitioners make “positive boundary crossings” and suggest that professional ethics is a 
matter of deliberated action rather than identity.  Mutual relations and “elastic 
boundaries” invite more creative and pragmatic problem solving and make ethical 
discourse more relevant and meaningful in everyday professional practice. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Citizens of economically “developed” and “developing” nations regularly use 
professional services.  Later today, I plan to take my cat to his appointment with the 
veterinarian.  Perhaps you sent a child to school this morning.  Relying upon and 
integrating professional services into daily life has become common, seldom questioned 
routine.  As well, managerial and professional services have become dominant sectors in 
the U.S. economy (Williams, 2014).   With attention toward the influence of 
professionalism on social organization, I am broadly interested in how boundaries 
organize and order relationship.  By centering ethics in the life-world of the professional, 
I seek to better understand how professional ethics organize relationships and describe 
how professional agents experience relationship boundaries.  While the experiences of 
recipients of professional services are an important area of study, I have found that the 
experiences of frontline professionals who provide services are less often theorized and 
described.  Given that professional codes of ethics establish general principles and rules 
of conduct, I want to know more about how they conventionally narrow the scope of 
what is “ethical” and, thereby, limit ethical possibility. 
I recently listened to a story on National Public Radio covering the January, 2015 
Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in which 17 people were killed.  When reporting about the 
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assailants and the accuracy of their marksmanship, the reporter described them as “very 
professional.”  I presumed that she meant the killings were carried out with technical 
expertise and skill.  Yet I wondered, “If killing can be described as ‘professional,’ does 
any ethical signification remain in the concept of professionalism?”  While a minor 
descriptor in one story does not fully reflect contemporary discourse, I wondered if 
professionalism has come to mean expert know-how devoid of any ethical content.  I then 
asked, “What meaning is conveyed when teachers or social workers are described as very 
professional?”  Does it mean they follow the rules?  Does it mean that they take their 
duties seriously and demonstrate competency in their professional skills?  Does 
professional signify anything about ethics—the teacher’s sense of justice or the social 
worker’s compassion?  Or, are ethical principles inextricably and tacitly built into 
“textbook” professional procedures and actions?   
I share this anecdote on the reporter’s use of the phrase “very professional” 
because it captures something about what professionalism is and how it is understood in 
everyday life.  I also share it to focus on professionalism as a form of social organization.  
As agents of professional activity, our freedoms are impinged by our professional 
obligations.  As professionals—educators and social workers in the case of this study—
we reasonably need to be able to make critically reflexive maneuvers by examining the 
very social institutions from which many of us derive identity, purpose, status, and 
meaning.   
I have degrees in K-12 teaching and social work and have spent significant parts 
of my life in the credentialing processes of professional education.  My undergraduate 
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studies led to a teaching license in North Carolina.  After five years of work experience, I 
enrolled in professional graduate studies for a Masters of Social Work (MSW).  When 
completing schooling I did not realize that while professional status gave me a pass 
through certain social barriers, the terms of access would always be prescribed and 
controlled by outside, third parties.  To be allowed into the lives of others, I completed 
the required professional schooling.  My schooling, some combination of classroom and 
internship learning, provided a series of competencies, skills, experiences and credentials.  
It also granted me with state-sanctioned public trust, which allowed me, a stranger, to 
show up in the lives of others.  
Among other things, my socialization into professional identity taught me how to 
conduct myself and how to regard myself.  Certainly, the privilege of my education and 
granted public trust came with responsibility and accountability.  With government 
oversight, the market-logics of consumer choice and a field of expertise, professionals 
deliberate the appropriate use of “discretionary powers” (Frowe, 2005, p. 44).  Regulation 
of professional power and practices of constraint have attempted to correct troublesome 
histories of misuse and abuse.   
To maintain trust and prevent harm, professionals adhere to guiding principles 
and rules of conduct and practice.  Toward these and other purposes, professional 
education includes some consideration of professional ethics—frequently codified into 
written statements.  Professional codes of ethics are developed and enforced to restrict the 
conduct of professionals and eliminate risks of abuse and exploitation.  In the United 
States, the National Education Association (NEA) and the National Association of Social 
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Work (NASW) approve and publish codes of ethics.  Professional codes of ethics may be 
summarized generally under the banner “do no harm” and depend upon an individual 
professional’s reasoning to follow guidelines, such as confidentiality, in a given situation.  
For example, a teacher refrains from posting negative remarks about a student on social 
media because those remarks might damage her network of professional relationships 
(with students, parents, colleagues, public).  As well, under a principle of confidentiality 
the NEA Code of Ethics states, “The educator … shall not disclose information about 
students obtained in the course of professional service …” (National Education 
Association, 1975).  The rule of behavior is given to teachers as a product of a certain 
kind of episteme, a tradition of practice and a particular ethical discourse.  The stage 
upon which professionals enact “correct” behavior is often the liminal, negotiated space 
between two persons. 
Technologies of Care 
Professionals maintain general boundaries between private life and professional 
life.  Drawing boundaries is part of the way that professionals check their own powers 
and protect clients, the public, themselves and the professions they represent.  Drawing 
boundaries also marks, divides and orders social space.  Drawing boundaries and making 
distinctions about what is “out of bounds” are attempts to address issues of trust and 
power.  Given privileged positions and discretionary powers, codes of ethics attempt to 
protect vulnerable populations and reduce potential for harm.  Ethical codes reflect 
instrumental objectives.  However, as technique, the declaration of professional ethics 
and the demarcation of professional boundaries may actually narrow ethical 
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responsibility.  Schools are tasked with the responsibilities of education.  Social services 
accept responsibilities for the care of vulnerable groups.  Thus, ethical responsibility is 
entrusted to professional institutions and exercised by following professional procedures.  
Ethical responsibility for the other person shifts from the one to the many, from the 
“brother’s keeper” to civil society.1 
In this dissertation, I explore the ethical dimensions of professional boundaries, 
codes and practices in spaces of one-to-one encounter.  How might one’s sense of 
responsibility to another person shrink under professional procedure or good boundaries?  
A teacher who refrains from risky self-disclosure to a student may build distance in the 
relationship to protect against a potential conflict of interest; however, such withdrawal 
may also stifle the ethical possibilities of that relationship.  In this study I address the 
problem of how professionalism, in general, and codes of ethics, in particular, narrow the 
scope of what is “ethical” and, thereby, limit ethical possibility.  I also pose critical 
questions about the relational, subjective and ethical dimensions of professionalism—an 
ideology promoted in universities of education and social work and emboldened by 
recent neoliberal trends.  
As organizational and psychological technique, drawing boundaries operates as an 
example of modern technology (Strivers, 2004).  Professionals learn and practice 
organizational and psychological techniques.  For example, within a technique of 
drawing boundaries, a teacher may limit or refrain from personal self-disclosure while 
expecting self-disclosure from students.  Such asymmetrical relations may be understood 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Alan Wolfe (1989) provides a thorough analysis of this social shift in Whose Keeper?  Social 
Science and Moral Obligation. 
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as maintaining teacher authority or position.  I generally refer to organizational, 
procedural techniques common to the social professions as technologies of care.  
Technologies of care externalize familial care activities when care is “performed” by 
professionals according to “contractual pattern of relationships governed by the market” 
(González & Iffland, 2014, p. 6).  González and Iffland (2014) distinguish caring about 
from caring for.  Caring about involves a subjective attitude of concern and an emotional 
or social bond.  Caring for includes actions aimed toward diminishing objective obstacles 
to well being (p. 3).  While caring for can be achieved through rational procedure, the 
subjectivity of caring about may be more difficult to achieve.  I suggest that caring for in 
the absence of caring about constitutes a technology of care.  Technologies of care make 
human relationships “abstract and impersonal.”  As well, the professionals who use them 
are “relieved of personal responsibility in judgment and choice” (Strivers, 2004, p. 17) by 
following rule and procedure.  Developed and deployed for consistency and efficiency, 
technologies of care contribute to alienation and loneliness in modern life, in part, by 
suppressing the professional subject and colonizing “our experiences, opinions, emotions, 
and consciousness” (p. 19). 
Describing the disabling effects of professionalized services, McKnight (2000) 
explains that “serviced societies” are “peopled with service producers and service 
consumers – professionals and clients” (p. 184).  He reasons that manufacturing “need,” 
increasing the supply of “personal deficiency” (p. 188), is essential for fueling service 
economies.  Such economic rationalism underlies what I describe as “technologies of 
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caring.”  Perhaps the most well-known critic of professions, Ivan Illich (1977), coined the 
phrase “the age of disabling professions” and emphatically warned: 
 
Only if we understand the way in which dependence on commodities has 
legitimized wants, coined them urgent and exasperated needs while 
simultaneously destroying people’s ability to fend for themselves, can the 
progress into a new dark age be avoided, an age in which masturbatory 
self-indulgence might be the safest assertion of independence. (p. 14) 
 
 
Focusing on the unintended effects of social welfare services, McKnight (2000) critiques, 
“The political consequence is neighbors unable to act as communities of competence with 
the capacity to perceive or act upon solvable problems” (p. 188).  Such reasoning troubles 
the ethical purposes of social professions—professions concerned with caring, helping, 
educating and advocating for vulnerable groups. 
Drawing from sociological and philosophical traditions, I build an 
interdisciplinary critique of professional ethics in Chapters Two and Three of this study.  
Central to my critique are postmodern approaches to ethics and the application of 
postmodern thought to professional practice.  For example, Dybicz (2012) claims that 
postmodern practice in social work offers a “new paradigm” where “care and expertise 
work together in supplementary fashion” (p. 278).  Re-examination of traditional beliefs 
about practice, such as professional boundaries and dual relationships, in light of 
postmodern thought and conditions may be called for.  I specifically center traditional 
beliefs and practices related to professional ethics, as embodied in codes of ethics, and 
the experiences of professional practitioners.  Agreeing with postmodern rejections of 
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universal truths and master narratives, I foreground the subjectivities of the professionals 
who must negotiate various technologies and regimes of truth. 
The Social Professions 
I believe that members of the “social professions” are uniquely positioned to 
contribute important perspectives on caring for and caring about others while also bound 
and regulated within a professional field of play.  Banks (2003) describes social 
professions as:   
 
…related but distinct occupational groups involved in care, social control, 
informal education and advocacy with a range of vulnerable, troublesome 
or “disadvantaged” user/client groups.  In European terms, this would 
include social work, along with many varieties of social care and social 
education work, including social pedagogy and community and youth 
work. (p. 134) 
 
 
The categories “social professions” and “social education” are more commonly used in 
European scholarship (Banks, 2003; Baptista, 2012; Campillo, Sáez & Sánchez, 2014; 
Clifford, 2002).  Baptista (2012) describes social pedagogy that occurs as “praxis 
education in the context of the ‘care sector’” (p. 41).  I use “social professions” to group 
similar activities in education and social work and to distinguish clinical or therapeutic 
social work practice from non-clinical practice.  Campillo, Sáez and Sánchez (2014) 
describe “social education” as a relational profession that involves work on the other in a 
caring or helping capacity (p. 7).  Clinical or therapeutic professions, while fitting this 
description, are not the focus of my study and only play a minor role in my discussion of 
ethics codes.  Because of complicating mental health practices and therapeutic processes, 
clinical social work is not included within my use of “social professions.” 
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Care ethicists, like Noddings (1984), may describe social professions as “caring 
professions.”  Others may make distinctions between the kind of activity involved in 
social professions when compared to more male-dominated professions like medicine or 
architecture.  They argue that professions such as social work “… have lesser claims to 
distinctive knowledge bases and rely more heavily on their ethical commitment to 
service, within defined tasks and roles, as the basis for asserting professionalism” 
(Hugman, 2014, p. 174).  I focus my dissertation study on social professions for several 
reasons.  First, my professional background, education and experiences are within the 
social professions.  A strength of my study includes my ability to speak with an “insider” 
understanding of professional ethics and relationships.  Second, social professions 
include relational activities such as care and ethical commitment.  Thus, members of 
social professions have first-hand understandings of how those activities are situated, 
managed and experienced under professional structures and ideologies.  Third, within the 
context of late-capitalism, globalization and the erosion of State-provided social welfare, 
practitioners in social professions are increasingly managed for deliverable outcomes and 
performance metrics (Banks, 2011; Brill, 2001; Dustin, 2007; Larson, 2014; Weinberg & 
Taylor, 2014).  For example, Weinberg and Taylor (2014) spoke with a social worker 
who was asked to “put in less quality work just to get the quantity done” so that her 
agency would be within the “funding corridor” (p. 80).  The experiences of frontline 
professionals have changed qualitatively under neoliberal policies and market logics.  
Thus, the values and ethical commitments that underscore a “calling” to service for many 
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social professionals are increasingly subject to economic influences and governmental 
techniques. 
Research Questions 
 How does modern, techno-scientific rationalism manifest in professionalism and 
professional ethics?  Do professional ethics and boundaries narrow space for being 
together in caring, responsible ways?  How might one’s sense of responsibility to another 
person shrink under professional procedure or good boundaries?  Does professionalism 
lower the stakes of professional relationship by restricting involvement?  What is 
professionalism without trust, and what is trust without risk?  Within an assortment of 
safe, pre-approved techniques of care, is there room for openness and close, mutual 
relationship?   
These questions are timely as fissures within centralized authority spider outward 
and create fractured shapes and fragments.  The “postmodern turn” points our attention 
toward multiplicity, fluid power relations and truths without certainties.  By studying 
breaches of professional ethics code, I intend to explore moral responsibility not as static 
duty, but as unsettled encounter and creation.  Countering normative rules, how might 
breaches of professional norms be understood (by professional subjects) as potential sites 
for ethical action?   
This study may interest anyone who has lived an experience of her own 
professional identity at odds with her felt sense of responsibility to someone or 
something.  My professional experiences as a teacher and a social worker have repeatedly 
placed me into conflicted and ambiguous space between professional boundaries and 
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lived responsibility to others.  For me, codes of professional ethics, such as strict 
prohibitions on “dual relationships,” often fail to clarify that ambiguity.  I expect that 
others have experienced ambiguities in their professional relations.  In this study I 
explore the potential of that ambiguity. 
Personal and Theoretical Reflections:  Queering a Professional “Minefield” 
 As an entry into my interest in this topic, I share my own experience of struggling 
to navigate professional boundaries while responding to an older adolescent.  My 
personal story involves becoming the foster parent to a young person who I met while 
employed in a therapeutic wilderness program.  I was Andrew’s family counselor (a 
masters-level social work position) during his ten-month stay in a residential facility.  
Andrew, seventeen years old, was in foster care; his parents were not available to 
participate in family counseling sessions or home visits.  So, I often talked with him one-
to-one.  Initially, I justified extra time with him as compensation for the lack of attention 
he received from family.  Without family involvement in his treatment, Andrew was 
deprived of certain “privileges” such as off-campus family visitation.  Over time spent 
together, we developed a bond and mutual connection.  I cared about Andrew and valued 
our relationship.  I also felt as if he cared about me.  Eventually, I could no longer contain 
my feeling and concern for him within the parameters of my professional duties alone.  
While my responsibilities extended equally to all of the twelve adolescents in my group, 
Andrew’s situation demanded more of me.  I could provide something that might benefit 
him—a stable place to live, an ongoing relationship with an adult.  My professional 
training taught me that distance and objectivity were valued over closeness and 
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partialness, which (according to clinical approaches) were signs of transference and 
countertransference.  The responsibility that I felt for Andrew differed from my 
responsibilities toward other group members.  I could no longer honestly describe it as a 
purely professional relation and was deeply troubled by the prospect of arbitrarily ending 
our relationship on his eighteenth birthday, when he would no longer qualify to reside at 
the facility.  No family members came forward, and aftercare plans remained uncertain as 
his discharge approached.  Neither my professional schooling nor the NASW Code of 
Ethics provided useful guidance for this peripheral space between professional and 
personal.  
 The periphery is a risky place to be.  The NASW maintains a peer consultation 
ethics call line that provides opportunities for social workers to consult with 
representatives from an ethics committee.  Freud and Krug (2002b) report, “The call line 
heard from a social worker who was fired from her job for trespassing clinical boundaries 
because she decided (with prior approval of child protection services) to become a foster 
mother to a child she had clinically evaluated” (p. 489).  How can professional practice 
that limits care be considered ethical?  Freire (1994) claims that our “ontological 
vocation” is “to be more fully human” (p. 74).  For me, uncertainty obscured a path 
forward as my “ontological vocation,” my humanity, seemed at odds with my 
professional identity.   
 When I considered getting licensed to become Andrew’s foster parent under 
independent living provisions that would allow him to remain in foster care until he 
turned 21 years old, I did not know what kind of reaction to expect from his social worker 
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at the Department of Social Services or from my employer and colleagues.  Even though 
permission and support came quickly, I had a vague sense of doing something wrong.  I 
questioned myself.  Was I foolish?  Was this too risky?  Was I too far afield?  In an 
editorial article Goldstein (1999) describes some of the tensions I experienced:  
 
[T]he treatment experience begins to look like a minefield, requiring the 
practitioner to tread carefully and risk little.  One might fear that genuine 
kindness and caring may incur dependency; physical contact—a hug—
may be interpreted as seduction; accepting a small gift might be seen as 
manipulation or control, as would revealing “too much” personal 
information.  … [T]his unusual relationship (that has no counterpart in the 
real world of human relations) … create[s] a set of presuppositions that 
draw lines and create boundaries that ought not be crossed.  It is no 
wonder that a practitioner would have “headaches,” feel like a sinner, or 
doubt his or her morality and confidence having ventured too far beyond 
the therapeutic boundaries. (pp. 436-437) 
 
 
I recall vague awareness of “working” outside of normal procedures when I began to take 
action toward becoming Andrew’s foster parent.  I tacitly felt the trip wires within this 
minefield, and I needed to justify myself for walking through it.  Was it suspect for a 
single man to pursue the role of foster parent to an older adolescent with whom he has 
professional obligations?  Was I being unprofessional? 
Breaches of professional code are often reported to the public and depicted as 
deviance or perceived as moral failing.  When breaches of professionalism happen we 
rarely question the codes of professionalism, because the codes provide a natural order.  
As “normative” approaches to ethics, professional codes prescribe “what people should 
do in terms of ethical principles, rules and specific actions” (Banks, 2008, p. 1242).  Once 
codified and established, normative ethics are treated as natural rather than “produced.”  
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Understanding ethics code as produced “… allows new insights into its vulnerabilities 
and greater possibilities for conscious reshaping of the terrain” (Rossiter, Prilleltensky, & 
Walsh-Bowers, 2000, p. 87).  Part of queer theory’s project involves troubling the 
assemblage of natural order.  I use queer theory as strategy for breaking open the codes 
and “natural order” of professionalism.  I do this in order to clear terrain and re-imagine 
horizons for professional relationship in a time of social fragmentation and “moral 
minimalism” (Strivers, 2004, p. 2).  
Nikki Sullivan (2003) suggests employing “queer” as a verb meaning “… to spoil, 
put out of order” or “denaturalise” (p. 50).  Queer theory initially emerged as a challenge 
to gender construction and heteronormativity.  Applied to examinations of other 
subjectivities and identities, queering helps dislodge generalizing and naturalizing 
constructions.  Sullivan explains,  
 
Deconstructing the presumed opposition between homosexuality and 
heterosexuality, the ‘unnatural’ and the ‘natural’ is important, then, 
because it enables us to acknowledge the constructedness of meaning and 
identity and thus to begin to imagine alternative ways of thinking and of 
living. (p. 51) 
 
 
Possibilities that might emerge from deconstructing the normative and the “natural” 
create space for moral responsibility, acts of resistance and love. 
 An example of how the “normal” organization of professional work can be 
disassembled in practice will help to illustrate how I use queer theory to support my 
study.  Distinctions between my personal life and my professional life slipped well before 
Andrew moved into my house.  While I was officially “off the clock” at 5 pm, I 
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frequently stayed on campus late to talk and spend time with him.  In general, the campus 
atmosphere relaxed a little after 5 pm, when most of the administrative and professional 
staff went home.  Talking after hours was more casual and invited mutual exchange; 
conversations went beyond the directives of treatment goals.  As day turned to night in 
the rural, forested setting, the obligations of school and treatment progress gave way to 
sitting around campfires in the presence of each other’s voices and stories.  In other 
words, stretching the business day and staying beyond 5 pm was a response to my 
relationship with Andrew that “broke open” the natural order of professional life and led 
to a different kind of interaction.  I was on professional ground (the physical location of 
my employment) but on my personal time.  By blurring the distinctions between personal 
and professional, I was able to consider the possibility of a different relationship with 
Andrew, of becoming his foster father—a possibility that Andrew and I may not have 
considered from the bounded space of my desk during office hours.   
Within professional terrain, my relationship with Andrew was on the periphery.  I 
was concerned about transgressing boundaries.  Our connection did not fall cleanly into 
the delimited space of professional.  We were on the periphery—the outer limits of what 
was allowed.   The only way out was to risk love, to risk harm, to risk relation. 
Importance of the Study 
The importance of this interdisciplinary study is personal, academic and 
pragmatic.  On a personal level I want to better understand my experiences of 
professional life and professional relations from social work and education.  I want to 
think more deeply about my observation that the part of professional relation that seems 
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to matter most is often on the periphery of the permissible.  I want to explore my claim 
that the potential for ethical engagement and love lies in a “shadow-area” (Doel et al., 
2010) of professional life.  Academically, my study attempts to pull together various 
currents of scholarship that rarely speak with each other.  I bring professional literature 
from social work together with education under “social professions”; I connect a 
significant body of scholarship in the sociology of professions to contemporary moral 
philosophy including postmodern ethics; I also share recent developments in empirical 
ethics (connecting moral philosophy with empirical research) and demonstrate these 
efforts with qualitative research in Chapter Five. 
The technical rules, ethical codes and procedures of the social professions fail to 
reflect the calling—the heart and soul—of the practitioners who enter and continue in 
these professions.  We need to better understand the experiences of professionals under 
various regimes and discourses when the professional “tools” are no longer useful to the 
situation at hand, when the professional agent is in the presence of the ethical demands of 
the Other and the codes and principles are no longer helpful.  This is particularly 
important at a time when social professions are increasingly managed under market-
logics and neoliberal discourse.  By highlighting these aspects of subjective experience, 
my study contributes to professional ethics pragmatically.  It potentially pushes the 
ethical discourse of social professions toward increased relevancy and meaning in 
everyday practice. 
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Outline of the Study 
To consider professional ethics as constricting ethical possibility and pushing 
ethical relation to the periphery, I combine sociological and philosophical analysis with 
qualitative research.  I also share my personal narrative and additional experiential 
narrative material as related to various themes and ideas throughout my dissertation.  In 
Chapter Two—Bound by Code:  Sociological and Philosophical Perspectives of 
Professions—I provide an historical and theoretical account of professionalism and 
normative ethics.  Sociological analysis frames professionalism (organization, 
knowledge-base, discourse and practice) and the codification of ethics broadly through 
macro and micro operations.  I draw heavily from Magali Sarfatti Larson’s (1977) 
sociological analysis, The Rise of Professionalism.  Sociological analysis also ties the 
“professional project” (Larson, 1977) to liberal capitalism.  Through structuralist, 
functionalist and interactionist theoretical perspectives, I describe professionalism as a 
product of modernity.  I focus on codes of ethics and relationship boundaries as part of an 
assemblage that has helped to produce professional ideology and identity.  I engage moral 
philosophy (e.g. deontological and teleological ethics) and introduce contemporary 
critiques of professional ethics and codes of ethics.  
In Chapter Three—Unsettling Professionalism:  Challenging Normative Code 
And Imagining Ethical Possibilities—I utilize postmodern critique to pursue my research 
questions and challenge some of the foundational assumptions of professional knowledge 
and ethics.  I introduce “feminist care ethics” as critique and alternative to traditional 
professional norms and ethics codes.  Then, I explore how care may be leveraged and 
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distorted in capitalistic, technological society and how “caring” has been reconfigured 
into impersonal technology through professionalism.  In the latter part of this chapter, I 
share alternative ways of defining and thinking about ethics against the professional 
conceptualizations described in Chapter Two.  I briefly discuss cognitive ethics and legal 
protections followed by a more detailed examination of postmodern ethics.  I discuss 
Bauman, Levinas and Foucault as major figures contributing to postmodern ethical 
possibilities.  
 In Chapter Four—From Top Down to Bottom Up:  Finding Ethics in Everyday 
Professional Life—I make a case for a phenomenological understanding of ethics that 
highlights “being-in-the-world” and empirical study of ethics in professional practice.  
While examination of sociology and philosophy behind “professional ethics” offers 
theoretical depth, normative ethics do not necessarily describe lived experience in social 
professions.  This chapter includes interdisciplinary scholarship from fields that include 
philosophy, psychiatry and ethnography.  To explore how the professional subject 
experiences and responds to the ethical structures of professionalism, I ground the 
“ethical” within the artifacts of everyday professional life.  After explaining a framework 
of empirical ethics, including “pragmatic hermeneutics,” I use experiential narrative 
material and film (i.e. the 2009 film A Single Man) to combine “factual” or descriptive 
accounts of the lived world with normative questions of judgment and value.  This work 
of grounding and bridging leads me directly into the next chapter, which adds qualitative 
research on ethical responsibility and professional boundaries with social workers and 
teachers. 
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   In Chapter Five—Crossing Lines, Opening Ethical Space:  Professionals 
Becoming Parents—I share the qualitative component of my dissertation research.  I 
conducted seven semi-structured interviews of professional teachers and social workers 
who became foster or adoptive parents to youth they met in professional contexts.  All of 
these professionals breached ethical and procedural norms of their professional 
relationships by pursuing more personal, parenting relationships with their clients or 
students.  Doel et al. (2010) report on “positive boundary crossings” in social work and 
describe a need for more research into “good and effective practice” that is taking place 
in the “shadow-areas” of policy and discourse (p. 1884).  I share my analysis results by 
identifying three themes from the participants’ descriptive accounts of moving from a 
professional role to a parental role with their clients and students.  I describe how 
participants experienced and negotiated rules and highlight the importance of action and 
responsibility beyond the parameters of one’s professional role.  Additionally, I 
acknowledge the critical role of discourse in defining what is thinkable or actionable 
among professionals.  I also discuss the limitations of my qualitative research as related 
to my overall dissertation.  
In my final chapter—Conclusion:  Imagining Social Professions that Make it 
Easier to Love—I summarize my findings and approach the task of decentering 
professional “ethics” by showing how risk-aversion lowers the stakes of professional 
relationship by restricting involvement.  Ethical possibility is much broader, and much 
less certain, than the rational center of normative professional ethics.  My queer reading 
of ethics code discloses how professional ethics are treated as stable knowledge.  I argue 
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that professionalism privileges ways of being ethical rather than active social processes 
and ways of doing ethics.  I identify two ethical possibilities—freedom and 
commitment—that are diminished by strict adherence to professional articulations of 
ethics.  I make recommendations for further research into the discursive practices of 
professional ethics and additional study of “positive boundary-crossings.”  Finally, I 
recommend more space for “elastic boundaries” and mutuality in the relationships 
between practitioners and their clients or students.
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CHAPTER II 
 
BOUND BY CODE:  SOCIOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES  
 
OF PROFESSIONS 
 
 
The professional bureaucrat is chained to his activity by his entire material 
and ideal existence.  . . . [H]e is only a single cog in an ever-moving 
mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially fixed route of march.  
—Max Weber, Bureaucracy 
 
 Being a professional and taking on a professional identity involve the enactment 
of professionalism.  To identify as a professional, one must engage the social 
expectations of professionalism through speech, appearance, conduct, ideas and ethos.  
When socialized into a profession, an individual typically adopts a professional identity.  
Occupying a profession, in this sense, plays a part in how one interacts with others and 
how identity is organized.  In this dissertation study, I ask how norms and codes of 
professional conduct shape and restrict ethical responsibility in everyday work practice.  
In order to address the question fully in this chapter, I summarize relevant sociological 
theory and history of professions.  My discussion of the sociology of professions is 
limited within the scope of this dissertation, which centers on the professional’s 
experience of “ethics.”  In this chapter I share a brief overview of major sociological 
perspectives of professions to provide an historical, macro-orientation to the power and 
dominance of professions.  I follow my discussion of structural, functional and 
interactionist perspectives of professions by describing professional ideology
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and exploring how professionals interact and make meaning within daily practice.  Then, 
I describe professional codes of ethics with particular attention to codes in the social and 
medical professions.  I discuss professional codes of ethics as normative and point toward 
Kantian deontology and modern legal code as examples of normative ethics.  Lastly, I 
locate professional codes of ethics within an expansive order of legal obligations and 
protections and introduce the concern that dislocating ethics from individual subjects may 
lead to individual ambivalence and withdrawal from social life. 
Sociological Perspectives on Professionalism 
 First, I want to provide an overview of how professions began and rose into 
established features of the economic order in the United States.  My inquiry into ethical 
code is broadly informed through the production and authority of professions.  How have 
professions gained social power and what is the basis of their moral authority?  In this 
chapter I rely heavily on Magali Sarfatti Larson’s (1977) analysis on the “rise of 
professionalism” and the “professional project.”  In the subfield of sociology of 
professions, Larson’s work influenced most of the scholarship coming out of the latter 
part of the twentieth century (MacDonald, 1995, p. 2).  Extending Eliot Freidson’s 
analyses of the medical professions, Larson’s conceptualizations have proven valuable to 
many researchers (MacDonald, 1995).   
 The rise of professionalism accounts for establishing markets and achieving 
market control.  It tells a story of organizing knowledge and expertise through schooling, 
while addressing and developing public need, in order to establish and control new 
markets.  Although each profession has a separate history, historical sociologists 
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highlight similar developmental structures that are shared among emergent professions in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Among industrial and post-industrial 
countries, my investigation focuses on professionalism in the United States, which has 
developed under different political structures compared to professionalism in Europe 
(Abbott, 1983).  When considered globally, my primary perspective is Eurocentric 
because I use social theory concerned with second modern2 and postmodern societies 
(Zinn, 2008, pp. 43-44). 
The Establishment of “Eufunctional” Professional Monopolies 
 A monopolistic perspective frames the rise of professionalism as part of the 
historic expansion of capitalism.  It describes the “professional project” (Larson, 1977)3 
in which the possessors of specialist knowledge build monopolies of their knowledge and 
establish a monopoly of services that derive from it (MacDonald, 1995, p. xii).  In her 
groundbreaking text on professionalism, Larson summarizes:  
 
Professionalization is thus an attempt to translate one order of scarce 
resources—special knowledge and skills—into another—social and 
economic rewards.  To maintain scarcity implies a tendency to monopoly:  
monopoly of expertise in the market, monopoly of status in a system of 
stratification. (1977, p. xvii) 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Zinn (2008) characterizes second modern society as having well developed nation states, 
welfare states, institutions of science and technology and “an institutionalized expectation of full 
employment” (p. 43). 
3 Macdonald’s (1995) review of Larson’s work and criticism directed toward it consider Larson’s 
“professional project” as an “ideal type.” Larson (2014) herself agrees that it is flawed for being 
too abstract and general.  Since I employ Larson’s work as background in a theoretical critique of 
ethics codes, I might concede that it is an “ideal type” and yet still useful for illuminating a fuller 
understanding of ethics codes. 
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The professional project advanced under a liberal phase of capitalism (Larson, 1977, p. 
38), which involved a period of open markets and widespread commodification.  
Preceded by medicine, emergent professions, like accounting, engineering, social work 
and teaching, followed.  The rise of professionalism demonstrates the rapid, “self-
regarding” expansion of capitalism through aggressive pursuits of new markets and the 
“commodification of everything” (Wallerstein, 1983, pp. 15-16).  In order to convert non-
monetized services (e.g. a daughter taking care of her elderly mother) into commodities 
(e.g. paid-for-service geriatric social work), broader social structures had to shape the 
social need for given services (Larson, 1977, pp. 17-18).  Across diverse professions, 
market development and control was achieved by (1) a potential market for professional 
service and (2) a cognitive base to which a service could be tied (p. 18). 
 Broadly speaking, professions are organized around specialized knowledge and 
abilities that are not available to the general public (Freidson, 1970; Frowe, 2005; Larson, 
1977; MacDonald, 1995; Schmidt, 2000).  Professionals achieve status and market value 
by claiming specialized knowledge and abilities within restricted “jurisdictions.”  A 
concept developed by Andrew Abbott, “jurisdiction” pertains to the formal and informal 
social structures that link profession to work and mark the boundaries of contested turf 
(Macdonald, 1995, p. 15).  For example, distinctions between the work of a clinical 
psychologist and a clinical social worker may be finely developed within each 
jurisdiction.  In addition to a knowledge base, other criteria often cited for “professional” 
status include adherence to a service ideal and a set of professional norms (Larson, 1977; 
Wilensky, 1964).   
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Gaining access into a professional class generally requires schooling or 
credentialing (Freidson, 1986; Ohmann & Schrecker, 2014; Schmidt, 2000).  Post-
secondary schooling became the dominant credentialing system in which discreet bodies 
of knowledge and skills were organized and standardized.  As such, the university 
became the mechanism for growing professions. Larson (1977) identifies the linkage 
between knowledge production and its application in a market: 
 
The core of the professionalization project is the production of 
professional producers; this process tends to be centered in and allied with 
the modern university.  The university also tends to become the major 
center for the production of professionally relevant knowledge.  Both of 
these processes—the producing of practitioners or researchers and the 
producing of knowledge pure and applied—tend to become increasingly 
integrated and coherent within the modern university.  ... Thus, in its 
modern sense, profession appears to be a structure which links the 
production of knowledge to its application in a market of services:  the 
training institutions are the empirical arena in which the linkage is 
effected. (pp. 50-51) 
 
 
Linking production of knowledge to market application inextricably fuses professional 
education to capitalist expansion of markets.  Whereas some academic disciplines may 
attempt to maintain independence from market influences, professional disciplines 
resemble training centers for producing professionals and serving market interests.   
 If anything, market interests have grown stronger and more intense since Larson’s 
original description.  Writing about the formation of teachers in teacher colleges and 
universities, Larson (2014) more recently states, “In the hands of university-based 
educators, pedagogical science aimed at rationalizing not only the school, but also the 
classroom, under the rule of experts” (p. 14).  Freidson (1986) relates rationalization to 
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secular formal knowledge and describes it as consisting of “… the pervasive use of 
reason, sustained where possible by measurement, to gain the end of functional 
efficiency” (p. 3).  Freidson connects rationalization with economic purposes under the 
operations of capitalism.  Managerialism and “McDonaldization” within the social 
professions have also received considerable attention recently (Clarke, Gerwirtz & 
McLaughlin; 2000; Cochran-Smith, 2008; Dustin, 2007; Kincheloe, 2002).  Weinberg 
and Taylor (2014) explain managerialism: 
 
Managerialism is characterized by attempts to ensure tight control over 
spending to eliminate excesses and inefficiencies, standardized work 
practices, increased management powers through the imposition of 
structures to monitor performance, working to targets, extensive 
documentation, and the erosion of professional autonomy (Banks, 2011; 
Clarke, 2004; Dickens, 2008).  (p. 75)  
 
 
According to Kincheloe (2002) “McDonaldization” is a process of elevating “efficiency 
and standardization over questions of human need and quality” (pp. 13-14).  While I do 
not provide a full explanation or analysis of these trends, I raise them here to update 
Larson’s (1977) linkage between professions, rationalization and market demands. 
 Lee S. Schulman, former President of the Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching, refers to “signature pedagogies” of professional education.  
He explains, “… signature pedagogies prefigure the cultures of professional work and 
provide the early socialization into practices and values of a field” (2005, p. 59). 
Schulman suggests that emergent professionals are socialized and shaped to fit market 
needs and purposes.  However, the ethos of professionalism is not generally depicted in 
such instrumental ways.  Market services and capitalist demands are absent in 
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Schulman’s description of professional education.  Schulman (2005) writes, 
“Professional education is not education for understanding alone; it is preparation for 
accomplished and responsible practice in the service of others.  It is preparation for ‘good 
work’” (p. 53).  Schulman’s description suggests that “service” and “good work” justify 
the socialization one receives through schooling.  His description is consistent with a 
functionalist telling of the professional project.  The functionalist perspective centers 
“social benefit” as the “functional foundation of professional authority” (Abbott, 1983, p. 
865).  Thus, the functionalist understanding of professionalism leaves out market 
purposes while emphasizing service ideals and social benefits ideologically aligned with 
progressive liberalism. This may be further described as “eufunctional,” helping social 
stability rather than disrupting it. 
From a monopolistic perspective, Larson (1977) describes socialization as a 
necessary process under market principles.  “ … [T]he continuity of corporate control 
over the producers was necessary to ensure ideological uniformity around the ‘definition 
of product’ and vigilance against ever-resurgent counter-definitions” (p. 54).  
Socialization into a profession should not be taken lightly.  Discussing professional 
socialization into psychiatry, Light (1980) describes it as a deep, enduring and 
transformative, structural process—where the structure of the profession is built into the 
process (p. 311).  Differing from “role learning” or “situational adjustment,” socialization 
is internalized such that “the adopted behavior has become incorporated into the person’s 
value system and no longer depends upon external relationships…” (p. 319). Thus, 
socialization produces professionals who demonstrate uniformity and make good work 
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and good business standard.  Socialization is one of the primary goals of professional 
education.   
Professional schools provide uniformity and standardization of product (i.e. the 
professional) (Larson, 1977).  Professional education indoctrinates students into 
theoretical perspectives, ways of thinking, bodies of knowledge, ideologies, research, 
common values, codes and procedures.  Uniformity of thought, rather than divergence, 
shapes the curriculum, because the explicit goal of professional schooling is to produce 
solidarity and professional identity (Larson, 1977).  Such uniformity also sets up 
mechanisms for self-correction and regulation, building a professional community with 
power to control and sanction its members. 
McMillan and Hope (2008) identify two problems with professional socialization 
through schooling in the health professions.  Like social work and teacher licensure 
education, the pedagogy of medical school relies heavily upon seeing and practicing.  
Over-emphasis on seeing and practicing leads to the problem that “… students learn that 
this is what to do rather than critically evaluating or reassessing what should be done” (p. 
11).  As well, “how-to” learning “tends to hide the values and ethical issues that underpin 
practice” (p. 11).  As a result, students learn what to do in specific situations and behavior 
becomes a fact without questioning whether it is right.  In other words, schools may teach 
future professionals what to do and how to fit in while failing to teach critical thinking 
and reflection. 
As professions and universities settled into mutually beneficial arrangements, 
questions of credibility and legitimacy were addressed by aligning epistemology with 
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scientific knowledge and method.  Once a professional knowledge base could claim 
scientific legitimacy, then the professional school could answer and contain challenges to 
its authority.  Larson (1977) maintains, “The cognitive activity (providing the conditions 
for a professional monopoly) is science” (p. 32).  Wilensky (1964) adds, “In modern 
societies, where science enjoys extraordinary prestige, occupations which shine with its 
light are in a good position to achieve professional authority” (p. 138).4  Thus, 
professionalism embedded itself within the scientific paradigm as a progressive, self-
legitimizing association.   
The promises of science were deeply intertwined within the promises of progress. 
Because anything that could be attached to science could then be attached to progress 
(Weber, 1946b, p. 137), an ideology of progress directs and shapes multiple and shifting 
currents within the rise of professionalism.  As professions staked claims for knowledge 
bases, scientific study offered the “possibility of unlimited progress” (Larson, 1977, p. 
35).  The aims of the social professions could be achieved through technical and 
procedural refinement.  Technical approaches prevailed but not without critical 
questioning from social theorists. Max Weber (1946b) cautioned: 
 
Natural science gives us an answer to the question of what we must do if 
we wish to master life technically.  It leaves quite aside, or assumes for its 
purposes, whether we should and do wish to master life technically and 
whether it ultimately makes sense to do so.  (p. 144) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Wilensky acknowledges that ministerial or religious work may be exceptions to scientific 
authority.  He also notes that social work vacillated between the “ministry” of social reform and 
the science of clinical practice (1964, p. 140).  Legal professions, too, are noted as exceptions to 
the rule of scientific legitimacy (Halliday, 1987, pp. 29-30).  Halliday (1987) further cautions that 
theoretical focus on scientific knowledge without a “more comprehensive epistemological 
context” is inadequate for understanding relations between the professions and the state (p. 29). 
	  
	   30	  
I elaborate on issues surrounding ideologies of progress and professional identity later in 
this chapter when I introduce interactionist approaches to my study.  For now, it is only 
important to recognize the market-school-science-progress constellation within the 
monopolistic perspective of professionalism. 
The monopolistic perspective of the rise of professionalism describes professional 
activities as purposeful for developing market monopolies.  It places professional service 
alongside corporate entrepreneurship—both located within a capitalist framework.  
Idealistic features such as ethics and values are articulated predominantly as “obligations 
toward fellow professionals” rather than serving or protecting clients (Abbott, 1983, p. 
862).  Codes of ethics, as understood through a monopolistic perspective, are considered 
necessary phenomena for establishing strong professional entities.  Professor of Medical 
Ethics Edmund Pellegrino (1999) acknowledges critiques of ethics code that claim they 
are devices for protecting the interests of the dominant professional group members (p. 
112).  While he dismisses such critique for presuming the intentions of the codes’ 
authors, sociological analysis (drawing from Freidson and Larson) demonstrates how 
functions of professions, professionals, and professional ethics and norms extend well 
beyond intentionality.  Historical sociology shows that institutional apparatuses, such as 
codes of ethics, have self-interested, instrumental purposes as well as idealistic ones.  
Freidson (1999) makes distinctions between institutional ethics and practice ethics.  He 
acknowledges the self-serving aspects of institutional ethics but also claims that practice 
ethics are encouraged with the protections of institutional ethics (p. 129).  Additional 
features with instrumental purposes include professional associations, exclusive 
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knowledge bases, institutionalized training, licensing and mechanisms for colleague 
regulation or control (Larson, 1977, p. 208).   
Larson’s monopolistic perspective on ethics codes and the rise of professionalism 
followed a functionalist approach that thrived within American sociology in the mid-
twentieth century.  Functionalists studied the structure and traits of professions and 
understood them as stabilizing elements in society.  Professional entities held moral 
authority with “eufunctional social forces” and were located “between the individual and 
the state” (Macdonald, 1995, p. 2).  The term “eufunctional social forces” generalizes 
social elements that provide stability by passing down traditions, values, standards and 
ways of thinking.  Like family and church, professional institutions were understood 
sociologically as stabilizing forces.  From intermediary positions (between individuals 
and the state), professions could prevent social breakdown by promoting social service, 
the collective good and altruism (1995, p. 2).5   
Within a functionalist framework, professional authority derives from expert 
knowledge and skill that professionals have and the general public lacks.  Expertise is 
offered with the promise of social benefit or progress.  In turn, the general public and the 
individual client are asked to give up some degree of power and control and to trust the 
professional.  Clements (1992) connects this element of trust to early shaman traditions.  
As holy men and botanists, shamans could as easily “murder as cure” those who sought 
their help (pp. 368-69).  People who sought help from shamans had to at least hope that 
they would act in accordance to their best interests.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 MacDonald (1995) credits the notion of “eufunctional social forces” to Durkheim’s (1957) 
Professional Ethics and Civic Morals. 
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The essential element of trust was eventually codified from a tradition of 
Hippocratic ethics.  In the mid-nineteenth century the American Medical Association 
(AMA) developed the world’s first national code of professional ethics (Baker, Caplan, 
Emanuel & Latham, 1999).  The central moral commitment prioritized patient welfare 
over physician self-interest (Pellegrino, 1999, p. 110) and engendered trust between 
physician and patient.  This was the “fundamental ethical contribution of Hippocratic 
Ethics,” which is dated to 460 – 377 B.C. (Clements, 1992, p. 369).  The AMA’s Code of 
Ethics set a precedent and blueprint for all other professional codes of ethics to follow 
(Baker et al., 1999).   
In contemporary context, a client or student is asked to trust the knowledge base, 
the methods and the ethical integrity of professional social workers or teachers. The 
professional’s “discretionary power” (Frowe, 2005, p. 44) is recognized, and the “social 
danger of uncontrolled expertise” (Abbott, 1983, p. 864) requires mitigating measures.  
To the point, the “fiduciary character of professional services” (p. 863) demands 
measures to establish public trust and to protect clients.  Such measures are “… found in 
normative codes that are in turn embodied as formal professional ethics” (p. 864).  
Formal codes of ethics, then, speak to concerns of power and trust.  Abbott states, “Ethics 
codes are the most concrete cultural form in which professions acknowledge their societal 
obligations” (p. 856).   
 By accounting for societal obligations and promoting social stability, 
professional ethics codes ostensibly garner public trust and contribute to theorizing 
professions as “eufunctional monopolies.” As already described within the monopolistic 
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perspective, standardization of schooling and uniformity of product helped to achieve 
market control of a particular professional domain.  Under a functionalist perspective, 
uniformity of product (i.e. homogenization of professional behavior, methods, norms, 
etc.) serves the needs and values of society and promotes institutional trust.  Processes for 
developing institutional trust differ from processes of developing individual trust.  As 
quoted in Frowe (2005), Harre believes: 
 
… that trust can exist between an individual and an institution (Harre, 
1999).  Although I may not have personal knowledge of the staff of an 
institution, I know that the behavior of the staff is subject to certain rules 
and customs, obligations and duties that give me reason to believe that 
they will, all things being equal, act in the ways I expect.  (p. 37) 
 
 
This point demonstrates that uniformity within professionalism can be understood 
through both monopolistic and functionalist perspectives.  Both perspectives illuminate 
important aspects of the purposes of codes of ethics during the structural and 
organizational development of various professions.  They also describe ethics as having 
dual purposes—building norms of professional conduct and securing public trust.   
Professional Bureaucracy and Normative Isomorphism 
In the process of becoming monopolies, professions become organized into 
bureaucracies.  As summarized in McDonald (1995), C. Wright Mills saw professions in 
modern society as “… being sucked into administrative machines, where knowledge is 
standardized and routinized into the administrative apparatus and professionals become 
managers (1956:  112)” (p. 3).  Some advantages of bureaucratic organization include:  
precision, speed, continuity, unambiguity, calculable rules and “objective” expertise 
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(Weber, 1946a, pp. 215-216).  Weber describes bureaucracy as “the means of carrying 
‘community action’ over into rationally ordered ‘societal action’” (p. 228).  In this sense, 
bureaucracies manifest a process of rationalization.  Returning to a previous example, 
professional elder care or geriatric social work moved from an informal community 
action to a social service once it was organized into a rational system and anchored by 
specific knowledge bases, skills, credentials, regulatory associations, legal mechanisms 
and codes.  Writing in the early part of the twentieth century, Weber (1946a) identified 
capitalist market economics as the major force pushing bureaucratization.  DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) added to Weber’s work by claiming that in the later part of the twentieth 
century, bureaucratization was driven less by competition and the need for efficiency but, 
rather, by the “structuration of organizational fields” (p. 147).  They explain that the need 
for professional legitimacy and status eventually overtook the need for innovation and 
performance.  Thus, in the aggregate, professions became homogenous in “structure, 
culture and output” regardless of efficiency and performance (p. 147).  They call this 
cookie-cutter effect “isomorphism,” which is a homogenizing and constraining process 
“… that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of 
environmental conditions” (p. 149).  Mechanisms of institutional isomorphism can be 
coercive, mimetic and normative.  Coercive isomorphism reflects political influences; 
mimetic isomorphism results from “standard responses to uncertainty,” and normative 
isomorphism is associated with processes of professionalization (p. 150).   
I include bureaucratic or institutional isomorphism in my study of the 
constraining effects of professional ethics code because it offers further explanation for 
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the homogenization of professionalism and for its power to enforce norms.  It also 
provides an opening for linking theories of structure and function to theories of action 
and interaction.  In a footnote DiMaggio and Powell (1983) indicate that goal-oriented 
behavior of individual actors (professionals or managers) “… reflects deeply embedded 
predispositions, scripts, schema or classifications.”  They continue to state, “The theory 
of isomorphism addresses not the psychological states of actors but the structural 
determinants of the range of choices that actors perceive as rational or prudent” (p. 149).  
As a common structure for ordering professional conduct, a code of ethics also 
determines what counts as “ethics” for those working in the social professions.  A code 
delineates normative conduct, determines acceptable action and, in turn, eliminates 
possible alternatives.  While bureaucratic isomorphism is about structure, I also want to 
extend discussion to issues of action, socialization, interaction, communication and 
meaning making.  In the following section on interactionist perspectives of professions, I 
will elaborate on some of those themes. 
 Before leaving my discussion of bureaucracy and isomorphism, I want to 
contextualize these concepts to those working in the social professions.  Within 
bureaucratic monopoly, the mechanisms of professional organization and bureaucracy 
tend to insulate themselves and cover dissent.  Margolin (1997) observes that social 
workers often disregard issues of  “discourse, complexity and difference” (p. 179).  
Caught up within the “euphoria of being a social worker and doing good,” social workers 
avoid deep self-criticism “for fear of destroying an illusion of unanimity” (p. 180).  
Professional hegemony, delivered in part through the NASW Code of Ethics, becomes a 
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way of suppressing dissent.  The NASW requires new members to review and “affirm” 
the ethics code in order to join the organization through their online website.  Singularly, 
micropractices that encourage adherence to the establishment may be dismissed easily, 
but in the aggregate they work their way into self-understanding and identity.  Moreover, 
they suppress variation and difference.  For these reasons, critical assessment and 
questions of existing norms often develop outside of the professional establishment. 
  As well, the social professions are populated with persons who are motivated to 
care and help others.  Working under the conditions of bureaucracy allows for only 
limited and measured expressions of care.  Whereas Parsons (1968) may have seen 
professions as “independent artisans” organized in “associational patterns” under service 
ideology (p. 541), others regarded them as subsumed within bureaucracy (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Larson, 1977).6  Weber (1946a) critiqued bureaucracy as an anti-
democratic structure that facilitates social stratification and flattens social differences 
through regular execution of authority (p. 224).  According to Gerth and Mills (1946), 
“Weber identifies bureaucracy with rationality, and the process of rationalization with 
mechanism, depersonalization, and oppressive routine.  Rationality in this context is seen 
as adverse to personal freedom” (p. 50).  Variation and innovation are not widely 
supported.   
 The calcification of rational procedure (including the conduct of professionals) 
within bureaucracy limits possibilities for needed change and adaptation.  In describing 
the “flexible mind,” Zerubavel (1991) links transgression and creativity.  He explains, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See Larson, 1977, “Profession and Bureaucracy” (pp. 178-207), for a detailed examination of 
professions as “technobureaucracies.” 
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“By practically ‘freezing’ reality, rigidity certainly inhibits change.  Innovation is 
inherently antithetical to boundaries. … Transgressing boundaries is a hallmark of 
creativity …” (p. 117).  If potential for improvement partially lies within the possibilities 
of people working together creatively, then rigid boundaries can be understood as 
obstacles to human improvement.  While also acknowledging the need for boundaries 
and order to “protect” us from “the endless aguish generated by open-endedness,” 
Zerubavel (1991) simultaneously makes a case for transgression.  He says: 
 
We normally regard those who transgress boundaries as deviants, yet they 
might also be seen as innovators who could show us how to break away 
from the ossified mental cages in which we often lock ourselves and 
realize our creative potential. (p. 117) 
 
 
 These critical points begin to trouble the notion of professionals as autonomous, 
self-governing experts and frame professional identity as restricted and bounded in 
rational bureaucracy.  As I further explore the experience of ethical action for those in the 
social professions, I connect the saliency of these restrictive structures to daily work 
practices including actions of risk, transgression and care within professional 
relationships.  
Interactionist Approaches to Professions 
By the second half of the twentieth century, functionalist and structuralist 
perspectives of professions were challenged by interactionist approaches (Macdonald, 
1995).  Interactionist perspectives took account of human action and interaction within 
the tensions between structure and agency.  Hence, interactionist theory draws attention 
to everyday work practices, routines, meanings and interpretations of professionals within 
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their social fields.  The work of scholars like Everett Hughes gave rise to studies that 
focused on “… the actions and interactions of individuals and groups, how they 
constituted their social worlds as participants and how they constructed their careers” 
(Macdonald, 1995, p. 4).  Shaffir and Pawluch (2003) cite Haas and Shaffir (1987): 
 
… interactionists see socialization as a process through which neophytes 
learn to mount a convincing performance and to “play” the professional 
role with convincing competence and confidence:  “Through ritual 
dramas, newcomers … and professions … adopt a symbolic-ideological 
and interactional cloak of competence” (p. 6).  (pp. 899-900) 
 
 
Within interactionist approaches to professions, inquiry shifted from asking about the 
structure of professions to asking questions like, “how do people become professional 
people?”  Affiliated with the “Chicago School” of sociology, the interactionist turn 
directed focus toward “what professions actually do in everyday life to negotiate and 
maintain their special position” (Larson, 1977, p. xii). 
To this point I have selected parts of Larson’s (1977) empirical analysis of the 
“rise of professionalism” to describe how professions establish monopolies; however, her 
scholarship goes well beyond description of professional monopoly.  Larson uses an 
interactionist approach to examine issues of power and describes professionals as striving 
to maintain position through status-driven actions.  As summarized in Macdonald (1995), 
Larson understands dimensions of market-control (monopoly) as “interlocked with the 
dimensions of social prestige” (p. 11).  With substantial empirical analysis of medicine, 
engineering and legal professions, she asserts that this monopoly/status constellation 
drives professional action (p. 12).      
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From an interactionist perspective, reality is socially constructed and “… a 
profession is to be understood in terms of the process by which its definition comes to be 
agreed upon” (Schudson, 1980, p. 218). In a review of The Rise of Professionalism:  A 
Sociological Analysis, Schudson (1980) summarizes Larson’s position: 
 
What professionals seek and gain is status.  But status, for Larson, is a 
mirage.  Typically in modern societies, professions fail to translate their 
status into power or autonomy.  Further, professional status becomes a 
barrier to a just and equal society – not because professions have usurped 
power from clients but because the ideology of professionalism seduces 
professionals, and others, into believing in bourgeois institutions. (p. 219) 
 
 
By focusing on the rise of professionalism rather than the rise of professions, Larson 
studies the organizing ideology that fixes or, at least, matters to the actions of 
professionals.  Drawing from Freidson’s (1970) study of the medical profession, Larson 
(1977) describes how cognitive and normative aspects of an occupation function to both 
(1) secure its social status and (2) define and construct social reality.  Operating within 
“ideologies of their own creation,” professionals circularly achieve “universal validity” 
through their own expertise (p. xiii).  Whereas many critics of professions examine power 
relations between professionals and clients, Larson concentrates on the subordination of 
professionals in relation to the larger institutional complex of corporate capitalism” 
(Schudson, 1980, p. 219).  Larson is “… interested only in passing in how specific 
professional ideologies control the public; her central concern is in how the general 
ideology of professionalism pacifies professionals themselves” (Schudson, 1980, p. 220).  
I am also interested broadly in how the ideology of professionalism has an anesthetic 
effect on professionals and, specifically, how it influences ethical expression and action.  
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 Larson (1977) notes the dominance of isolation, concern for status and 
individualism within the ideology of professional privilege (p. 236).  While socialization 
processes have homogenizing effects, professional ideology promotes belief in individual 
responsibility and self-regulation.  Alliances with other workers or clients are understood 
as symbolic losses of social status (1977, p. 236).  I quote Larson (1977) at length in the 
following passage because she succinctly ties ideological belief to individual action and 
internally generated notions of power and status: 
 
The ideological insistence on individual aspects, the neglect of the whole, 
merges with specialization to confine the professional in an ideological 
conception of his role:  the importance of narrow responsibilities is 
consciously and unconsciously emphasized, exaggerating the “dignity” of 
the functions.  The dominant ideology attributes to professionals and 
experts special prestige as well as “moral and intellectual superiority”:  
sharing in this ideology, professionals can easily mystify to themselves 
their actual power.  Moreover, they are locked into conformity with the 
role society offers them to play – locked in by their vocational choice, by 
the particular mystique of each profession, and by their whole sense of 
social identity.  (pp. 236-237) 
 
 
According to ideology, individual professionals who simply follow procedures are 
doing good work and, in the social professions, are contributing to the social 
good.  If evidence of such good work manifests as professional status and reward 
(i.e. those who follow the rules are promoted to “higher” positions), there may not 
be much emphasis on examining the social good itself for evidence.  Within this 
ideology, following the procedural rules is given more value than having a 
positive effect on another person’s life. 
	  
	   41	  
 Larson’s attention to the power relations between individual professionals and the 
ideologies and structures within which they operate resonates with my inquiry into the 
boundedness of ethical action.  I am most concerned with the “existential oppression” 
(Dybicz, 2010, p. 37) that may occur when a member of a social profession feels forced 
to abandon authentic engagement with someone due to professional ideology, identity 
and normative boundaries. What sort of ethical crisis might rupture professional ideology 
and open consideration for the “possibility of freedom”?7  
The Service Ideal and Progress Ideology in Professional Identity 
 Professional identity is constructed, modified and reinforced in many ways. As 
already noted, professional schooling socializes students toward uniform understandings, 
knowledge, behaviors, methods and values.  Furthermore, professional associations, work 
environments, licensing requirements, ethics codes, literature and continuing education 
extend socializing processes throughout one’s career-life.  Subjectively, one’s career is a 
“pattern of organization of the self” (Larson, 1977, p. 229). Professional identity denotes 
a predetermined identity that a neophyte assumes rather than creates.  Light (1980) 
writes: 
 
In professional socialization, certain aspects of a person’s identity and life 
pattern are broken down (de-socialized) so that a new identity can be built 
up.  While the person actively participates in the process and to some 
degree negotiates the terms of his or her new identity, this activity serves 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The phrase “possibility of freedom” reflects a postmodern discourse that foregrounds possibility 
rather than causality.  It references Heidegger:  “Human freedom now no longer means freedom 
as a property of man [sic] but man as a possibility of freedom. Human freedom is the freedom that 
breaks through in man and takes him up unto itself, thus making man possible” (Dybicz, 2012, p. 
28). 
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more to coopt the person using the concepts, values, and language of those 
in power. (p. 327) 
 
 
When a pattern of professional identity is derived from external sources, how does an 
individual practitioner respond to the ambiguities and complexities that arise in practice?8  
Specifically, what happens when professional norms do not match one’s personal ethics?  
Do we organize by bifurcating our ethical selves into professional and citizen?  In an 
extensive literature review that considered codes of ethics and professional identity, Doel, 
et al. (2010) did not find resolution.  They found studies that attributed compliance with 
ethics code as part of the professional’s “commitment to act rightly (Pattison, 2001)” (p. 
1873).  Other studies indicated that codes cannot replace a professional’s “ethical 
sensitivity and individual decision-making (Yoder, 1998)” (p. 1873).  While these 
questions and tensions resonate with the larger purpose of my study, here I want to 
explore ideology and subsequent tensions as part of the socialization of professional 
identity.  Within the milieu of the social professions, like social work and education, 
idealistic regard for “good work” obfuscates processes of knowledge/power, social 
control and regulation in professional monopoly and bureaucracy. 
 Sociologists who study modern professions theorize the notion of “vocational 
calling.”  Weber (1950) explored the Protestant origins of “callings,” which tied every-
day worldly activity to religious significance (p. 80).  Within various professions 
“vocational calling” is coupled with a “service ideal,” which places “intrinsic value” on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In his meta-analysis of professional ethics, Abbott (1983) notes that belief and compliance with 
formal ethical codes corresponds with higher status in a given profession (p. 858).  High status 
intragroup members are more compliant and regard lower status members, who are more likely to 
be frontline social workers and teachers, as “ethically questionable” (p. 862). 
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one’s work (Larson, 1977, p. 62).  The service ideal is a prominent and basic feature of 
many professions (Larson, 1977; Wilensky, 1964).  It is what separates professionals 
from entrepreneurs—service and social benefit, such as health and wellness, are the 
substance of the work rather than profit alone.  “The service ideal is the pivot around 
which the moral claim to professional status revolves” (Wilensky, 1964, p. 140).  Shortly, 
I will return to the service ideal to discuss its relation to ethics codes.   
A “calling” involves self-awareness of one’s talents or preferences and 
emphasizes creative self-expression and self-realization (Larson, 1977).  A vocational 
calling ties one’s individual self-realization to the purposes of one’s socially located 
work.  Larson (1977) describes: 
 
…[T]he notion of calling is the ethical base of the modern division of 
labor.  Durkheim also had seen its importance:  in an individualistic and 
atomized society, the notion of calling appeared as the necessary link 
between the “cult of individual” and the collective needs, characterized by 
increasing economic interdependence. (p. 61) 
 
 
From a sociological perspective, vocational calling bridges the gap between self-interest 
and social need.  Division of labor has an “ethical base” when professionals are “called” 
to serve others (i.e. the service ideal) in the interest of a social good.   
Noted educator and author Parker Palmer notes that the word vocation is rooted in 
the Latin for “voice.”  In Let Your Life Speak (2000) Palmer writes, “… we do not find 
our callings by conforming ourselves to some abstract moral code.  We find our callings 
by claiming authentic selfhood, by being who we are …” (p. 15).  Palmer’s advice to 
have us listen to an inner voice for guidance may exceed the focus of sociology.  
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However, a similar sentiment is found within sociological descriptions of service ideal 
and vocational calling.  Larson (1977) remarks, “Whatever else the service orientation is 
in a secularized society, its ethical and motivational base must include a sense of work as 
self-realization and a sense of duty to one’s calling deeper than just compliance with a set 
of standards” (p. 62).  A “deeper” sense of duty to one’s calling suggests that 
socialization processes and compliance with norms and codes must fit with one’s inner 
vocational motivations.  According to Weber, poor fit may lead toward “disenchantment” 
– “the loss of meaning and spiritual inspiration that accompanies the rationalization 
process” (Lyng, 2008, p. 213).  On one hand, professionalism exerts significant power 
and control to establish uniformity and standards.  On the other hand, professionalism’s 
“ethical base” depends upon something deeper, perhaps more personal and abstract.  
Thus, the potential for tension exists between professional compliance to professional 
norms and individual “duty” to one’s calling.  I return and explore this tension throughout 
my study by tracing and questioning tensions between strict adherence to ethics codes 
and an embodied sense of moral responsibility. 
An ideology of progress influences identity among those in the social professions.  
The service ideal and scientific/religious/humanist overtones of progress are prevalent 
qualities of professional identity. In direct response to the domination (and exploitation) 
of liberal capitalism, early professionals often understood their work as providing a 
“civilizing function” to address the “… consequences of unplanned, ‘savage,’ capitalist 
industrialization” (Larson, 1977, p. 58).  Early professionals saw their work as valuable 
in buffering against the harsh realities of industrialization and moving toward greater 
	  
	   45	  
public civility. In other words, professional identity was characterized by an ideology of 
progress; professionals were concerned about the unchecked advancement of class 
capitalism.  An ideology of progress among social professionals continues to motivate 
and validate the meaning of their work today.   
Briefly, I want to turn to the history of professionalization in social work for 
illustration.  The fertile ground from which social work emerged included social reform 
and community improvement initiatives.  For example, Jane Addam’s Hull House and 
other settlement houses focused on maximizing civic engagement and support in poor 
and immigrant communities (Specht & Courtney, 1994).  Turning community 
engagement into professional practice didn’t occur without contestation.  Some have 
argued that professional status interfered with helping relationships.  Macdonald (1995) 
asserts, “. . . genuine help cannot be based on a superior, patronizing position” (p. 136).  
Courtney and Specht (1994) critique social work for aligning itself within a psycho-
scientific paradigm of applied knowledge and abandoning a communitarian ethic of care.  
Freud and Krug (2002a) add, “Our search for respectable professionalism through 
licensure, our language of scientific knowledge, and claim to technical expertise has 
gradually and inadvertently led us away from our original humanistic strivings” (p. 476).  
While developing professional status may have provided stability, consistency and claim 
to a psychotherapeutic/scientific knowledge-base, the very “spirit” or “ethic” of social 
work may have been corrupted, or led-astray, under the conditions of professionalization. 
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Summary of Sociological Perspectives on Professionalism 
 Sociological descriptions of professionalism situate it within a modern, 
scientific paradigm and explain how capitalist markets shape knowledge and 
organize schooling to establish professional fields and workers.  Sociological 
study of professions includes monopolist and functionalist theories of professional 
structures and addresses how ethics codes, as a part of professional structures, are 
understood within differing theoretical approaches.  In the United States the 
competitive proliferation of professional fields and workers helped to propel 
global capitalism.  According to Wallerstein (1998) and world systems theory, the 
professional project established services, markets and market control where 
previously there was none.  Professionalism, then, fueled the commodification of 
everything, leaving “. . . no social transaction . . . intrinsically exempt from 
possible inclusion” (p. 16).   
Functional and structural theories help us to understand the social and economic 
processes allowing for the rise of professionalism.  Interactionist theory reveals tensions 
within professional ideology, identity and human agency.  These include:  (1) tensions 
between routine compliance with professional norms and the dutiful pull of one’s 
individual, vocational calling; (2) tensions between a professional ideology of status and 
authority that operates within institutions to only deliver “powerless discretion” (Larson, 
1977, p. 237); (3) tensions between ethics that are about social stability and ethics that are 
about authenticity, freedoms and possibilities.  Passive obedience to codes and standards 
may have instrumental value for establishing and regulating uniform professional 
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product.  However, the actual people who are subject to such professional forces 
inevitably experience contradictions, ambiguities and moral tensions during the course of 
performing professional duties.  
Modern discourse regarding development of professional expertise and service 
depicts the professional project as a natural convergence of purpose and practice within 
given fields of expertise. This progress narrative tells a story of refined knowledge, 
research, theory, skills and infrastructure bringing the profession and the professional 
actor incrementally closer to efficiency of purpose in partnership with the public.  Such 
an account of professional progress downplays the monopolistic market functions of 
professional organization and structures and fails to question the regulatory powers that 
operate upon the public and the professionals. Sociological understanding of the rise of 
professionalism provides a general analysis and draws attention to self-serving aspects of 
ethics code in the establishment of professional monopolies. Interactionist approaches 
that study professional ideology in contexts of identity, practice and action reveal 
ruptures and discontinuities9 in the grand, progress narrative.  
Professional Codes of Ethics 
 Next, I shift focus to the normative features that make up professional ethics.  
Professions archive normative ideals, principles, standards, rules and procedures into 
codes of ethics (Rich, 1984; Banks, 2003).  Banks (2003) defines a code of ethics as a 
“… document produced by a professional association, occupational regulatory body or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Such discontinuity is further explored in Chapter 5 where I share empirical analysis of 
professional social workers and teachers who have transgressed professional relationship 
boundaries. 
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other professional body with the stated aim of guiding the practitioners who are members, 
protecting service users and safeguarding the reputation of the profession” (p. 133).  
Abbott (1983) acknowledges that ethics codes are “… the most concrete cultural form in 
which professions acknowledge their societal obligations” (p. 856).  According to 
Macdonald (1995), a code of ethics is “the one thing thought to characterize a profession” 
besides a knowledge base (p. 167).  Halliday (1987) argues that facts and knowledge 
must work in tandem with cultural values.  Accounting for the ground upon which 
political mobilization between nation states and professions occurs, Halliday says that, 
among other things, it depends upon the profession’s “… ability to create expert authority 
and convert it into moral authority” (p. 54).  In the case of many social professions, social 
science or technical knowledge/authority must incorporate normative moral authority. 
For an historical example of professionalization, early twentieth century social 
workers combined charity (originating in religious authority) and science in pursuit of 
precise interventions to be delivered to indigent populations (Lubove, 1965).  As services 
moved from community action to rationally systematized societal action, social and 
ethical relations within communities changed.  The charitable, religiously-inspired 
“friendly visits” of social work became the professional, quasi-scientific practices of 
“social diagnosis,” and professional / public interactions became formalized (Lubove, 
1965).  Abbott (1995) describes the friendly visiting by the wealthy to the homes of the 
poor as unlike systematic charity but more of “… an outgrowth of earlier gentry-type 
obligations” (p. 864). The various tasks of social work existed as “independent, 
unconnected boundaries long before it made any sense to speak of social work as a social 
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entity” (1995, p. 866).  One can see how “friendly visits” developed the moral foreground 
for “social diagnosis.”  Eventually, the normative, moral predecessors become formalized 
into standard professional practice.  The first school of social work opened in 1898, and 
social work was recognized as a professional field by the 1920’s (Abbott, 1995, p. 865).  
 Baptista (2012) addresses the “break” between “compassionate assistance” and 
professional work by saying that the “values of selfless dedication to others, generosity 
… and mercy are part of the social memory of these professions” and represent “a 
precious heritage…” (p. 42).  Warning against excessive technicality and 
“proletarianization of socio-pedagogical mission,” Baptista believes that such traditions 
should become “objects of critical appropriation” (p. 42).  
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries formal ethics codes have been 
foundational for achieving professional status.  Writing in the mid-1920’s, Watkins 
(1925/1926) defined a profession as “a means of making a living based directly upon 
science, carried on by a special art, and dignified by an ethical code” (p. 330).  Almost 
forty years later Wilensky (1964) studied the social histories of eighteen occupations and 
included the development of formal ethics codes as a “general pattern of events” for 
establishing professional status (pp. 142-45).  I emphasize this history to recognize 
formal ethics codes as fundamental mechanisms or tools for establishing “legitimate” 
professions.  This does not negate stated ethical purposes of ethics codes; however, it 
does recognize the less-recognized instrumental purposes.  
 In most accounts, the necessity of an ethics code is tied to development and 
maintenance of public trust.  Professional organizations work to develop public trust in 
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relationships where professionals wield substantial power.  In his study of medical 
professions, Freidson (1970) understands “ethicality” as “prerequisite for being trusted to 
control the terms of work without taking advantage of such control” (p. 360).  Balancing 
such delicate and volatile arrangements can be addressed by institutionalizing the social 
and ethical norms that constitute professional behavior.  A normative relation to society 
that is reflected in the discourse and substance of professional ethics and codes ostensibly 
garners more trusting relations.  Professional ethics are normative because they both 
reflect norms of modern society and produce norms of professional conduct. 
To generate public trust in a profession and professional service, the intellect or 
“special” knowledge base and the morality of the professional must be accepted by the 
common public.  Watkins (1925/1926) provides a basic description in simple terms: 
 
As a layman he seeks professional services in order to be relieved from 
the mental responsibility for certain problems which he either cannot 
solve or does not trust himself to be able to solve.  To compass his 
difficulties he regards some intellectual help as desirable, if not 
indispensable.  The professional mind, however, is so far superior to his 
own intellectual equipment for grappling with this particular difficulty 
(and this is necessarily so if the professional services are to be objectively 
competent), and the professional art so much more perfected than his own 
that the client finds himself quite ignorant of the plan and purpose of 
what is being done in his behalf.  Under these circumstances he clearly 
will not be much better off for having purchased these services if he 
cannot count upon a certain moral responsibility being assumed by the 
professional practitioner in addition to his intellectual responsibility. (pp. 
329-330) 
 
 
Watkins reflects a functional understanding of ethics codes and valorizes the “superior” 
status of the professional.   
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The ascribed value and discretionary powers of professionals must also be 
counterbalanced for protection of clients and promotion of trust.  As a counterpart to 
professional autonomy, “…professional ethics are seen as a controlling and balancing 
element” (Terhart, 1998, p. 434).  The weight for a counterbalance is supplied through 
normative codes that are inscribed as formal ethics codes.  
 Banks (2003) summarizes the function of ethics codes as follows: 
 
• Protection of clients through explicitly stating what can be 
expected of a professional practitioner. 
• Guidance to practitioners about how to act and how to make 
ethical decisions, either through encouraging ethical awareness and 
reflection or through explicit rules. 
• Enhancement of professional status, since a code of ethics is 
supposed to be one of the hallmarks of a profession. 
• Creating and maintaining professional identity through the explicit 
statement of the core purpose, key ethical principles, the kinds of 
qualities expected qualities of people who belong to this profession 
and the kinds of conduct required. 
• Professional regulation through requiring members of a 
professional group to adhere to the code and using it for 
disciplinary purposes in cases of misconduct.  (p. 135) 
 
 
Professionals and the public alike, as good practice, accept adherence to 
professional norms and ethics codes for the improvement of services, protection 
of clients and promotion of public trust.  The “insider” functions of ethics codes, 
regarding professional status, identity and regulation, are less known and less 
considered by the general public. 
Analysis of codes of ethics from different professions in twenty different 
countries led Banks (2003) to identify five common components of contemporary codes:  
(1) ethical principles; (2) ethical rules; (3) principles of professional practice; (4) rules of 
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professional practice; (5) statements about the character/attributes of the professional (p. 
134).  Banks generally found that codes of ethics consisted of both rules (do’s and don’ts) 
and principles (broad, underpinning statements).  She also found that content dealt with 
matters of an ethical nature (e.g. human dignity) and matters of how one should practice 
(e.g. maintain confidentiality) (p. 134).   
Normative Ethics 
 Normative ethics codes provide rules and principles of conduct and procedure for 
individual professionals.  Members of the American Medical Association, the first 
national professional medical organization in the world, wrote the original Code of 
Medical Ethics in 1847.  Members dedicated themselves to “establishing uniform 
standards for professional education, training and conduct” (American Medical 
Association, n.d.).  Dr. John Bell’s introduction to the 1847 American Medical 
Association (AMA) Code of Ethics identified the “moral center of the Hippocratic 
tradition” as focused on “the conduct of the physician-patient relationship” (Pellegrino, 
1999, p. 110).  Moreover, the conduct that the code upheld was modeled upon “eminent 
physicians” who “adorned the profession by their learning and their piety,” such as 
Hippocrates (Bell, 1999, p. 317).  The norms that were embodied in practice by these 
“eminent physicians” have been instilled and regulated through professional schooling, 
association, work setting, literature, discourse, popular media and general public attitude.   
 Defenders of traditional codes of ethics, like the AMA’s, support foundationalism 
as stable moral truth that is part of rational enterprise.  They defend moral 
foundationalism and its normative power.  Pellegrino (1999) claims, “…medical ethics 
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codes derive their moral force from what is self-evident about the nature of medicine as a 
special kind of human activity” (p. 116).  Pellegrino goes on to dismiss anti-foundational 
“threats” to the AMA Code.  Citing postmodern threats that favor social construction or 
pragmatic accommodation, Pellegrino rejects what he refers to as “the new moral 
plasticity,” because it “robs” any code of its normative powers (p. 119).   
 The chairperson of the most recent NASW Code of Ethics Revision Committee, 
Frederic Reamer (2012), describes two types of “normative” ethics:  (1) deontological 
and (2) teleological.  Etymologically, deontological ethics are reasoned duties (Baptista, 
2012).  They are obligatory and “… claim that certain actions are inherently right or 
wrong, or good or bad, without regard for their consequences” (Reamer, 2012, p. 26).  
The deontological perspective manifests in ethics code as rules of conduct.  For example 
the National Education Association (NEA) states, “The educator … shall not 
intentionally expose the student to embarrassment or disparagement” (National Education 
Association, 1975).   Banks (2003) concludes that codes of ethics might be best 
understood as deontological – a “set of professional duties” and rules of conduct (p. 137).  
She points out that what is called a “code of ethics” in English is referred to as a “code de 
déontologie” in French (2003, p. 134). Deontology is, perhaps, a more accurate descriptor 
of what ethics codes actually are.  Consider another example from the NEA Code of 
Ethics:  “In fulfillment of the obligation to the profession, the educator … shall not accept 
any gratuity, gift, or favor that might impair or appear to influence professional decisions 
or actions” (Rich, 1984, p. 148).  In its deontological form, this rule reflects principles of 
Western morality—“universality, rationality and constraint” (Baptista, 2012, p. 39).  The 
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formal language of the rule is written for clarity, simplicity and certainty.  It also 
demonstrates a telltale sign of normative ethics:  the use of instructive language such as 
“should” or “ought to.”   
 Teleological ethics include utilitarianism and emphasize that “… the rightness of 
any action is determined by the goodness of its consequences,” or “… an action is 
morally right if it promotes the maximum good” (Reamer, 2012, p. 26-27).  In practice, 
utilitarianism may show up in a negative form – minimizing harm rather than maximizing 
good (i.e. “do no harm”).  For example, should a child remain in an abusive household or 
be separated from his parents?  Neither option is ideal; so, which one minimizes harm the 
most?  How much and what kind of abuse has occurred?  Two types of utilitarianism—
“act” utilitarianism and “rule” utilitarianism— further characterize teleological ethics.  
Act utilitarianism operates on the premise that all situations are particular and contextual.  
In other words, the “goodness of the consequences in that individual case (or act) 
determines the rightness of an action” (Reamer, p. 28).  Rule utilitarianism disregards the 
particularities and context and generates rules based upon an overall likelihood of 
maximizing good or minimizing harm.  The directives of ethics codes attempt to 
minimize interpretation and are often constructed as rule utilitarianism.  Rule 
utilitarianism avoids exceptions or precedents that might “undermine clients’ and the 
publics’ trust in human service professionals … limiting the human services general 
effectiveness as a profession” (p. 28).  Rule utilitarianism is reflected in the following 
example from the NASW Code of Ethics: 
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Social workers should not engage in dual or multiple relationships with 
clients or former clients in which there is a risk of exploitation or potential 
harm to the client. … Dual or multiple relationships occur when social 
workers relate to clients in more than one relationship, whether 
professional, social, or business. (Reamer, 2012, p. 215) 
 
 
In this statement practitioners are asked to anticipate “risk” and “potential harm” in their 
relations with clients.  Risk, itself, is incompatible with rule utilitarianism.  Professional 
codes of ethics tend to minimize moral risk (i.e. taking a chance on someone) with risk-
avoidance.  While others argue that risk and uncertainty are important to moral 
responsibility (Bauman, 1993, 1995), here, I simply want to point out how rule 
utilitarianism forecloses risk—potential for positive outcomes not withstanding.  
 Professional codes of ethics include normative matters that may fall outside of the 
domain of “ethics,” and the norms of professional ethics may not always be reflected in 
code.  Abbott (1983) reminds us that norms can be included in codes, but they don’t have 
to be.  Norms also show up in the “routines” of “everyday professional life” (p. 856).  
After analyzing social work ethics code from various countries, Banks (2003) found that 
they can be rhetorical, aspirational, educational and regulatory devices (pp. 139-141).  
Using Banks’s framework we may classify the NASW’s prohibition on dual relationships 
as regulatory while requirements to “promote social justice” are aspirational.  Banks 
illuminates how codes of ethics always exist within context of a particular profession and 
a particular public at a particular time.  To abstract them at face value as ethical discourse 
in a tradition of moral philosophy disregards their presence in the world.   
 As well, the normative ethics of professions have been shaped through public 
opinion and the norms of society at large.  In part, the public’s attitude and understanding 
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of professional ethics is informed through news media, which regularly reports on cases 
of exploitation and abuse by professionals, such as the 2011 Penn State sex abuse story.  
Shifts of public opinion and social norms can be traced in revisions of formalized ethics 
codes.  Committees of professional peers regularly amend ethics codes, which in turn 
“reflect the social values or conventions of their time” (Hick, 1992, p. 375).    
 Normative ethics, as applied in professional code, are forms of rule-bound 
utilitarianism in which the maximum good and/or minimum harm is sought (Reamer, 
2012, p. 27).  While there may be some room for interpretations, they are rule-bound 
because they do not change or adapt to particular situations or contexts.  The immutable 
rule or principle applies to the entire professional class, because any “… precedent would 
undermine clients’ and the public’s trust in human service professionals, particularly 
regarding professionals determination to protect clients from harm and exploitation, thus 
limiting the human services general effectiveness as a profession” (2012, p 28).  Hence, 
normative rules, such as prohibitions on sexual contact, are ostensibly made to protect 
people from potential harm and to protect the general reputation of a profession—thus, 
maintaining public trust. 
 In a research study of teachers’ self-reported perceptions of ethical violations, 
Barrett, Casey, Visser and Headley (2012) recommend stronger codes of conduct for 
teachers.  They fault the ethics codes of professional educational associations, such as the 
National Education Association (NEA)10, as being overly general and vague.  They 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The National Education Association (NEA) currently provides a Code of Ethics that was 
adopted in 1975. However, the NEA’s Code of Ethics is a brief two pages and does not have the 
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suggest a more “principle-based, prescriptive and enforceable code of conduct for 
teachers” (2012, p. 891).  The authors refer to sexual harassment and intimate 
relationships between teachers and students as well as “misconduct” and “boundary-
crossing” with social networking (e.g. Facebook) to support their case for more 
“prescriptive” codes.  They also draw conclusions about the “internal norms” of teacher 
behaviors through a survey of pre-service teachers and practicing educators who were 
asked to score a list of behaviors for frequency and seriousness of “violation” (e.g. 
“Communicates socially with students on Facebook, Twitter”).  They recommend a 
formal code of ethics and standards for teachers that are based on four “fundamental” 
principles:  students’ personal welfare, respect for community standards, objectivity and 
integrity.  Drawing from the American Psychological Association, Barrett et al. (2012) 
believe that teacher behavior needs more regulation, “both in and outside of the 
classroom” (p. 891).  They describe, “It should include both prohibitions against certain 
behaviors and a set of decision rules for action when certain underlying principles appear 
to be in conflict” (p. 891).  Claiming that teaching is “invariably” about decision-making, 
they suggest a formal code for guiding teachers in their decision making, regulating the 
practice of teaching and increasing the public’s confidence in teaching and public 
education (p. 896).  They conclude, “It [is] the task of teachers and teacher educators to 
take responsibility for the difficult tasks of identifying the norms and mores of the 
profession, articulating standards and expectations for practitioners, and communicating 
these expectations to the public” (p. 896). The authors’ recommendations reasonably 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
authority of a licensing body.  In the U.S. each state has its own code of professional conduct for 
teachers. 
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seem to promote and stabilize essential dispositions, ways of thinking and responding 
within teacher decisions and practice.   
 Before leaving the Barrett et al. study, I want to point out that the normative 
principles and standards that they support are largely justified only from within the 
existing professional institution, which has been structured through processes of social 
closure.  In other words, they primarily protect the interests of the profession or 
professionals and not necessarily the best interests of students or the public.  They claim 
to maintain “public trust and appropriate professional relationships with students” 
(Barrett et al., 2012, p. 890).  Maintaining public trust is a self-serving task of any 
profession.  As well, “appropriate professional relationships,” “respect for community 
standards,” and professional “objectivity” do not necessarily reflect matters of ethics.  
Such directives may over-emphasize control and constraint while under-emphasizing 
compassion and courage.   
 Barrett et al. (2012) reflect dominant professional discourse by centering dangers 
and risks of involvement: 
 
… the desire to develop close and caring relationships with those with 
whom we work has to be balanced by an awareness of the dangers 
inherent in “dual relationships,” situations in which a professional 
maintains a social or personal relationship with a client in addition to a 
professional one.  Such relationships are particularly dangerous when the 
caring provider is an adult and the person being cared for is a child.  (p. 
895) 
 
 
In addition to presuming all “danger” is bad and all risk should be avoided, this statement 
is only thinkable within a discourse that already calibrates “ethics” to situations of 
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predatory adults and innocent children in need of protection.  The authors narrowly 
construe “appropriate” teacher conduct as that which does not violate; they fail to 
consider the ethical potentials of dual relationships.  
 Although ethics codes across professions have much in common, normative ethics 
have “immediate relevance to practice” (Reamer, 2012, p. 25) and, thus, vary from 
profession to profession.  For example, social work’s purposes and supporting practice 
theories generate concern about dual relationships.  Dual relationships occur when the 
social worker assumes a second role with a client (e.g. both social worker and friend).  
Because social work processes may be compromised by the social worker’s friendship 
with a client, dual relationships are largely prohibited.  Dual relationships within other 
professions (i.e. teaching) may be figured and problematized differently.  A dual 
relationship in a classroom might occur if a classroom teacher is also a family member to 
one of her students.  Professional authorities may be concerned that bias or favoritism 
could interfere with her teaching duties, such as grading.  In each case, normative ethics 
regulate and inform what conduct and relationship should look like in a given 
professional setting (and, sometimes, outside of the professional setting11). 
 Often, normative ethics are so firmly established within particular professional 
culture that acculturation occurs with little notice.  Norms are taken for granted, adopted 
and performed without self-awareness, thought or critical reflection.  Watkins 
(1925/1926) describes the “authority of ethical prescriptions” as an “attitude of the mind” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For example, some Catholic schools in the U.S. have inserted morality clauses in teacher 
contracts.  These clauses may forbid certain teacher behaviors in their professional and personal 
lives and are justified with purposes of church doctrine (Dirks, 2014). 
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and “an habitual mode of thinking regarding obligations and privileges in human 
relationship” (p. 332).  Habituated responses stifle deep questions and reflection about 
how one might respond to the needs of others.  Normative ethics preclude individual 
actors grappling with the nuances of complexity (e.g. power and hegemony) and, rather, 
provide a standard rule of thumb – a uniform action and procedure.   
 Thus far, one can see from my description of professional codes of ethics that 
they have developed within sociological, historical and economic contexts.  Rather than 
arriving from nowhere, ethics codes have been situated in specific contexts and 
conditions (e.g. second modernization or “late capitalism” for many Western cultures).  
As ethics, they are normative and bare resemblance to various lines of thought in moral 
philosophy, like deontology and teleology.  However, the alignment between current 
forms of professional codes of ethics and current thinking in moral philosophy is askew.  
For example, Banks (2003) cites the late American ethics philosopher John Ladd (1918-
2011) to describe moral philosophy as a “reflective critical activity” (p. 137) and to 
challenge code-bound ethics.  Ladd describes: 
 
[E]thics is basically an open-ended, reflective and critical intellectual 
activity … .  Ethical principles can be established only as a result of 
deliberation and argumentation.  These principles are not the kind of thing 
that can be settled by fiat, by agreement or by authority.  To assume that 
they can be is to confuse ethics with law-making, rule-making, policy-
making and other kinds of decision-making.  (Banks, 2003, p. 137) 
 
 
Considering contemporary moral philosophy, including feminist and postmodern ethics, 
the scholars and associations that guide professional ethics code seem to ignore or resist 
more pluralistic, open-ended conceptualizations of ethics.     
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 Drawing comparison between moral philosophy and ethics code, Banks (2003) 
concludes that current versions of professional ethics codes are “strange documents” (p. 
137).  She describes them as a mix of “ideals, general ethical principals, rules of conduct, 
rules of professional etiquette, guidance, advice and threats of disciplinary action, which 
are sometimes ambiguous and contradictory” (pp. 137-138).  This “strange” variety of 
ethics has thrived through professionalism.  For the most part, moral philosophy has been 
distanced from professional ethics.  According to Reamer (2012), “… the deliberate 
exploration of the relevance of moral philosophy and ethical theory to the analysis and 
resolution of practical ethical dilemmas” is a relatively recent development among the 
“major” professions (p. 25).  Banks (2008) recommends deeper integration between 
social work ethics and moral philosophy.  Because social work ethics has been drawn 
from within the discipline of social work, moral philosophy has only been integrated in 
“piecemeal and simplistic ways” (p. 1244).   
 In the remainder of this chapter, I bring professional ethics into closer 
conversation with moral philosophy and, in doing so, develop critical perspectives on 
professional codes of ethics.  To manage this conversation within the limited space of my 
dissertation, I only examine two traditions in moral philosophy in relation to professional 
codes of ethics—Kantian deontology and feminist care.  I examine Kantian deontology 
because, as previously noted, ethics codes are often stated in a deontological manner—as 
rules, duties and obligations.  As well, the Kantian categorical imperative opened doors 
for thinking about universal ethics, rights, welfare and laws.  I begin Chapter Three with 
consideration for feminist care ethics to juxtapose Kantian deontology against twenty-
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first century feminist thought that rejects autonomous, free reason as justification for 
moral rules.  Given that most practitioners in social professions are women12, relational 
care ethics are particularly relevant for thinking about care activities and emotional labor.  
By only addressing these two traditions in moral philosophy, I clearly leave a lot out.  
Most considerably, I do not address Aristotelian ethics; others (Baptista, 2012) have 
discussed Aristotelian ethics in relation to professional ethics.    
Kantian Deontology and Ethics Code 
 Out of Enlightenment ideology, the capacity for human reason gave rise to the 
potential for universal morality and norms of conduct.  Kantian philosophy, through the 
“categorical imperative” and a rationally justified deontology, paved the way toward 
“universal” ethics.  The possibility of a rationally justified, universal ethics has 
tremendous appeal to professions that promise positive social effects through scientific, 
rational and technical actions.  Kantian ethics both produced and were a product of 
modernist ambitions and have been used to legitimize professional codes of ethics 
(Bagnall, 1998; Banks, 2003; Harris, 1994; Hick, 1998). 
 While Kantian deontology would seem to offer possible justification for 
professional ethics codes, it has brought far less certainty than was once, perhaps, 
imagined.  The necessary purity of reason and unencumbered freedom seems to be 
conceptually sound only as descriptive, idealized, philosophical abstraction.  In other 
words, it is good theory but has limited application to “in-the-world” life.  Hick (1998) 
describes the inseparable cornerstones of Kant’s rational justification of ethics as rooted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For example, the founding of professional social work is attributed to two women – Jane 
Addams and Mary Richman. 
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in the human capacity to reason and the inherent property of freedom (p. 147).  The 
application of “pure reason,” under conditions of unencumbered freedom, justifies rules 
of human action and ideally would apply to all people and “all situations in which the 
actions of individuals or collectivities may be seen as having a moral dimension” 
(Bagnall, 1998, p. 315).  Such rules suggest a universal, normative legislation of human 
action (Bauman, 1995).  However, the unreachable conditions of Kant’s categorical 
imperative suggest the possibility for rather than the reality of universal ethics.  When 
does anyone exist in “unencumbered freedom”?  Hick (1998) explains that “freedom” is a 
“necessary property of all reasonable beings to the extent of their being reasonable.  The 
more reasonable they are, the more they are free, the more they are self-legislators or 
autonomous agents” (p. 147).  As soon as one’s freedom is compromised by an imposed 
rule or imperative, one is no longer acting or thinking freely and reason is no longer 
“pure.”  Speaking of Kant’s categorical imperative, Hick (1998) concludes: 
 
It is only an expression of the internal structure of practical reason, 
describing the necessary actions of purely rational agents.  If empirical 
human agents are concerned, this categorical imperative is no longer 
descriptive but prescriptive and it is this prescriptive form, demanding 
what should be done, that creates a problem of justification:  These 
demands of the categorical imperative cannot, by virtue of its purely 
rational form, be further justified in a real world situation…. (p. 148) 
 
 
Harris (1994) contends that the prescriptive form of an imperative or a maxim could meet 
Kantian views as long as it was formulated through rational will.  Regarding professional 
codes of ethics, Harris adds: 
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The risk is that people will not puzzle out maxims for themselves and so 
adopt them; rather, maxims will become externalized.  Professionals may 
see a code as absolving them from the responsibility for determining their 
own duty. (p. 109)   
 
 
Harris makes a critical point is explaining how codes may lead to externalizing or 
outsourcing responsibility from individuals to governing institutions.   
 Wolfe (1989) further describes how modern forms of moral regulation can lead to 
the “withering away of civil society” (p. 13).  Wolfe points out the major contradiction 
between modern moral autonomy and modern social organization.  Neither the market 
nor the state with their regulatory powers “…recognize one of the very things that make 
liberal democrats modern:  that people are capable of participating in the making of their 
own moral rules” (p. 12).  Within free society Wolfe is concerned about the “deleterious 
effects of too many free riders” (p. 219) – meaning those who take “moral shortcuts” and 
outsource their moral responsibilities to prevailing social systems.  Wolfe articulates 
these contradictions within modern society: 
 
Society does not carry out our obligations to others for us, but instead 
creates the possibility that we can carry those obligations out ourselves.  If 
we choose not to do so, we deny what is social about us and are left only 
with something resembling the state of nature.  In that case, it ought not be 
surprising why modern liberal democrats, for all the wealth their 
economies have generated and stability their governments have delivered, 
sometimes wonder what it all means. (1989, p. 23) 
 
 
Today, I suspect that few people take time to reflect on themselves as “modern liberal 
democrats”; however, I believe that members of the social professions often may 
experience the sort of existential questioning that Wolfe describes.  Presumably, 
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members of social professions have an inner-sense of civic and moral responsibility and, 
yet, operate under massive regulatory regimes.  In the following section, I provide 
context for some of Wolfe’s concerns by addressing legal protections and the National 
Association of Social Work (NASW) Code of Ethics. 
Rights, Welfare, and Legal Protections 
 Adopting approaches to ethical regulation from medical professions, ethics codes 
of the social professions have been informed by ethical, legal, philosophical and 
epistemological documents and traditions.  Some of these influences include Hippocratic 
ethics, the Nuremberg Code, malpractice or malfeasance, and scientific orientations that 
favor objectivity and distance (Clements, 1992; Hick, 1998; Weber, 1946b).   
For example, the Nuremberg Code was established in the mid-1940’s in response 
to egregious transgressions in human experimentation by Nazi doctors.  It declared a 
universal human right to consent (Hick, 1998, p. 143).  Consent is strongly reflected 
within a social work principle of “self-determination,” which broadly translates to 
“respect for persons” and individual autonomy.  Kant’s rational analyses, in which he 
identified free will as an inherent trait of human beings (1998, p. 147), may lend 
justification to individual autonomy and self-determination as universal rights.  However, 
social enforcement of individual rights manifests as rule or law from external 
authoritative bodies such as professional associations or government policies that have 
been informed through social sciences (e.g. U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 46 – Protection of Human Subjects). 
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Over time, ethics codes tend to grow longer and more prescriptive (Banks, 2003, 
p. 133).  Expansion of ethics codes helps to calibrate professional norms with ever more 
clarity such that regulation and control can be achieved more precisely.  The NASW 
Code of Ethics began in 1960 with fourteen broad statements; the current version has 155 
“specific ethical standards” (Reamer, 2012, pp. 28-29).  While some believe that the 
NASW Code of Ethics has improved with increasing “specificity” regarding “the range of 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviors” (Strom-Gottfried, 2000, p. 260), others express 
concern that technical and decontextualized, ethical standards on matters such as dual 
relationships limit and obscure moral responsibility (Goldstein, 1999).  Nonetheless, 
many regard the “Code” as a necessary but insufficient guide to ethical practice (Freud & 
Krug, 2002a). 
Once rules of professional conduct acquired legal foundations (e.g. laws 
pertaining to professional licensing, malpractice, malfeasance, etc.), distinctions between 
ethical judgment and legal compliance began to erode.  Rights and conduct codified into 
law prompted the “reinterpretation of standards of conduct (codes of ethics) into 
standards of practice (legal standards for determining malpractice claims) which convert 
medical codes of ethics into a legalism rather than an ethics” (Clements, 1992, p. 375).  
In building legally codified rules of conduct and adopting legal language, the professions 
slowed the pulse of ethical deliberation and replaced it with efficient governance by rule 
and law.  Rejecting modernist attempts to legislate morality, Bagnall (1998) argues that 
codes have taken “the morality out of individual and collective action,” and replaced it 
with “rule-following behavior” (p. 316).  Koehn (1998) remarks, “Since legal obligations 
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are often of only the most minimal sort, this reduction impoverishes our ethical world” 
(p. 6).  Mistaking professional, legal rules for morality contributes to an erosion of 
interpersonal responsibility for one another.  Systems of legal governance expropriate 
decisions of ethical responsibility to institutional and legal systems and away from 
individuals.  Some may argue that a legal foundation is absolutely necessary toward the 
pursuit of public trust and beneficent relations.  Others (e.g. Bauman) claim that the 
potential of human-to-human encounter, left intact with all of its uncertain ethical 
dimensions and freedoms, is foundational to human possibility itself.  
 Following Kantian possibilities for universal ethics and despite the idealized 
individual capacity for moral conduct, state-sanctioned social institutions began to grow 
as regulatory forces.  The establishment of modern social institutions (e.g. the legal 
system) as protectors of individual rights and welfare is a paradoxical twist on Kant’s 
philosophy.  Bauman (1993) writes:   
 
The only way in which individual freedom could have morally positive 
consequences is (in practice, if not in theory) to surrender that freedom to 
the heteronomously set standards; to cede to socially approved agencies 
the right to decide what is good and submit to their verdicts.  This means, 
in a nutshell, to replace morality with legal code, and to shape ethics after 
the pattern of Law.  (p. 29)   
 
 
Indeed, legal and ethical codes have alleviated us from or robbed us of individual 
freedoms to face the responsibilities that we may feel for one another.  In doing so, they 
have reduced space for being together and discouraged uncertain ethical engagement by 
replacing individual responsibility and engagement with rules, personal withdrawal and 
rational procedure.  A common example of this may be understood by anyone who has 
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been approached on the street by someone asking for money.  Dozens of cautionary 
thoughts rush through our heads—“Is this person ‘for real’?  How will he spend the 
money?  Shouldn’t he go to housing services for help?”  Yet, we may also feel compelled 
to be present with the person in front of us, to engage in the uncertainty of what to do 
rather than shrinking from him by classifying him as a social problem deserving of social 
assistance.  In Chapter Three, I further consider our ethical responses and responsibilities 
to each other and how they are affected by the technological mechanics of our social 
institutions as encountered in “professional” processes and structures.  I begin Chapter 
Three by describing forms of care in technological society and introduce thinking behind 
an “ethics of care.” 
Summary 
 In this chapter I have broadly explored major sociological perspectives of the rise 
of professionalism and specifically professional codes of ethics.  Where possible, I 
focused on professional relationships and boundaries within contexts of social 
professions.  Major sociological contributions included monopolistic, functional and 
interactionist perspectives of professions and professionalism.  Social professions have 
adopted and generated normative ethics, which have been codified and have developed 
legal standing.  Despite idealistic justification through Kantian deontology and the 
possibility of universal ethics, the regulation and enforcement of professional ethics 
undermines morality and individual ethical responsibility. Feminist care ethics offer 
theoretical alternatives to normative ethical rules and provide important critiques of 
power, hierarchy, rationalism and individualism.  I elaborate upon care ethics and 
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postmodern ethics as more open, more responsive alternatives to deontological or 
teleological ethics in the remaining chapters.   
I titled this chapter “Bound by Code:  Sociological and Philosophical Perspectives 
of Professions.”  Medical doctors used to engender trust and affirm their ethicality by 
declaring an individual oath.  In fact, the “word profession is literally Latin for ‘bound by 
oath’” (Baker et al., 1999, p. xiii).  No longer “bound by oath,” professionals are now 
bound by socialization and code.  To be “bound by code” signifies how professions 
developed and proliferated as distinct fields and jurisdictions, which were each bound 
together within a knowledge base and normative ethics.  Professions achieved uniformity 
of product, market monopolies and a degree of public trust within the bindings of 
normative ethics.  They also established regulatory mechanisms with legal powers to 
enforce normative behaviors.  Moreover, to be “bound by code” signifies how 
professional discourse determines what is thinkable.  Articulated as “ethics,” these norms 
constrain and restrict ethical possibility within relationships between professional actors 
and those with whom they interact.  In the spectral questions that lace throughout the 
remaining chapters of this dissertation, I ask, “What are the consequences of restricted 
ethical possibility for professional agents?” and “How do professionals experience 
potential friction between professional identity and human encounters that are 
emotionally charged, laden with complexity, and rich with possibility.
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CHAPTER III 
UNSETTLING PROFESSIONALISM:  CHALLENGING NORMATIVE CODE AND 
IMAGINING ETHICAL POSSIBILITIES 
 
 To think of ethics, service ideals or the “calling” of social professions as 
expressed through care may help to move my study from a place of vague abstraction to 
a place of everyday familiarity.  Care has become both a philosophical and sociological 
area of study. Although a complex philosophical and sociological concept, most people 
have experienced care from and care about friends, family members, companion animals 
and other living (and nonliving) things.   
 Many traditions of moral philosophy have been faulted for narrowly masculine, 
individualistic and autonomous orientations.  Rorty (1999) states that the major flaw of 
traditional moral philosophy is the “myth of the self as nonrelational” (p. 77).  Feminist 
perspectives offer alternative conceptualizations by taking up social difference and social 
relation as salient to ethics (Clifford, 2002).  Much of the thinking from feminist 
perspectives has developed into a body of scholarship known as “care ethics” (Noddings, 
1984; Koehn, 1998).  I begin this chapter by exploring care ethics.  Care ethics is relevant 
to my dissertation study because it locates “care” as ethical practice and helps to 
demonstrate how care has been expropriated and commodified in capitalistic, 
technological society.  Hence, it follows a theme of my study that questions the ethicality 
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of codified, market-oriented ethics.  I briefly draw upon Koehn (1998) to outline 
differences between care ethics and normative, deontological ethics.  Then, I explore how 
care may be leveraged and distorted in capitalistic, technological society and how 
“caring” has been reconfigured into impersonal technology through professionalism.  In 
the latter part of this chapter I share alternative ways of defining and thinking about 
ethics against the professional conceptualizations that I have already described.  I briefly 
discuss cognitive ethics and legal protections followed by a more detailed examination of 
postmodern ethics.  I discuss Bauman, Levinas and Foucault as major figures 
contributing to postmodern ethical possibilities.  By disclosing professional ethics’ close 
relationship to market transactions and by demonstrating the narrow shape of 
professional ethics in relation to alternatives provided by care ethics and postmodern 
ethics, I establish broad support for my claim that modern ethics codes (i.e. professional 
ethics) restrict ethical possibilities in a social field of one-to-one relationship. 
 Care Ethics, Professional Care, and Technological Society 
Care Ethics 
 Koehn (1998) reviews literature from care ethics and summarizes characteristics 
that distinguish care as a form of ethics.  These include: 
• The relational self, rather than the individual moral agent (e.g. professional) 
• Elevated concern for vulnerable populations (akin to the concerns of social 
professions) 
• The political or public significance of intimate, caring relationship (as opposed to 
distant objectivity) 
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• Valuation of difference, rather than consistency or universalism 
• Imaginative and contextual communication (as opposed to scripted, standard 
procedure) 
• The significance of power differentials in society (including examination of 
professional powers) 
Each of these characteristics of care ethics enables us to call into question uniform 
principles and undifferentiated rules that professional ethics code attempts to achieve.  
For example, care ethicists recognize bi-directionality and mutuality in human 
relationship (Alexander & Charles, 2009; Koehn, 1998).  They implicitly challenge the 
notion of “relationship boundaries” as an attempt to impede reciprocity and diminish full 
relational potential.   
 Skeptical of thinking that depicts the arrival of ethics through an autonomous, 
rational individual with expert knowledge, care ethicists consider ethics within uncertain 
practices of care, trust, mutuality, and dialogue (Alexander & Charles, 2009; Clifford, 
2002; Koehn, 1998; Lerman & Porter, 1990; Noddings, 1984).  Inclusion of female 
voices, experiences and perspectives opens ethical discourse to new ideas about what 
counts as “ethics.” Attention to situational caring, mutual relation and dialogue differs 
from an ethics where universal rules or laws are applied to unique situations (Koehn, 
1998, p. 21).  Feminist care ethics are also attuned to the protection of vulnerable people 
and the social structures and dynamics that enable abuses of power (Koehn, 1998).  
Hence, a feminist critical assessment of professional power may lead to a more rigorous 
analysis of what, if anything, is ethical about professionalism.  Furthermore, women 
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perform most of the work involved in social professions.  Ways of knowing and ethical 
practices that have been informed by the women who do the work potentially strengthen 
connections between knowledge, theory and practice. 
 Many people understand the principled and prohibitive nature of professional 
ethics codes as part of a progressive agenda to protect the dignity and rights of the most 
vulnerable populations (including women, children, minorities and poor people).  
Increased regulation and specificity in professional ethics codes can be understood as 
correcting historical abuses (e.g. forced sterilization, euthanasia, medical research 
experiments, sexual violations) that have harmed the most vulnerable people.  As 
described in the previous chapter, development of public trust and regulation of 
professional power is part of the rationale for how professional ethics developed.  
Sharing with feminist ethics, professional ethics also centers vulnerable and marginalized 
people (Koehn, 1998, p. 9).  For example, the NASW Code of Ethics (1996) “requires” 
social workers to “act to prevent and eliminate domination of, exploitation of and 
discrimination against any person, group, or class on the basis of race, ethnicity, national 
origin, color, sex, sexual orientation, age, marital status, political belief, religion, or 
mental or physical disability” (Brill, 2001, p. 233).  One’s professional duty, then, 
includes actively advocating and collaborating with marginalized groups to prevent or 
rectify harms that may result from power differentials.  These common areas of concern 
demonstrate shared ground between professional and feminist articulations of ethics 
(Koehn, 1998; Lerman & Porter, 1990).    
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Attempting to distinguish an ethics of care from code or principle-based ethics, 
Noddings (1984) states: 
 
What we do depends not upon rules, or at least not wholly on rules – not 
upon a prior determination of what is fair and equitable – but upon a 
constellation of conditions that is viewed through both the eyes of the one-
caring and the eyes of the cared for.  By and large, we do not say with any 
conviction that a person cares if that person acts routinely according to 
some fixed rule.  (p. 13) 
 
 
Accordingly, professional commitments involve purposes and principles that precede 
actual encounter with someone.  Koehn (1998) cites Graham (1983) to describe 
professional care as “tending” – “a kind of ‘domestic labour performed on people’” (p. 
25).  Professional “care” differs from an ethics of care, which is described as “… an 
affective stance in which both the care-giver and the cared-for put themselves at risk as 
part of a process of committing to the forging of a shared self” (p. 25).  Drawing 
primarily from Gilligan and Noddings, Koehn (1998) summarizes “care” as “… being 
attentive to another’s well-being and of being willing to act to promote it. …an active, 
interpersonal, mutual reciprocity” (p. 24).   
Many ways of sharing and reciprocating with clients, students or community 
members are subdued by professional guidelines and practice theory (Alexander & 
Charles, 2009).  Within social professions, restricting dual relationships and marking 
relationship boundaries are justified for preserving “therapeutic efficacy,” avoiding 
potential for harm or conflicts of interest, and maintaining “objectivity” (2009, p. 7).  
Since I have excluded clinical and therapeutic professions from my use of the term 
“social professions,” I will not explore therapeutic efficacy or concerns related to 
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transference and countertransference.  However, it is worth noting that some clinicians 
and therapists (frequently women) have challenged the necessity of rigid boundaries even 
within therapeutic practice (Greenspan, 1993; Heywood, 1993; Lerman & Porter, 1990).  
In fact, a collective of therapists called The Feminist Therapy Institute developed its own 
ethics code in the late 1980’s (Lerman & Porter, 1990).  Within their version of a feminist 
ethics code, “overlapping relationships” are specifically addressed.13  While prohibition 
of sexual contact and concern for confidentiality are explicitly stated, the Feminist 
Therapy Ethics Code (1987) provides flexibility for the therapist to determine whether or 
not to engage in dual or overlapping relationships.  It further acknowledges power 
differentials and the therapist’s responsibility for “…monitoring such relationships to 
prevent potential abuse of or harm to the client” (1990, p. 40).  “Peer consultation 
groups” are recommended for the purpose of monitoring misuse of power (1990, p. 58).  
In part, such flexibility is afforded in order to recognize ethics on a continuum and 
acknowledge the potential harm of “distant, uninvolved therapist-client relationships” 
(1990, p. 7).   
 In her book, When Boundaries Betray Us:  Beyond Illusions of What is Ethical in 
Therapy and Life, Heywood (1993) shares her stirring account of being in therapy.  She 
describes how boundaries held up by her therapist (and the codes of her therapist’s 
profession) were abusive and dehumanizing to both her and her therapist.  Heywood 
defines “abusive” as “… withholding intimacy and authentic emotional connection from 
those who seek our help” (p. 10).  Heywood continues,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See Lerman & Porter (1990), Section Three – “The Problems of Overlapping Relationships,” 
pp. 83-110. 
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For ‘abuse’ is not simply a matter of touching people wrongly.  It is,  
as basically, a failure to make right-relation, a refusal to touch people  
rightly.  We as professionals – indeed, we as people on this planet –  
are likely to destroy one another and ourselves by holding tightly to  
prescribed role definitions as we are by active intrusion and violation.  
(1993, p. 10) 
 
 
Struggling to maintain professional conduct, Heywood’s therapist resisted their emergent 
bond and friendship over many months.  While following proper professional behavior, it 
is clear from Heywood’s narrative that the situation denied mutual relation, moral 
responsibility and oppressed the full humanity of the two individuals involved.  The 
distancing principle, in effect, caused harm. 
 Despite the attempts of some to unhinge principles from care ethics, Koehn 
(1998) finds that professional ethics and feminist ethics are both informed by principles 
that are rooted in contextual purposes.  As professional ethics derive norms from the 
character of a particular goal (e.g. education, mental health, safe housing), feminist ethics 
also “… derive guidelines for action from the character or essence of a single activity or 
virtue” (e.g. care or trust) (p. 10).  Thus, according to Koehn, care ethicists remain 
connected to guiding principles, because they characterize certain situations as 
purposefully calling for care or trust just as professions derive norms of practice 
dependent upon the “purpose” of the profession (1998, p. 14).  This is an important point 
for Koehn’s “rethinking” of feminist ethics, because care ethicists, such as Noddings, 
generally disassociate ethics from the practice of imposing unified principles onto unique 
situations.  While the meaning of care and the conditions that call for care may not be 
completely de-coupled from purposes and principles, a care ethic does clear space for a 
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more emergent, dynamic, relational process.  Therein lies a difference between an ethics 
of care and a professional or “male” ethics.  Koehn (1998) states, “The caring self is far 
more dynamic than in those ‘male’ ethics which view the self as a static locus of rational 
agency bound by duties grounded in the idea of rational agency as such” (p. 26).  Koehn 
continues to critique care ethics for lacking regulatory and legal capacities and 
reconceptualizes them into “dialogic” ethics.  According to Koehn, dialogic ethics 
preserve the concerns of feminist care ethicists (e.g. attention to power dynamics and 
concern for the vulnerable) in a more practical, pluralistic and open way (1998, p. 18).  
While Koehn’s dialogic ethics may contribute to professional ethics in interesting ways, 
it is not within the scope of my dissertation study to further describe or include them 
here. 
 Allowance for more fluid and situationally responsive relationship boundaries has 
clear benefits according to some within the social professions.  In making a case for the 
ethics of dual relationships, Tomm (1993) carefully delineates differences between 
exploitation, duality and complexity.  He remarks, “While dual relationships always 
introduce greater complexity, they are not inherently exploitative.  Indeed, the additional 
human connectedness through a dual relationship is far more likely to be affirming, 
reassuring and enriching, than exploitative” (p. 48).  Approaches to ethics that center 
care, reciprocity and relation preserve complexity rather than legislate simplicity through 
elimination of dual relationships (Alexander & Charles, 2009, p. 9).   
 Another line of thought from feminist ethicists probes the architecture of 
professionalized relationships for supporting and constructing opportunities for abusive 
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situations.  Accordingly, professional relationships that are built upon distance, 
objectivity and neutrality maintain an unequal, authoritarian position of power and 
preserve a patriarchal architecture of violence and abuse.  Dietz and Thompson (2004) 
cite a number of challenges to the “distance model as maintaining the oppression of 
women by instituting a hierarchical relationship between professional and client” (p. 9).  
Tomm (1993) suggests that a web of connection found in dual relationships is more 
“protective” than a distant, unfamiliar, professional relation because it tends “… to 
reduce space for exclusion practices, for covert manipulation, for deception, and for 
special privilege” (p. 52). 
Feminist therapist Miriam Greenspan (1993) critiques, “[Professionalism] is an 
entire hierarchical system of value, status, and, ultimately, of power.  A system of 
privilege locks this whole tragic drama into place”  (p. 201).  She substantiates: 
 
[A]ll professionals are trained in a system and an ethic that emphasizes 
distance, neutrality, and ‘boundaries’ at the expense of person-to-person 
connection and interrelatedness. … What I mean by person-to-person 
connection is building an authentic bond between the two persons. . . .  (p. 
196) 
 
 
Thus, some feminist ethicists indict the hierarchical posts and beams of professionalism 
for being forged within patriarchal systems.  Within systems of domination and control, 
the enforcement of rigid roles (which are attached to positional power and authority) sets 
up conditions that are conducive to abuse and exploitation.   
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Professional Care 
Disciplinary societies and societies of control make care and situationally 
responsive ethics difficult, because social professionals “…find themselves constrained 
by politics and markets…” (Campillo, Sáez & Sánchez, 2014, p. 13).  Offering uniform 
and unbiased services, professionals perform under a “neutral standard” where “positive 
valuations of care … have no place” (Dybicz, 2012, p. 278).  However, different critical 
approaches to professional practice—often catalogued under postmodern or feminist 
labels—may push care and expertise together in supplementary form (2012, p. 278).  
Such arrangements hope to fashion a professional agent as a “relational self” who 
maintains authentic “concern for the vulnerable” and a critical consciousness of power 
relations (Koehn, 1998).  Clifford (2002) believes that a contemporary feminist ethic can 
provide a “moral and epistemological framework for practice in the social professions” 
by maintaining sensitivity toward “issues of personal caring, social justice, and multiple 
social difference” (p. 39).  He concludes, “It is capable of appreciating the postmodern 
insight into uncertainty and complex differences, yet is also indicates a way forward that 
permits the professional development of practice in situations of serious need and 
vulnerability…” (p. 39). 
 Understanding the professional subject as “relational” helps one to recognize the 
fundamental bi-directionality of human interaction.  Human relationships are by their 
very nature two-way and interactive (Alexander & Charles, 2009, p. 10).  Within the 
school setting, Lysaker and Furuness (2011) observe that care cannot be unidirectional 
but requires teachers to “create environments of trust and reciprocity” in order to make 
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“the acceptance of care” by students possible (p. 188-189).  Alexander and Charles 
(2009) flip the script of helper and helped by gathering qualitative material on social 
workers’ experience of receiving care from their clients.  They conclude their 
examination of care, mutuality and reciprocity in social worker-client relationships with 
the following remarks on ethical practice: 
 
While the professionalization of social work practice and relationships is 
meant to provide standards for ethical behavior, the findings of this study 
indicate that a professionalized approach to human relationships may be 
unethical for both social workers and their clients.  A rigid, standardized 
and non-personal approach to engaging with people while attempting to 
support their development belies a message of inequality and is ultimately 
patronizing and disrespectful.  This standard, or one-way approach, 
implies that people who are clients (in this moment) are incapable of 
determining or creating the kind of relationships they want or making a 
significant contribution to our life experience.  In the professionalized 
context, we hesitate to embrace the meaningful impact their care, strengths 
and vulnerabilities have on our lives. (p. 19) 
 
 
Regarding the promotion of caring relationship, Alexander and Charles (2009) find 
ruptures and contradictions within the microcosm of professional social work practice. 
Professional ethics may be thought of as contributing to technologies of care by 
brokering the trust that is needed to “disembed” care from families and communities and 
relocate it in consumable, professional services.  Drawing from Illich and Giddens, Smart 
(1999) describes this modern transaction: 
 
Social relations are abstracted from their local setting, lifted out or 
“disembedded” and then rearticulated “across indefinite spans of time-
space” ([Giddens]1990:  21). …[I]ndividuals have become more and more 
reliant on experts and professionals, have been increasingly constituted as 
clients or consumers of professionally organized and produced systems, 
services and commodities (Illich, 1978, 1985).  These systems of 
	  
	   81	  
professional expertise on which we rely, to which we are subject, and in 
which we are inclined to trust, until further notice, until that is increased 
risk-awareness, itself often triggered by expert systems, occasions doubt 
and uncertainty, constitute one of the two forms of “disembedding 
mechanism” analysed by Giddens ….  (p. 6) 
 
 
As professional ethics regulate practice and garner public trust, forms of care can be 
disembedded from non-monetized transactions and introduced to the market.  Smart 
(1999) summarizes that “trust invested realizes security as its dividend” (p. 7).  However, 
these securities also come with risks.  Exploitative or abusive action recalls trust and 
reminds us that modern, technological society is full of risk (Smart, 1999, pp. 7-8).  
During acute times of public anxiety, professional associations double-down efforts to 
recapture public trust through more regulation and potentially expanded, more specific 
varieties of ethics code. 
Through “disembedding mechanisms” and commodification of care, learning to 
care not only occurs through interactions in the home, family or community but also 
through professional training.  By learning to care through professional schooling and 
credentialing processes, emotional labor contributes to a billable supply of social care.  
As a consumable service, external provisions of care are limited by “the absence of the 
emotional immediacy proper to care in the familial context” (González & Iffland, 2014, 
p. 7).  In a familial context emotional bonds and attitudes of concern constitute caring 
about (p. 3).  Care technologies supplied through professional enterprise may achieve 
caring for, actions aimed toward diminishing objective obstacles to well-being (p. 3), but 
the subjectivity of caring about may be more difficult to achieve.  Social problems like 
family abuse and neglect make it clear that the familial context does not necessarily make 
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for “better” care.  In fact, professional standards and practices of care also influence 
family norms.  For example, professional child welfare prohibitions on corporeal 
punishment also filter into family sociocultural norms of parenting.   
Hugman (2014) raises important questions about professionalizing care.  He asks: 
 
 
…[I]nsofar as we accept the idea that these professions integrate caring 
about and caring for (which is also itself a moral claim), to what extent is 
it relevant to look to an ethical concept such as commitment to service as 
the basis for professionals? (p. 176) 
 
 
Koehn also regards particular service goods and commitments (justice, education, health, 
well-being, etc.) as the “moral purpose” of social professions (Hugman, 2014, p. 177).  
However, the technologizing of care includes the possibility of impersonal professional 
duties and roles (Blum, 1990).  Citing Graham, Koehn (1998) suggests that the 
“principled attention” associated with professional roles easily denigrates “into ‘tending,’ 
a kind of ‘domestic labour performed on people’” (p. 25).  Hugman (2014) summarizes 
the “irony” of professionalizing care: 
 
To be seen as competent, informal carers may be judged against standards 
that suggest a shift toward professionalization, while to be caring, 
professionals may be judged against the ethics of close informal social 
relationships.  Yet this irony is exposed by the importance of both the 
close informed relationships that characterize the former and the trained 
and ethically accountable professionalism of the latter. … The challenge is 
for professionals and informal carers to work with the contradictions that 
emerge from this set of social expectations.  (p. 190) 
 
 
 Writing about vocation and moral psychology, Blum (1990) compares vocational 
caring with friendship caring.  First, he distinguishes “vocation” from professional “role.”  
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According to Blum, vocation reflects a calling that is value-laden and personally 
meaningful to the vocational agent.  The “moral pull” of a vocation is implicated in the 
individual’s sense of personal values.  Roles, however, do not necessarily reflect the 
individual occupant’s sense of personal value.  “This is why the moral pull exerted by 
role obligations as a moral requirement of the position can be experienced entirely as 
external to the person” (p. 180).  Whether one’s motivation is personal (related to internal 
values and ideals) or impersonal (values and ideals applied from an external source) is 
significant to Blum’s description of vocational caring.  In the personal/impersonal 
framework of moral psychology, personal motivation for action (e.g. benefit to self) 
would qualify as non-moral, while impersonal motivation (e.g. altruism or universal 
moral rule) would qualify as moral.  Blum argues that a large range of motivation and 
action falls outside of this binary framework (1990, p. 174).  He claims that the 
vocational agent is sensitive to the external commitments and practices of her profession 
(impersonal moralities) but also has room to interpret or express them personally (p. 
180).  Finally, Blum states that friendship care is also neither personal nor impersonal.  
Social norms of friendship (e.g. loyalty) combine with individual intimacy and trust (p. 
183).  Likewise, in vocational care, a teacher may act with sensitivity to his vocational 
commitments while also responding directly to his unique student “without consulting the 
norms of his vocation to see what they prescribe” (p. 183).  Thus, Blum concludes that 
the ethics of care in professional relations may be more comparable to the ethics of care 
in personal relations than many who adhere to the personal/impersonal binary have 
allowed. 
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Technological Society 
The broader tensions of technological society are felt in the pull between 
responsible authorities and individual responsibilities.  Do we relieve ourselves of these 
contradictions by withdrawal and deference—solving problems with convenient, pre-
established answers?  Or, do we risk ambiguous, uncertain engagement with our 
questions and implied responsibilities?  Wolfe (1989) addresses the question, “Are we 
rule followers or rule makers?”  He describes “social-scientific approaches to moral 
obligation” as committed to modern notions requiring “rules that regulate people’s 
interaction with one another.”  He continues to describe difference of thought as to 
whether “rules ought to guide choices or choices, rules” (p. 226).  Wolfe explains, 
“Markets and states reach their limits as moral codes for modern liberal democrats 
because they assume that moral obligation lies in rules rather than in the people whose 
behavior they will govern” (p. 227).   
With an eye on ambivalence in late-modern society, Bauman (1993) responds to 
Wolfe’s inquiry by describing the existential consequences of rule-dependency on 
individuals:  
 
Relying on the rules has become a habit, and without the fatigues we feel 
naked and helpless.  Upon the return from the world ‘out there’ in which 
others took (or assured us that they have taken) responsibility for all our 
works, the now unfamiliar responsibility is, for the lack of habit, not easy 
to bear.  All to often it leaves a bitter after-taste and only adds to our 
uncertainty.  We miss responsibility badly when it is denied to us, but 
once we get it back it feels like a burden too heavy to carry alone.  And so 
now we miss what we resented before:  an authority stronger than us, one 
which we can trust or must obey, one which can vouch for the propriety of 
our choices and thus, at least, share some of our ‘excessive’ responsibility.  
(p. 20) 
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This ambivalence is palpable in the daily work of teachers whose care is misdirected 
toward administering tests, keeping records and implementing approved curricular 
programs while looking for moments to connect with students in ways that reflect 
meaningful vocation.  In an ethnographic study, Brodwin (2013) shares articulations of 
“futility” from frontline community psychiatric social workers and describes them as 
feeling “demoralized” (pp. 69-70).   Ambivalence takes hold as apprehension and 
indifference in “minefields” of “do’s and don’ts”.  Smart (1999) claims that ambivalence 
is a “product of the modern pursuit of order” and describes “existential and mental 
ambivalence” as regular experience of modern life (p. 6).  In a world of ordered relations, 
what happens when a stranger asking for money interrupts one’s walk to a local 
restaurant?  For myself, I often feel ambivalent.  Give a few dollars or don’t; it doesn’t 
really matter.  There are homeless shelters and housing programs that are “better” able to 
deal with it.   
 Describing how technology “colonizes” our “experiences, opinions, emotions, 
and consciousness,” Stivers (2004) states: 
 
Insensibility to another’s plight or even my own means that I analytically 
search for the causes of the misfortune and what remedies there are for it, 
instead of responding intuitively, emotionally, and with moral judgment.  
In so doing we “deaden” ourselves against suffering and become 
indifferent to others even though we may urge political action or 
contribute to charity. (p. 23) 
 
 
Under a rational-technological paradigm we quickly sweep moments of face-to-face 
presence and unplanned interpersonal openness to the periphery.  With any luck we can 
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leave it there and quickly return to our personal lives.  If we cannot, we must be careful, 
or secretive, or, perhaps, even a bit rebellious in our responses. 
 As various twentieth century philosophers (e.g. Heidegger and Foucault) have 
observed, “the modern world and modern technology … produce a different kind of 
subject—a subject who does not simply objectify and dominate the world through 
technology, but who is constituted by this technology (Dreyfus, 2002)” (Besley, 2007, p. 
57).  Procedural rationality through technology is the understanding and order of being.  
When technologies and techniques are applied to people, human relationships are made 
“abstract and impersonal” (Stivers, 2004, p. 17).  Stivers (2004) explains, “As a rational, 
objective method, technique turns the object of technique into an abstraction … [a] 
standardized product” (p. 17).  When students or clients are turned into standardized 
products, new forms of alienation are produced through the “material relations between 
persons” and the professional’s “estranged labour” (Marx, 1978).  In other words, the 
professional becomes separated from an essential aspect of labor—personal relation to 
the product (or service user).  One’s labor does not satisfy an ethical responsibility but 
merely creates the means for satisfying a responsibility that is external to it.   
Specifically, social professionals—whose identity has been formally socialized 
with modern ideologies and whose actions are informed by rational, scientific 
processes—are subjects constituted by the technologies they enact.  Professional ethics 
code helps to normalize organizational and psychological technique.  Organizationally, 
ethics code helps secure vocational jurisdiction for a given profession, protects the 
territory with a service mission and expert knowledge and provides an appearance of 
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security.  Psychologically and interpersonally, ethics code works upon professional 
practitioners and clients alike to set the requirements and limits of relationship.  With 
urgency, Stivers (2004) remarks, “The proliferation of techniques for relating to others is 
unrelenting. … Technique is being applied to every human relationship…” (p. 17).  
According to Smart (1999), “Where official discourse constitutes the ‘client’ and/or the 
‘consumer’ as sovereign, ‘persons’ become vulnerable to being treated as objects of 
disregard” (p. 4).  We should remember that professionals are also “constituted” in this 
system that can be totalizing in its disregard for individual persons.  This is more than 
curious given the rhetoric of care, autonomy and justice that social professions use. 
Ethics in a Technological Society:  Procedures, Limits, Choices, and Legal Rights 
  In this section, I argue that naming and treating codified laws and professional 
rules as “ethics” contributes to an erosion of interpersonal responsibility for each other.  
When codified, systematized and mediated through professional and legal institutions, 
rules called “ethics” address the people (i.e. whole populations) who are subject to those 
rules.  As such, they function to move freedom and responsibility away from persons and 
onto governing institutions.  Ethical matters become simplified for persons in that a 
person is accountable only for adherence to implicit norms and explicit rules.  In theory, 
this frees individual persons from burdensome responsibilities (e.g. their moral freedoms) 
so they can “get on” with the business of being productive participants in global 
economic commerce.   
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Procedures:  Bauman’s Adiaphoric Social Action 
Bauman (1995) applies the term “procedural rationality” to “action directed by a 
codified reason of rules” (p. 259).  Troubling the consequences of “procedural 
rationality,” he argues that it dehumanizes and renders interaction “totally impersonal” 
(p. 259). Bauman explains, “No more of the self tends to be deployed in the encounter 
than the topic-at-hand demands; and no more of the other is highlighted than the topic-at-
hand permits” (p. 50).  Void of presence and togetherness, the potential for mutual 
relation and moral responsiveness is lost when ethics gets reduced to following rules.  
Professionals—teachers or social workers—are not expected to act from moral 
consciousness and are officially held accountable only for following correct procedure.  
Bauman (1991) describes adiaphoric social action as “… neither good nor evil, 
measurable against technical (purpose-oriented or procedural), but not moral values” (p. 
144).  Adiaphorizing action results in compulsion to make the rules more specific and 
more clear, to reduce ambiguity and to achieve predictable outcomes by decisively 
following “the book” (Bauman, 2000, p. 10).  Predictable, stable ground provides fertile 
soil for professional enterprise.   
Limits:  Koehn’s Liberating Limits 
In a culture that too rarely questions individualism, should we not also ask, “Why 
should the development of the moral person hold priority over the collective well-being 
of a people or a population?”  Exercising protections of a people or upholding absolute 
principles to establish rights may also open ethical possibilities.  Koehn (1998) explains: 
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…[A]lthough we should be sensitive to the way in which our principles 
lead us to foreclose possibilities, we also must recognize the peculiar and 
important power of principles to set liberating limits.  Principles 
enunciating absolute prohibitions can open up, as well as close 
possibilities.  For example, the language of absolute, inalienable rights has 
been instrumental in allowing persons to oppose tyrannical governments 
or persons and in placing limits on what agents legitimately may do out of 
loyalty to their ethnic group or race. (p. 14) 
 
 
While some may comply with legally granted rights by shrinking away from others or 
passively following the rules, the idea of “liberating limits” reminds us of the possibilities 
that are generated with new political rights—when new social space is inhabited and new 
relations form.  Traditional moral philosophy frequently questions moral life through 
individual agents while failing to address the moral through collective politics.  
Nonetheless, we know that the political and ethical are deeply intertwined when practiced 
in the world.  Banks (2008) encourages more conscious linkages between professional 
ethics and politics, since “the ethical judgment and decision making of individual 
professionals cannot be abstracted” from political and policy contexts (p. 1244). 
Choices:  Cognitive Ethics 
 Dawson (1994) critiques normative ethics and rules as “unethical.”  Positing 
ethics as a reflective critical activity, he suggests that codified ethics are antithetical to 
the very meaning of ethics, which locates situationally sensitive, flexible and subjective 
forms of behavior in individual cognition.  More than semantic juggling, professional 
practice that lacks room for subjective ethics and, rather, operates from duty, policy, rule 
or law can forthrightly be construed as unethical.  Dawson (1994) argues that 
professionals who follow pre-established rules rather than respond to individual people 
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and context will be “desensitized to the morally relevant factors,” resulting in truncated 
moral development and the loss of ethics (p. 153).  “Cognitivism,” writes Dawson, 
emphasizes the moral agent as “always responsive to the situation, or perpetually 
learning.  On this view being a moral agent is a constant striving for flexibility and 
sensitivity …” (p. 153).  New situations may confound the scope and relevancy of the 
rules.  Dawson (1994) argues that a “code of practice can never be rich enough to provide 
guidance in all situations, perhaps because there are so many ethically relevant factors to 
take into account” (p. 148).  To extend Dawson’s statement, each situation is, perhaps, a 
unique constellation of relevant factors.  Different people, different timing, differing 
motivations, commitments and power relations throw into question (if not crisis) 
professional duty and generalized rule. 
 Responding to such concerns, Dawson (1994) favors an “inside out” approach to 
professional ethics rather than an “outside in” approach.  An “outside in” approach 
removes the ethical domain from an individual agent and relocates it to an authoritative 
body or association (as the legal system does).  An “outside in” arrangement serves the 
interests of public trust by safeguarding professional conduct.  Furthermore, an “outside 
in” approach has been crafted toward a technical, managerial, efficiency model of social 
professions wherein management often overshadows mission and purpose.  Thus, it 
supplants individual motivations and ethical interests of teachers and social workers and 
replaces them with a fiat of procedure. 
 Citing McDowell (1979), Dawson locates ethics in the capacities of individuals.  
Thus, “ethical conduct is generated from the ‘inside out’.  …This capacity is not 
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something like an instinct, but an ability which can be learned and developed …” (1994, 
p. 150).  Referring to this as a “cognitivist” approach derived from Aristotelian virtue 
ethics, Dawson describes: 
 
Ethical conduct is seen as the product of the character of the agent, in 
being able to see that something must be done.  Such a view naturally 
requires a response to the particularities of the situation, rather than the 
rigid following of rules. (1994, p. 150) 
 
 
As a dynamic element in situation, the professional agent does not have special 
ethical status but, rather, understands ethical action by using her experience, being “open 
to new experience, advice and criticism” and receiving “new ideas, and clients’ and 
colleagues’ attitudes and opinions. … The idea of moral agency becomes a radically 
dynamic one, an active seeking of the most appropriate action for those particular 
circumstances” (Dawson, 1994, p. 151).  Although Dawson refers to this approach as 
“inside out,” I do not see it as truly “inside out.”  Rather, it is a social process involving 
bi-directionality, reflexivity and responsiveness—a transactional loop rather than a line 
from the inside directed outward. 
 Where does Dawson’s view of ethics leave the legal system or any formal social 
system of human conduct and duty?  Seemingly, “cognitivism” just reminds us of the 
difficult divide between civil rules and individual ethics.  If professions are intermediary 
institutions between individuals and the state or market, how can they reflect positions 
from each side of the divide? 
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Legal Rights: Ethics as Protective  
  Legal systems are outcomes of social process—slow and incremental in 
development but also capable of acting swiftly and decisively.  Perhaps codified 
protections and rights are not incompatible with subjective or cognitivist ethics.  While 
legal, governing systems are tools for enforcing rights and principles, they coexist with 
situational exchange between persons.  Protected legal rights should not be abandoned; 
however, we need to recognize that they are only heuristics.  Although often treated as 
“ends” in a system that is rationally organized, legal rights require thoughtful engagement 
through social processes in order to provide a platform for ethics.  Perhaps we have 
misunderstood “rights” as guaranteed ends rather than opportunities to engage in social 
life.  Or, perhaps rights are fundamentally antithetical to ethics.   
 I see rights as openings for engagement in social life.  Legal rights and rules are 
instrumental first steps toward unrealized potentials—potential for full participation in 
society or the realization of “respect for persons,” for example.  Once rights and 
protections are established and integrated into policies, they implicitly encourage 
individuals to sidestep the ambiguity and uncertainty of engaging with others, of being 
with difference.  As Dawson (1994) argues, this redirection “truncates” individual “moral 
development” (p. 153).  Rules and codes of “ethical” behavior mark shortcuts to bypass 
or, at best, clarify the messiness of particular situations.  Greenspan (1993) remarks that 
codes contribute to an “ethical system that in many ways encourages professionals to be 
moral bystanders” (p. 205).  However, sometimes circumstances are so egregious and 
unjust that there is no time to reflect on relationships and ethical behavior.  Civil society 
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requires the safety and protection of people; law promises swift action to correct 
malicious and illegal acts.  Nonetheless, shortcuts may not always offer the best way 
forward when considering ethical relationship between two people.  If relationships are 
primary to the enterprise of social professions, is it not heavy-handed to downplay 
particular moral relation in-situation by instituting uniform norms and codes? 
 Often organized around identity politics, legal rights tend to fix identity into rigid 
categories and build upon “the much narrower right to live an undisturbed private life” 
(Vaid, 2012, p. 2).  In an individualistic culture, singular attention on attaining an 
individual right can unintentionally lead to cozy retreat into “an undisturbed private life.”  
One of the purposes of my study is to attend to possible iatrogenic effects from codifying 
“ethics” in professional communities.  An iatrogenic disease is a malady created by 
medical intervention, or, more generally, a negative side effect that comes from an 
intended good.  The tradition of analyzing the possible negative side effects caused by 
professional services is more established within medical professions than social 
professions (McKnight, 1995, p. 101).  At a micro-level, a decision to deport a child’s 
“undocumented” parents from the U.S. (leaving the child “parentless”) leads to 
recognition of the iatrogenic effects of immigration laws and policies.  Therein, 
professional commitments to “do no harm” become muted by legal classifications of 
citizen and non-citizen.  At a macro-level, policies and laws that institutionalize 
individual rights may lead to retreat from social life and “truncated” moral development.  
If I have an individual citizenship right to live in the United States, then somebody 
without citizenship does not share that right.  The right of citizenship, thus, leads to 
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deportation of noncitizens—the denial of a right to those who do not qualify.  As such, I 
might argue in favor of the legal deportation of noncitizens based on my right as a 
citizen, and I can completely disregard consequent human suffering and the hardships of 
broken families while claiming my legal rights.   
 Ethical engagement and action are qualitatively different than following code and 
obeying the law.  Mistakenly naming legal and professional rule as “ethics” contributes to 
an erosion of interpersonal responsibility for each other.  Dawson (1994) considers 
professional ethics codes “unethical” insofar as they minimize “the responsibility of the 
professional for his or her actions” and stunt “the moral development of the individual, 
suggesting that once a code is known, then ethics come to an end” (p. 153).    
Postmodern Critique:  Knowledge, Ethics, and Subjectivity 
One of the most challenging theoretical critiques of modern professionalism (in 
general) is the turn toward postmodern thought.  Postmodern perspectives widely 
describe a social world that has splintered under modern, rational structures of authority.  
Postmodern thought acknowledges the shortcomings of the tools of eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment – reason, science and technology – to engineer social stability and 
“advance” civilization (Irving, 1999, p. 30).  Moral authority and grand narratives of 
social progress – such as those tied to the epistemologies of social professions – have 
failed to materialize.  Furthermore, institutional mechanisms of social control have been 
cast critically within relations of truth, knowledge and power.  Because pluralism, 
complexity and subjectivity are pressing and paradigm-shifting matters in contemporary 
society, postmodern theorists interrogate normative rules for the ways in which they 
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enforce existing power structures.  In the twenty-first century, society may be less 
grounded in normative logic and categorical truths even while modern institutions still 
rely on them.  The pursuit of universal truth has slowly made way for appreciation of 
relative worth and context.  As well, modern-era catastrophic events of human making 
and predictions of future environmental collapse have shattered unwavering allegiance to 
“progress” and innocent knowledge.  Referring to a “postmodern turn,” Best and Kellner 
(1997) describe a “turn away from modern discourses of truth, certainty, universality, 
essence, and system and a rejection of grand historical narratives of liberation and 
revolution” (p. 6).  An epistemological stance that uproots foundations also dislodges 
social constructs such as professional authority, specialized knowledge and ethical code.   
I do not to mean to say that “progress” or improvements have not been made 
through modern social institutions.  Certainly, much evidence validates the material and 
social improvements initiated by modern institutions (and the ethics codes that support 
them).  As a minor example directly resulting from ethics code, the initial AMA Code of 
Ethics helped to eliminate unqualified, unskilled people from presenting themselves as 
trained physicians and exploiting patients in the interest of personal profit (Baker et al., 
1999).  I am, however, suggesting that the conditions of late modernity have brought 
about important critique of mechanisms of social control and disciplinary society.  
Deleuze believed that Western thought “… privileged identity and unity over 
difference” (Irving, 2006, p. 136), and Foucault “… viewed codes and categories as 
blocking expressions of difference” (p. 134).  Irving (2006) offers a Foucauldian critique 
of ethics codes: 
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Ethics for Foucault was not a history of moral codes, or the writing of 
regulatory codes of ethics, or the application of universal moral 
imperatives.  Foucault often talks about “games or regimes of truth,” 
making the point that there is no inherent meaning in what we claim to be 
true; truth is only and always a clumping of the procedures used to 
establish it.  Similarly, we can say that codes of ethics have no internal or 
intrinsic meaning and are simply a bringing together in one place of the 
procedures used to establish a particular code:  arbitrary, contingent, and 
the artifact of particular gushings of power. (p. 132) 
 
 
Foucault (and other postmodern theorists) rejects codes and rules of practice as 
viable ethics.  As demonstrated in his studies of prisons, mental illness, and 
sexuality, truths are normative products of power relations within certain 
historical conditions.  Professional ethics codes give an impression of self-evident 
truth and authority, while ignoring contingency, context and variation. 
Writing about social work, Dybicz (2010) claims that a postmodern discourse 
represents a “fundamental shift in consciousness” that is not expressed in the “techno-
rational consciousness” of a modern discourse.  A postmodern discourse expresses a 
“critical consciousness” that “…views each client as creating his or her own world and 
views human action as springing from the social construction process – hence, an 
understanding of how power influences the construction process…is vital” (p. 43).  
Dybicz proposes a way forward that values fluency in both discourses and wants social 
work:  (1) to expand its social science orientation by including the humanities (e.g. 
philosophy, history and cultural studies) in its epistemological base and (2) to emphasize 
“critical consciousness” as the “authority base” (2010, p. 43).  Critical consciousness 
refocuses practice from negation of difference to social change.  
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Levinas and the “Knowing” Professional  
The institutions that support the social professions developed through a 
production of knowledge rooted in positivist thinking.  “Social work from its origins to 
the present has located its center of gravity in these Cartesian foundations of modernism.  
The nature of knowledge, research, and truth for social work has largely relied on the 
methods of Descartes” (Irving, 1999, p. 31).  Cartesian epistemology positions an 
observer standing in relation to the world – a subject in relation to an object.  “The 
Cartesian mind sorts data, organizes material, and scrutinizes validity” (1999, p. 40).  
Following Descartes (1596-1650), Kant (1724-1804) described a uniquely human “free 
will” as an “initiator of causes” (Dybicz, 2010, p. 26) and prepared the philosophical 
foundations for modern practice in many social professions.  “Free will allows one the 
possibility to successfully adapt to various non-beneficial situations via initiating new 
actions that will produce the desired reactions” (2010, p. 27).  These modern discourses 
of rational causality, categorical thinking and corrective action have informed the 
production of knowledge within social professions.  Applying this model to schools, 
progress is the result of initiating better technologies, better curriculum, better 
management and better assessment. 
Applied to practice, this can lead to a singular coalescence of understanding that 
views and treats others categorically rather than individually.  Dybicz (2010) argues that 
categorical thinking undercuts freedom by constructing causal explanations and 
promoting client adaptation or modification.  In other words, the emphasis is on fitting 
into existing structures and categories rather than engaging politics, preserving difference 
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or transforming oppressive structures.  For example, an emergent field of critical 
scholarship in disability studies has shown how entire systems (e.g. special education) 
have been developed to handle difference.  Granted with the power of expert knowledge 
in treating and classifying people, these systems have been legitimized by pathologizing 
and medicalizing the bodies and minds of persons who don’t fit within normal 
expectations.  Hence, these systems also reify the abnormal (Connor & Gabel, 2010).  In 
doing such, professional mechanisms open themselves to critique as performing 
operations of social control rather than providing service toward a public good or needed 
change.   
 Social professions produce knowledge and use concepts with ever-increasing 
precision in their commitment to “helping” others (clients, students, etc.).  Within social 
work, “… professional knowledge valorizes and mandates ‘knowing the client’ as a 
special professional function” (Rossiter, 2011, p. 987).  For example, social work case 
managers routinely compile client psychosocial histories, which are drawn from piles of 
previous reports, interviews, notes and documents.  Part of the knowledge contained in a 
psychosocial history may include an analysis of problems (including individual, peer, 
family, legal and health factors), risk factors and protective factors.  In the early days of 
professional social work, this was often referred to as “social diagnosis.”  Teachers, as 
well, rely on the knowledge of test results, colleagues, academic reports and school 
psychologists to “better understand” and teach their students.   
 Levinas takes direct aim at the Platonic, Cartesian infatuation with disengaged 
knowledge that has dominated the social professions.  Levinas finds an “unbridgeable 
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gap between knowledge and ethics” (Gottlieb, 1994, p. 366).  He philosophically negates 
the idea that ethics can be generated through knowledge.  I offer a brief summary of the 
Levinasian perspective through the writings of Roger Gottlieb (1994): 
 
He [Levinas] believes that knowledge is necessarily aimed at or inevitably 
leads to domination, objectification, and alienation.  Therefore knowledge 
cannot be the basis of ethical life—that is, of a kind of transcending 
concern for other people, a concern untouched by our own needs, desires 
or attempts to control.  … [K]nowledge of others necessarily reduces the 
Other to something we possess, something we have acquired, and 
something—ultimately—we will use. (p. 366) 
 
 
Knowledge of others, whether professionally construed or otherwise, may be experienced 
as totality.  “… [T]otalities are the concepts we deploy that allow us to feel that we know 
or understand another person” (Rossiter, 2011, p. 983).  These concepts may emerge 
from knowledge, assumptions and beliefs, which create understandings of individuals “as 
extensions of the conceptions we use to understand” (2011, p. 983).   
 Knowing, and potentially totalizing, an Other interferes with the possibility of 
caring.  Robinson (1999) describes an “ethic of care” as emerging “out of an ability to see 
the other as a concrete, particular person who exists not as ‘other’ in an absolute, 
objective sense, but as another whose uniqueness and particularity emerges through her 
relations with others” (p. 102).  She continues,  
 
A human being only becomes a particular person when she is understood 
as a person with an identity —a person who may be both different and 
similar to the moral agent and to others.  This in itself means that that 
particular person exists, and can be known, only in the context of her 
relationships both to the moral agent and to other individuals and groups.  
One cannot even begin to respond morally, indeed, to care for another 
person, without making sense of this. (p. 103) 
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While Levinasian ethics fundamentally differ from care ethics, both describe how the 
uniqueness or alterity of the Other must be affirmed for ethical relation to occur.  Since 
expertise essentially differentiates professions (however arbitrarily), it runs the risk of 
totalizing the person within a particular disciplinary frame and squeezing aside potential 
ethical relationship between the person and the professional. 
 Levinas describes totalization of the Other in terms of violent exploitation.  
Insofar as the client is an extension of the professional’s knowledge and an extension of 
the professional herself, such extension amounts to “symbolic murder” (Rossiter, 2011, p. 
985) – the annihilation of the Other’s singularity.  This idea resonates with those who 
have expressed similar critiques of categorical thinking.  Dybicz (2012) explains “… 
[W]hen applying one’s expertise, the client is always viewed in this categorical manner—
and is thus robbed of his or her individuality” (p. 274).    
 When I worked in social work, I recall laboring over writing representations of 
clients when corresponding with court officials, insurance companies, case managers and 
so forth.  How did I acquire the power to represent another person—especially someone 
under eighteen years old who was not legally allowed to represent himself?   I knew the 
agencies just wanted bare-bones clinical information (preferably in bullet points).  But, if 
I was ever truly present with the person whom I represented in words, I also knew that 
my representation would always fall short.  Citing Levinasian ethics, Perpich (2008) 
describes, “To represent the other is to begin the process that reduces her from a who to a 
what.  It is a way of getting hold of the other, of exercising social control over her” (p. 
191).  Perhaps, that is all the bureaucracy of mental health wanted and expected.   
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 In the following section I want to connect my critique of the knowing professional 
with my experiential narrative.  Insofar as working with an Other involves telling, 
arranging or attempting to control the Other through perceptions of knowing better than 
the Other, I question if such dynamics can also be ethical.   
“Nobody Tells the Birds How to Fly” 
 I want to share a brief story to rejoin my personal narrative with my dissertation 
study.  I use it to counter some aspects of the master narrative of social professions 
related to “knowing” our clients and students.  After I became Andrew’s foster parent, as 
described in Chapter One, I drew upon my professional training (MSW) and personal 
exposure to parenting as I figured out my new role as “parent” (to an eighteen year old, 
nonetheless).  Officially, I was a “therapeutic foster parent,” which meant that Andrew 
had therapeutic goals, a case manager and a social worker to oversee his progress.  I 
provided daily notes on Andrew’s “treatment plan” to his case manager.  We met with 
her once every three months.  Based on these conditions and requirements, I never 
completely left a professional orientation in some aspects of “working” with my foster 
son.  While there were many more casual, familial aspects to our relationship, he also had 
“independent living goals” (e.g. education and employment) to work on so he could leave 
my home more prepared to be a self-reliant person. Unofficially, Andrew was a brilliant, 
musical, complex person who thought deeply and felt cautiously.  He inspired me to live 
more artistically and changed my own self-understanding through our relationship. 
 After about eighteen months, Andrew’s “therapeutic foster care” placement was 
officially not going well.  He stopped attending community college classes; he couldn’t 
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keep a job; he disappeared for days at a time, and he relapsed into regular drug use.  
Around this time, his social worker wanted to terminate the placement because Andrew 
had repeatedly violated the terms of his “independent living” agreement.  Youth who 
remain in foster care beyond their eighteenth birthdays enter voluntary “independent 
living” agreements.  These agreements can be terminated by the youth or by social 
services; otherwise the agreement terminates when the youth turns twenty-one years old.  
As well, my relationship with Andrew had moved into a period of heated argument, 
uncertainty and depth of emotion that I had never felt before.  I relied on my social work 
knowledge and expertise:  confronting Andrew, holding him accountable but also 
offering support and consistency.  In truth, I began to wonder if I was out of my depth. 
 At the worst of it, when the arrangement and entire relationship seemed certain to 
come apart, I took a hike.  I walked along a stream that cut through my landlord’s 
property.  I felt exhausted and confused.  Andrew’s drug use was a problem.  It prevented 
him from keeping a job and going to class.  It damaged his relationships with friends, 
with me.  I knew what Andrew needed to do.  His case manager and social worker knew 
what he needed to do.  Why couldn’t he do it? 
 Sitting on a rock next to the stream, I noticed a flock of birds migrating overhead.  
They were headed somewhere with singular purpose.  Not one of them flew out of form 
or appeared confused about where to go.  It occurred to me:  “Nobody tells the birds how 
to fly.  They just fly.”  Who was I to tell Andrew how to fly?  In knowing what he needed 
to do, how was I complicit with violating his individuality and the direction of his own 
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flight?  How could I dictate what Andrew should do when nobody tells the birds how to 
fly?   
 This story brings me back around to the problem of knowing in ethical relations.  
Since interfacing with professional child welfare services, mental health services and, 
eventually, the adult criminal system—a time span that covered all of Andrew’s teenage 
years—professionals had been offering or requiring “services” that were set forth in his 
“best interest.”  I am not suggesting that these services were unimportant or wrongly 
advised.  Andrew reflects that most of them were “beneficial” to him.  I am, however, 
questioning whether an ethical relationship manifests in “knowing” an Other.  The 
rational knowledge and practice of social professions is rendered in the interest of 
correction and expressed through control and coercion.  As well, such knowledge is 
compiled into ethics code, which attempts to link knowledge and procedure to “ethics.”  
While such standard services may be instrumental or helpful, what makes them ethical?  
Are attempts to classify and define “ethical” practice in a fixed form misguided or 
irrelevant?  
 Levinas unequivocally argues that any action leading to the reduction of an Other 
has no claim to ethics.  While one might demonstrate care through guiding or supporting 
an Other, care is also outside of what Levinas calls “ethics.”  Arriving prior to 
knowledge, ethics prefigures one’s encounter with an unknowable Other.  The primacy of 
ethics denotes that obligations precede our contingent identities (Gottlieb, 1994, p. 368).  
Our responsibilities exist prior to professional and vocational roles.  Levinas 
conceptualizes “totality” across from “infinity.”   
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Infinity, on the other hand, is the inexhaustible, irreducible singularity of 
people:  it is what is outside the Same.  At the heart of Levinas’s ethics is 
the notion that our representations of persons are always inadequate.  
Something always overflows, escapes our knowledge, comprehension, 
conceptions.  Infinity is the acknowledgment of what is beyond 
comprehension. (Rossiter, 2011, p. 983) 
 
 
It is at infinity, the “irreducible singularity of people,” where Levinas identifies the 
ethical.  “Ethics for Levinas is the orientation itself to that which exceeds our concepts 
and our ideas of persons—how we are alert to the inadequacy of representation” 
(Rossiter, 2011, p. 986).  Ethics alert us to the fact that we are more than social workers 
and more than teachers in our relationships.  Responding to ethics prevents us from 
defaulting to purely technical, mechanical interactions.  By being alert to the 
inadequacies of how the Other is represented, we may remain more open and reflexive—
more “unsettled”—in our professional interactions.  
 In light of Levinasian ethics, Rossiter (2011) advocates “unsettling” social work 
“as a practice of ethics defined by a conscious and deliberate commitment to working in 
full view of the tensions and contradictions derived from social work’s professional status 
and knowledge claims” (p. 981).  Given that professional knowledge (and related codes) 
function as mechanisms of social control and collude with economic and political 
interests, I wonder what it really means to work in “full view of the tensions and 
contradictions” of practice.  What does that look like?  How does it feel?  After all, 
individual professionals are subject to the dominant mechanisms and discursive practices 
of their given professions.  The coalescence of narratives (about “professional behavior,” 
“appropriate boundaries” and not getting “too involved”) shapes the particular ways we 
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understand our world and the people in it.  I have suggested that “unsettled” practice 
entails working on the periphery of professional norms and rationalism.  Doel et al. 
(2010) agree that ethical engagement in social work practice may mean entering the 
“grey areas” or the “shadows” (p. 1884).  Weinberg and Taylor (2014) add that even the 
most rule-bound social workers sometimes bend the rules to be “ethical subjects” in 
actual practice (p. 84).  
 Professional traditions, ways and discourses constitute what Gadamer calls 
“horizons of understanding.”  Understandings are “enabled and conditioned by pre-
judgements” (Moran, 2000, p. 252).  Dybicz (2010) suggests that when our “horizons of 
understanding” begin to restrict the “possibilities of being,” then freedom is “undercut” 
and “oppression occurs” (p. 36).  He calls it “existential oppression” when the dominant 
discourse defines “the individual in such a way that one’s essence, or worth, is lessened” 
(p. 37).  Citing Freire, he adds, “… freeing oneself from existential oppression is a 
necessary precondition for spawning a critical consciousness…” (p. 38).  Just as those 
who receive help from social professions may feel totalizing violence, rule-following 
professionals who rotely adhere to standard procedure may feel the heft of existential 
oppression.  As a rule-abiding professional, you withdraw for fear of getting too close; 
your supervisor reminds you to only concern yourself with the tasks of your job (your 
totality); you are evaluated by your student’s score on an exam rather than how you 
responded to her throughout the year; your livelihood depends on a duty to 
professionalism that encroaches upon any other ethical commitment you might consider.   
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The Professional Subject—Foucault’s Technologies of Self  
 To focus on the professional subject, examination of power relations may lead to 
more critical understandings of the dynamic circuitry of professional identity and 
professional-client/student interactions.  A Foucauldian analysis provides insight for 
understanding how power and identity are at play within professional structures.  
Foucault describes modern techniques through which humans develop knowledge about 
themselves and understand themselves.  Two techniques of particular interest here are 
“technologies of power” and “technologies of self.”  Foucault (1997a) describes 
“technologies of power” as an “objectivizing of the subject” that determines the “conduct 
of individuals and submit[s] them to certain ends” (p. 225).  He describes “technologies 
of self” as the ways that individuals, through their own means, engage techniques on 
“their own bodies, souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform 
themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or 
immortality” (p. 225).  Professional systems (schools, organizations, codes) can be 
described as technologies of power, and professional identities and relations can be 
thought of as technologies of self. 
Based on a Foucauldian analysis, technologies come from “bio-power” and 
governmentality.  Foucault refers to “bio-power” as the larger complex of relations and 
practices between knowledge, power and discipline (Rabinow, 1984, p. 17).  The bio-
power complex includes scientific classifications and dividing practices.  
Governmentality involves “. . . the rise of modern political and social institutions that, in 
tandem with the emergence of the sovereign nation-state, have sought to categorize, 
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compartmentalize, and control populations by placing them into clearly defined groups” 
(Wilkin, 1999, p. 181).  O’Malley (2008) explains that governmentality refers to “the 
diverse ways in which we may govern the conduct of others and ourselves” (p. 54).  
Social professions (especially those involving systematized schooling and social work) 
have been thoroughly critiqued as operations of governmentality (Chambon, Irving, & 
Epstein, 1999; Peters & Besley, 2007).  Foucault (1995) states, “The judges of normality 
are present everywhere.  We are the society of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the 
educator-judge, the social worker-judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the 
normative is based” (p. 304).  Students, clients, teachers and social workers are all 
subjects for the “optimal harnessing” of “self-governing capacities” (O’Malley, 2008, p. 
55).  Students and clients are clearly subject to judgments and normative corrections.  
Less obviously, teachers and social workers are also subject to the self-governing tactics 
of professionalism.   
If professional technique is seen as including strategies of self-governance, then 
codes of ethics can be implicated in Foucauldian description of governmentality.  
O’Malley (2008) describes, “The analytic of governmentality … is concerned with 
surfaces—the words used to describe problems, the discourses in terms of which subjects 
are characterized, the categories that are used to explain policies” (p. 56).  Ethics codes 
are paramount in this assemblage but so are the discursive elements that support them, 
such as “do no harm,” and normative geographies (i.e. how space is regulated and where 
caring can occur).  As a professional tenet, “do no harm” centers the problem of harm and 
places professionals in a position of “not doing” or withdrawing action.  “Do no harm” 
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has more regulatory potency than a tenet such as “do good.”  As a category to explain 
policy, codes categorize policies and procedures as “ethics.”  As I described in Chapter 
Two, Banks (2003) found codes of ethics to be made up of a combination of principles 
and rules of practice, and principles and rules of ethics.  By linking rules of practice to 
rules of ethics, codes achieve the “intense practicality” that O’Malley (2008) attributes to 
governmentality.  “Governmental mentalities are … always linked to technologies for 
doing things, answers to the question of ‘What is to be done?’” (p. 56).  In this sense, the 
governmental mentality of professional ethics code discreetly defines “ethics” as 
following correct procedure. 
  O’Malley (2008) also shows how governmentality uses “risk” as a “particular 
way in which problems are viewed or imagined” in order to develop self-governance.  
“Do no harm” foregrounds “risk.”  Statistical and probabilistic techniques that report on 
professional violations of code (e.g. frequency of sexual misconduct among teachers) 
foreground “risk.”   
 
…[I]ncreasingly prevalent adoption of risk as a framework of government 
creates new subjectivities and redefines relationships.  There is a focus on 
how it invents new techniques for self-government (or “techniques of the 
self”) and for the government of others, and creates and assigns 
responsibilities accordingly. (O’Malley, 2008, p. 63) 
 
 
For the professional agent, this means that responsibilities are always mediated by risk 
awareness.  One’s sense of moral responsibility to an Other may be neutralized by the 
probability of risk. 
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 In his later work Foucault focuses on technologies of self and self-care.  Foucault 
turns his attention toward the question of how humans are made into subjects.  Foucault 
scholar Paul Rabinow (1984) refers to this as “subjectification” (p. 11).  Rabinow 
explains that “subjectification” differs from dividing practices and scientific classification 
because it has less to do with marginalized or dominated populations.  In subjectification 
the person initiates an active self-formation.  As quoted in Rabinow’s (1984) introduction 
to The Foucault Reader, Foucault writes: 
  
There are two meanings of the word subject – subject to someone else by 
control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or 
self-knowledge.  Both meanings suggest a form of power which 
subjugates and makes subject to. (p. 21) 
 
 
As addressed in my discussion of professional socialization and identity in Chapter Two, 
members of social professions are tied to their identities through common ideology, 
knowledge, moral calling, status, power and community. 
 Writing about Foucault’s technologies of the self, Besley (2007) refers to 
subjectification as a possibility in the “ascetic practice of self-formation” (p. 59).  
Foucault (1997b) describes “self-formation of the subject” as “an exercise of the self 
upon the self by which one attempts to develop and transform oneself, and to attain a 
certain mode of being” (p. 282).  As with religious asceticism wherein the subject 
disciplines himself, professional asceticism applies a scientific method to groups of 
professionals.  Professional asceticism “… turns human beings into objects” that, for their 
own good or society’s good, subjects them to “discipline” such that they “collaborate in 
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their own subjection” (Macdonald, 1995, p. 175).  Professional asceticism is generally 
motivated by the desirable status of being professional.   
Summary 
In this chapter, I offered a conceptual analysis of professional codes of ethics.  I 
suggested that rules, rights and codes may serve important purposes in society and 
professions, but they are fundamentally afar from ethical activities—critical social 
processes that are dynamic, uncertain and ambiguous.  I described the present conditions 
of a technological society in which ethical activities are reduced to rules of efficiency and 
procedure.  I then explored the problems of technological, late-modern society (e.g. 
feelings of alienation, emphases on social correction) through various postmodern 
perspectives.  I attempted to link professional ethics code to its place in technological 
society through technologies of care and practices of monetized, professional care.  
Finally, I provided a brief and incomplete account of postmodern perspectives of ethics.  
I shared Levinas’s rejection of a “knowing” ethics and related Foucauldian insights on 
governmentality and technologies of self to expressions of ethics such as “do no harm” 
and professional agency.  From these postmodern critiques, other articulations of “ethics” 
emerge that necessarily point toward the limitations of professional ethics.  Specifically, 
the various scholars I included describe an ethical orientation that is more open, sensitive, 
responsive and generous in everyday life. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 FROM TOP DOWN TO BOTTOM UP:  FINDING ETHICS IN  
 
EVERYDAY PROFESSIONAL LIFE 
 
 
One can, obviously, behave ethically without engaging in ethics as a 
philosophical enterprise….  
—Nel Noddings, Caring:  A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education 
 
 In the previous two chapters I broadly surveyed sociological understandings of 
professionalism and philosophical analysis of ethics and ethics code, including feminist 
and postmodern perspectives.  Together, sociology of professions and moral philosophy 
provide broad context for the ideology of professional ethics and describe processes 
through which normative, prescriptive ethics are codified.  While examination of the 
sociology and philosophy behind “professional ethics” offers theoretical breadth, 
academic understandings of professionalism and normative ethics do not necessarily 
describe the lived experiences of ethics in social professions.  My primary research 
questions include:  (a) How do professional codes of ethics conventionally narrow the 
scope of what is “ethical” and, thereby, limit ethical possibility; (b) How might one’s 
sense of responsibility to another person shrink under professional procedure or good 
boundaries?  While the previous two chapters show how professional code binds and 
limits the scope of professional conduct and ethical practice, I have not sufficiently 
addressed how a professional might experience such narrowing.  To explore how the 
professional subject experiences and responds to the ethical structures of professionalism,
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I must ground the “ethical” within the artifacts of everyday professional life.  In this 
chapter, I develop bridges between the abstract (e.g. moral philosophy) and the lived 
world (e.g. social science).  Many of the scholars I draw from in this chapter write about 
ethics theory and research from interdisciplinary positions that include philosophy, 
psychiatry and ethnography.  After explaining a framework of empirical or pragmatic 
ethics, including pragmatic hermeneutics, I use film and narrative artifact to combine 
“factual” or descriptive accounts of the lived world with normative questions of judgment 
and value.  To help traverse a temporal bridge between professional ideology and the 
lived world, I also offer a queer reading of Kenny and Professor Falconer from Tom 
Ford’s 2009 film A Single Man.  This work of grounding and bridging leads me directly 
into the next chapter, in which I add qualitative research on ethical responsibility and 
professional boundaries with social workers and teachers. 
Ethics as “Being-in-the-World” 
Because professional social workers and teachers are immersed in practice that is 
already organized with purpose and structure, Heidegger’s sense of “being-in-the-world” 
is relevant and useful for grounding my research approach.  “Heidegger looks to the way 
Being emerges within the context of our everyday practical engagements—what he refers 
to as being-in-the-world.  The aim is not to begin with an already constituted subject but 
to focus on the emergence of subjectivity in a concrete historical situation” (Arfken, 
2006, p. 44).  Heidegger’s “being-in-the-world” is an initial step for moving my inquiry 
from ethics as metaphysics to ethics as a subject of practical activity.  This move helps 
me identify tensions between explanations of professional behavior as constituted 
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through tradition and discourse and professional behavior as not “already constituted” but 
emerging or becoming in everyday life.  While “professional ethics” and “applied ethics” 
typically have been developed and codified as a “rational process involving the 
application of ethical principles to practice” (Banks, 2008, p. 1241), Heidegger’s focus on 
practical involvement with the world through tools and traditions helps me to locate 
ethics in moments of interaction between people.  Thus, professional practice is a source 
of ethics and not just a setting where pre-determined ethics are applied. 
Thinking about ethics in terms of “Being-in-the-World” is not just a shift from 
abstraction to practice; rather, it bluntly confounds a Cartesian subject/object dichotomy 
that is necessary in applied ethics.  Applied ethics involves a professional subject who 
acts upon an object (e.g. student, client) with principled intentions or practices.  Borry, 
Schotsmans, and Dierickx (2008) explain that applied ethics is “based on a top-down 
rationalistic and deductive model” (p. 41).  With his notion of “Being-in-the-World,” 
Heidegger suggests that we dwell in or inhabit the world with pre-understanding and 
background knowledge that exceeds our intentionality.  Heidegger uses the term 
“comportment” to draw attention to “concrete engagements that precede any mentalistic 
commitments” (Arfken, 2006, p. 43).  In this sense, we are involved in the world in 
shifting contexts against multiple backgrounds.  By foregrounding ontology and practical 
involvement in the world, Heidegger draws attention to “a way of being that need not be 
grounded in intentionality” (2006, p. 43).   
In her work on Levinasian ethics, Todd (2003) makes a distinction between 
“applied ethics” and “implied ethics.”  Whereas “applied ethics” involves application of 
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an ethical principle or value onto a situation, “implied ethics” asserts a situation in which 
“… practices, technologies, discourses, and relationships always already participate in a 
field of ethical signification ...” (p. 14).  In other words, ethical conditions and 
signification exist prior to professional procedures, technologies and discourse.  Reduced 
social space for “implied ethics” (Todd, 2003, p. 29) and moral responsibility (Bauman, 
1995) can discourage individual engagement with others by disregarding the primary site 
of ethics—human encounter prior to pre-understandings and rationally determined 
procedures.  Borry et al. (2008) note that bioethics has “drifted away from a purely 
theory-driven approach towards moral theory that is more grounded in practical reality” 
(p. 41).   
Professional training and socialization generate “pre-understandings” of “ethical” 
behaviors and reflect Gadamer’s emphasis on history and tradition in understanding and 
interpreting phenomena (Laverty, 2003).  For example, Hick (1998) recalls traditions and 
events behind ethical principles in medical practice such as freedom, consent and self-
determination.  He makes a case that Kant’s emphasis on the birthright of freedom and 
events leading to the Nuremberg Code have made up (in part) a tradition for “respect for 
persons” and led toward legal client rights.  While Gadamer believed we cannot escape 
the “historicality of being” or our “prejudices” (e.g. respect for persons seems naturally 
ethical), he did believe that we can extend our perspectives toward new interpretations 
and meanings (Laverty, 2003, p. 11).   
A professional automaton may follow tradition and enact “ethical” behavior with 
technical expertise and unwavering precision.  She may control her own emotional 
	  
	   115	  
response through a dutiful performance of trained emotional labor.  González and Iffland 
(2014) explain “emotional labor” as the “personal manipulation or management of one’s 
emotions or feelings” to produce a sense of being cared for (p. 17).  Citing Eva Illouz 
(2008) they argue that the “emotional norm of self control” operates in bureaucracy 
through an ideal of “self-mastery” (pp. 17-18).  Upon studying members of social 
professions in the “real-world,” such ideals seem too mechanical and overly determined.  
Weinberg and Taylor (2014) report that regardless of increased “managerialism” and 
expansion of rules in social work, front-line practitioners sometimes “bend” the rules and 
sometimes follow the rules.  They report, “… practitioners did not turn to the rules 
enshrined in the codes as their major means of resolving ethical struggles…” (p. 79).  In 
other words, pre-determinations and pre-understandings cannot fully account for 
professional behavior as related to ethics.  They conclude with recommendation for the 
field of professional ethics to be “expanded to look at the situated nature of practitioners’ 
work and not rely solely on cognitively-based universal sets of principles” (p. 84).  
In an ethnographic study of ethical decision-making in community psychiatry, 
Brodwin (2013) describes “ethics wide” as “broad values and ideals” that assume a “false 
uniformity” (p. 17).  He continues to describe “ethics narrow” or everyday ethics as a  
“… sense of right and wrong and the way they [clinicians] figure their responsibility for 
particular others” (p. 17).  Ethics wide reflects the general principles or values of a 
profession.  However, when such principles and values are codified for the practical 
governance of a profession, they tend to prescribe specific behavior and, as often, 
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prohibit specific behavior.  Ethics narrow more closely reflects what happens in everyday 
professional practice.  Brodwin (2013) elaborates: 
 
… [T]ranscendent ideals are constantly questioned and modified through 
the give and flow of face-to-face encounters.  As an element in social life, 
high-order principles, virtues and norms are always already relational.  
They get mobilized only when people start to figure their responsibility, 
and hence their proper conduct, in concrete circumstances.  … This 
process becomes visible especially when they fell a mismatch between the 
inherited ideals and what the immediate situation demands.  Such 
moments prove that people are not social automatons or simple vehicles 
for the reproduction of existing arrangements and ideologies. (pp. 17-18) 
 
 
 To the question of my dissertation—is ethical possibility constrained or restricted 
under pre-determined professional code and discourse—I need empirical information to 
further my conceptual analysis.  McMillan and Hope (2008) recommend research that 
“combines empirical work with ethical analysis,” when “ethical analysis identifies key 
empirical questions” (p. 17).  Two empirical questions from my dissertation include:   
(1) Countering normative understandings of ethics, how might breaches of professional 
norms be understood (by professional subjects) as potential sites of moral action?   
(2) Does the professional subject experience the ethical structures of professionalism in 
“second thoughts and fleeting moments of self-doubt” (Brodwin, 2013, p. 4)?  I approach 
these empirical, phenomenological questions from an anti-foundational, pragmatic 
stance.  A top-down approach moves along paths from the universal to the particular and 
has been faulted as “insufficient” to ethically guide the activities of professionals 
(Campillo et al., 2014, p. 4).  A pragmatic or bottom-up approach focuses on everyday 
professional practice that is uniquely situated in existing relationships. 
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Pragmatic Assessment of Ethics Codes 
Pragmatic approaches to professional ethics take up concerns and questions about 
the usefulness of codes, guidelines, principles, values and discursive traditions.  What is 
the usefulness of such equipment in everyday practice?  What happens when such 
equipment is no longer useful for a particular situation?  When empirical research 
demonstrates what is classified as “rule-bending” behavior, does that evidence negatively 
impute professional behavior (e.g. “She should have followed the rules.”) or the 
usefulness of the rules (e.g. “The rules were unjust in this situation.”)?  Heidegger 
remarks, “The equipmental quality of the equipment consists indeed of its usefulness” 
(1997, p.48).  From a Heideggerian perspective, a code of ethics can be thought of as a 
tool or piece of equipment that is “ready at hand” or “available” (Moran, 2000, p. 233).  
Professionals readily use codified rules as they are helpful.  They may be useful for 
adherence to stated ethical norms or other purposes like procedural efficiency.  As Gibbs 
(2010) notes, “Our work can be disrupted when the equipment becomes conspicuous by 
not functioning” (p. 278).  “Unready-at-hand” refers to equipment that might have once 
helped but no longer does; since the properties of the equipment have not changed, such 
conspicuousness leads to a more theoretical, scientific examination of the equipment 
(Gibbs, 2010).  When thought of as equipment and considered for usefulness, 
professional codes of ethics become conspicuous when experienced as impeding or 
irrelevant to ethical action.  Such “unreadiness” may lead one to question the essential 
ethicality of professional codes of ethics. 
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 Brodwin (2013) provides rich description of the very processes that Heidgegger 
and others have conceptualized.   In reading the following introductory passage to 
Brodwin’s ethnography of a community psychiatry mental health team, it is useful to 
think of ethics code as an “apparatus” for work. 
 
Taking a moral stance interrupts the flow of work, if only for a moment, 
and exposes the background justifications for action.  Most of the time, 
frontline staff are immersed in the demands of the day.  They must 
manage the crisis that just blew up in their face or carefully move a given 
case to the next step in an intricate dance of paperwork and phone calls.  
But when their efforts fail, or when success would mean abandoning other 
ideals, clinicians can start to question the very apparatus for work.  A 
ripple of conscience pushes them to rethink just what the paperwork 
accomplishes or what warrants their power over clients.  Most of the time 
it remains just a ripple – not a full-blown critique of the workplace and its 
foundational value.  Everyday ethics is a matter of second thoughts and 
fleeting moments of self-doubt.  People reflect in passing on what they 
just did or witnessed someone else doing, and why it disturbed them.  
Afterwards, they plunge back into their usual routines. (Brodwin, 2013, p. 
4) 
 
 
By describing the “terrain of everyday ethics” (2013, p. 1), Brodwin conveys the quick 
pace of work in community psychiatry and ethical consternation in “fleeting moments.”  
If we assume ethics code is a possible “apparatus for work” (i.e. “equipment”), the 
background justifications of ethics code become exposed by a professional’s “moral 
stance” outside of the code’s parameters.  The professional’s own vocational ideals or 
internalization of social values rub up against formal ethical norms causing a “ripple of 
conscience.”  After close study of “workplace ethos” and the “logics of care” in an 
“Assertive Community Treatment” (ACT) facility, Brodwin (2013) suggests that the 
“ethical” voices of professional clinicians are “soft, fugitive, and often drowned out by 
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the contingencies of practice” (p. 22).  I concur that “second thoughts and fleeting 
moments of self-doubt” are frequent phenomena within social professions.  Such 
thoughts and moments of self-doubt might disclose “ethical signification” prior to the 
enactment of professional duty.  Empirical study of everyday ethics offer a way to 
understand what is happening and, potentially, a way to make professional ethics more 
relevant and meaningful in everyday practice. 
Pragmatic Hermeneutics 
 In developing theory and methods for studying ethics empirically, Widdershoven 
and van der Scheer (2008) draw upon the hermeneutic phenomenology of Heidegger and 
Gadamer in outlining “pragmatic hermeneutics.”  As opposed to prescriptive principles 
and rules of conduct, descriptive ethics intends to construct professional ethics from the 
practitioners’ perceptions, values, beliefs and actions (Banks, 2008).  Offering a research 
methodology that combines empirical work with ethical analysis, Widdershoven and van 
der Scheer (2008) describe medical practice as a source of ethics (p. 24).   
 In line with pragmatic orientations to ethics, Widdershoven and van der Scheer 
(2008) first claim that “the meaning of concepts lies in their practical consequences” (p. 
25).  Within professional practice14 they ask, “Which issues are relevant to practice?” and 
“What problems do practitioners experience?” (2008, p. 24).  Without framing problems 
within “strictly defined principles,” they are critical of solving problems through 
“abstract procedures” (2008, pp. 25-26).  Thus, they suggest that the problems of practice 
are the “proper” objects for “normative analysis” (2008, p. 24).  This is how they fuse the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Widdershoven and van der Scheer (2008) refer to psychiatric or medical practice.  I am 
extending their scope to include professional practice in the social professions. 
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normative work of moral philosophy with empirical work.  For example, a professional 
teacher who develops a relationship with a student living in the foster care system may 
demonstrate forms of parental care for her student that is outside of what might be 
considered “normal” teacher care.  A minor example might be that she makes her student 
a birthday cake.  This might become a problem of practice if issues of “boundary 
crossing” come up.  Is she now taking on a parental role?  Does that lead to concerns 
about favoritism or conflict of interest?  Through my research I also address questions of 
relevance and problems of practice.  Are codes of ethics and professional ethics relevant 
to practice and do they generate problems for practitioners or lose their usefulness in 
particular situations?   
 In their second claim, Widdershoven and van der Scheer’s (2008) assert that 
“experienced persons have practical knowledge about what is good and bad in the 
concrete situation” (p. 32).  They draw from Aristotelian “phronèsis,” or “practical 
wisdom,” to suggest that acting or judging from one’s practical insight results in 
“appropriate application of the rules” and makes normative content more visible (p. 31).  
Baptista (2012) explains that “control” and “courage” are the two virtues associated with 
“phronèsis.”  These counterbalancing virtues reflect an understanding of ethics as 
“prudential wisdom,” which leads to “thoughtful and sensible action” (p. 40).   
 Returning to my previous example, if it is understood that other students in the 
class and their parents do not find favoritism in the teacher’s act of making a birthday 
cake for her student in foster care, then there is no problem except, perhaps, in the 
relevancy of a rule (i.e. “Should there be a rule prohibiting such action?”).  If concerns 
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about favoritism or conflict of interest do arise, could they be addressed through a 
process of dialogical ethics15?  The teacher could make a “normative claim” that the child 
should have a birthday cake. While a birthday cake may hold limited significance, in the 
next chapter I report on professional social workers and teachers who could make a 
normative claim that everyone should have a parent or guardian.  There, I describe the 
experiences of social workers and teachers who become foster or adoptive parents or 
guardians to youth who they met in professional contexts.   
 Finally, Widdershoven and van der Scheer (2008) describe a hermeneutic or 
interpretive, dialogical process in relation to the “phronèsis” of the experienced person.  
They “do not assume that the views of practitioners are perfect; they are open for 
improvement,” and there is a “process of negotiation between people investigating each 
other’s views and responding to each other’s claims” (p. 32).  While such pragmatic 
orientations allow for continual improvement and include processes for changing 
ineffectual foundational ideology, they do not fit the form of codes.  Rather, pragmatism 
can guide teams of professional colleagues and supervisors toward determining how 
ethical principles may or may not apply and toward responding to the particularities of 
the situation.  I show how this might look in practice in my analysis section of Chapter 
Five. 
 By privileging the practical knowledge and insight of experienced professionals, 
Widdershoven and van der Scheer (2008) may under-theorize the subjugating effects of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Koehn (1998) rethinks feminist care ethics to include critical openness, relation to others, 
sensitivity to power dynamics, and critical conversation. She articulates her case as a principled 
dialogical ethic. 
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professional identity and performance.  As I explained in Chapter Three, professional 
identity and the background practices of professional schooling can be understood as 
technologies of the self in which, by striving to be professional, professionals collaborate 
in their own subjugation.  Such subjugation would likely call into question the phronèsis 
of the experienced professional.  Nonetheless, they suggest that such questions could be 
worked through in processes of negotiation and dialogue with others.  Widdershoven and 
van der Scheer (2008) write: 
 
Pragmatic hermeneutics stresses the importance of practical processes of 
meaning-making, related to concrete problems.  It is critical of all attempts 
to frame the problem in terms of strictly defined principles and to solve it 
through abstract procedures. . . . [Pragmatic hermeneutics] emphasizes 
that moral knowledge is not theoretical, but embedded in action. (pp. 25-
26)   
 
 
Pragmatic hermeneutics, “being in the world” and descriptive ethics provide sound 
justifications for conducting human science research to study questions of professional 
ethics.  Such approaches contextualize ethics by taking into account “commitments to 
specific others, motives and emotions” (Banks, 2008, p. 1243).  Thus, they provide an 
approach to the study of ethics that is embedded in the everyday lives of professionals—
an approach that is commensurable with “being in the world.” 
 “Being-in-the-World” Vignettes 
 To traverse aforementioned bridges between prescriptive or normative ethics of 
professional code (what we ought to do) and descriptive or empirical ethics (what is 
done) of professional practice, I offer two vignettes in this chapter, and then explore 
breaches of professional norms for ethical possibilities in the following chapter.  I follow 
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Van Manen’s (1990) statement about human science research claiming that “any lived-
experience description is an appropriate source for uncovering thematic aspects of the 
phenomenon that it describes” (p. 92).  My first vignette is a poem that I wrote in 2001 
when I was practicing social work.  In the poem I explore and trouble the boundaries of 
the professional workday and aforementioned practices of self-mastery and emotional 
labor.  Through my second vignette, I offer a detailed interpretation of a professional 
boundary violation through the character of Professor Falconer in the film (and book) A 
Single Man.  These vignette bridges swing and sway; they may lead to vertigo.  Bridges 
into “being-in-the-world” are not made of “foundational” materials like concrete and 
steel and offer no guarantees of safe passage. 
Emotional Labor on the Clock 
 After completing my Master of Social Work (MSW) degree, I accepted a job as a 
“family worker” in a residential treatment program serving adolescent males and their 
families.  Along with general case management, I worked closely with a group of twelve 
adolescents and monitored the progress of their treatment during their residencies, which 
typically continued for about one year.  Because it was a “24/7,” live-in program for the 
residents, I extended my contact hours with them by remaining on campus after 5 p.m., 
eating meals with them and occasionally participating in off-campus hiking/camping 
trips.  While residents bonded with different staff members, I generally developed close, 
trusting relationships with my group members, and they frequently requested one-to-one 
time to talk with me.   
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 In mid-summer of 2001, I wrote the following poem: 
 
 
Office Hours 
 
Tuesday morning: 
I think I’m here at 9 am to listen while you tell me. 
 
Tell me how it is to always fall short, 
 to falter over hurdles using your own bridled maneuvers. 
Tell me how it is to set the bar just out of reach, 
 to open old wounds as you reach for it. 
Tell me how it is when you withhold your own love to prove yourself 
unlovable, 
 to prove yourself right. 
While rusted teeth clamp into blood-drained flesh in a trap that you’ve 
sprung for yourself, 
 tell me. 
I turn it on – only during office hours. 
I press down just enough to probe the pain and just enough to stop the 
bleeding. 
 
Professional.  I sit next to you. 
And, when you might believe I care, I turn it off and head home. 
I keep the office keys and write my own hours. 
 
Until I’m home and wonder who is telling you … 
Until I’m driving and find a question I might have asked … 
Until I wake up and recall beauty in tears falling from your eyes …  
 
Then, I know that you write my hours,  
And, we’re both alive outside of nine to five. 
 
 This poem speaks to the professional experience of “emotional labor” and the 
organization of time.  As a professional agent of rationalized, commodified care, I 
struggled with the temporal containment of care and emotional labor as a “norm of self 
control” and “self-mastery” (González & Iffland, 2014).  I struggled with boundaries.  
While the expectation of “not taking your work home with you” may signify good 
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professional boundaries, it also seems incongruent with genuine caring relation.  
Mechanistic processes of locking and unlocking—turning on and turning off—become 
conspicuous and “unready” in the context of caring relationship.  By recognizing that 
“we’re both alive outside of nine to five,” I disclosed an experience of a more continuous 
relationship with the Other, one that isn’t easily broken down into work hours or 
compartmentalized into “professional” or “personal.”  Within the instrumental aims of 
professional activity, the spillage from such compartmentalization could be cited as 
justification for more clear and specific professional codes of behavior.  While 
instrumental for maintaining professional norms, such a case would not have ethical 
justification from either a care perspective or a Kantian perspective of ethics. 
 In Chapter Three I introduced feminist care ethics and described Heywood’s 
(1993) warning that “withholding intimacy and authentic emotional connection from 
those who seek our help” might be considered “abusive” (p. 10).  González and Iffland 
(2014) ask, “Is there something exploitative about a social norm that considers the 
maintenance of certain emotional states (e.g., ‘caring for’) as constitutive of professional 
excellence?” (p. 19).  Both perspectives disclose something about the felt experiences of 
emotional labor and professional care.  González and Iffland (2014) elaborate:  
 
For if the emotional labor of a professional ‘carer’ requires her to 
reconfigure and conform her emotions (what she cares about and who she 
cares for) to the personal needs and demands of others, then it seems to 
require that she give up her capacity for self-determination and her 
capacity to choose what she (as opposed to others) treats as an object of 
ultimate concern.  For the professional ‘carer,’ emotional labor seems to 
pose a threat to one’s development as an autonomous moral agent. … This 
can lead us to ask whether the rationalization of emotional labor by 
institutions—its being taught, studied, acquired, and treated as a kind of 
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professional competency—would prevent a professional carer from 
achieving personal agency or moral autonomy.  (p. 19) 
 
 
González and Iffland’s discussion of professional caring draws from Kantian ideals of 
moral agency and autonomy.  Accordingly, the threat to individual moral development 
comes from impediments to one’s freedom, self-determination, and personal identity.  
From a care ethics perspective, control or mastery of emotional labor threatens to impede 
the development of mutual and interdependent commitments.  Both critiques challenge 
the professionalization of care for threatening or narrowing ethical possibility.   
 As I express in the poem “Office Hours,” social professionals and workers who 
provide care may experience the division of time—distinctions of professional time and 
person time—conspicuously.  The rationalization of the work day and the control that is 
granted to the professional with her arrival and departure, her presence and absence may, 
at worst, erode some of the efficacy of social professions and likely sounds a bit absurd to 
anyone who has been part of genuinely caring relationship.  
Performance and Ethical Response in A Single Man 
As performer, the professional acts in correspondence to the social cues, purposes 
and contexts of a situation while remaining threaded to professional ideology.  The 
twenty-first century professional manages her appearance, speech and gestures as she acts 
out her role in the real world.  Erving Goffman (1959) theorizes performance and 
impression management in Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.  Goffman describes the 
self as a “performer” and “character” with social origins (p. 252).  The role of 
professional is learned in both explicit (formal education) and tacit ways.  Character is 
	  
	   127	  
credited or discredited depending on how well the audience receives and believes the 
performance.  According to Goffman (1959), “... performance is ‘socialized,’ molded, 
and modified to fit into the understanding and expectations of the society in which it is 
presented” (p. 35).   
 In the opening scene of A Single Man, Professor George Falconer selects a freshly 
pressed and dry-cleaned shirt and lightly polishes his shoes.  Next, he observes himself in 
front of the bathroom mirror and carefully combs his hair.  He narrates, “It takes time in 
the morning for me to become George.  Time to adjust to what is expected of George and 
how he is to behave.  By the time I’ve dressed and put the final air of polish on a now 
slightly stiff but quite perfect George, I know fully what part I’m supposed to play.”  
George’s morning routine takes place on the “back stage”—a place that is closed and 
hidden from the audience (Goffman, 1959).  To become the professor who teaches 
literature to college students, he must develop a front, which “functions in a general and 
fixed fashion to define the situation for those who observe the performance” (p. 22).  The 
“slightly stiff but quite perfect George” is a “collective representation” with its own 
meaning and stability aside from George, himself.   Convincingly performed, the subject 
before the class is imputed as Professor Falconer.   
George describes the result of his front as “stiff but quite perfect.”  He has grown 
accustomed to what Goffman (1959) referred to as “bureaucratization of the spirit.” 
Goffman explains, “A certain bureaucratization of spirit is expected so that we can be 
relied upon to give a perfectly homogeneous performance at every appointed time” (p. 
56).   “Bureaucratization of spirit” describes socialization processes that not only 
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transfigure but also “fix” the character, the self or, in this case, the professional.  
Professional schooling significantly contributes to fixing professional identity.  Goffman 
(1959) refers to a “rhetoric of training” in which aspiring professionals experience a 
“mystical range and period of training” to “… foster the impression that the licensed 
practitioner is someone who has been reconstituted by his learning experience” (p. 46).  
One becomes a professional through particular regimes of truth, ways of knowing and 
performing.  The necessary training and subsequent professional role cooperate to 
subjugate the person and constitute identity.   
The commodification of human interaction occurs where being together serves 
some purpose external to those present.  Institutional purposes are guided by correct 
procedures and implemented through professional practice.  Professional practice 
operates to maintain the status quo.  Resonant of Bauman’s (1995) description of episodic 
“mis-meetings,” the commodification of human interaction renders togetherness 
“inconsequential.”  According to Bauman (1995), ways of being together are often 
“episodic, fragmented, strategic and disengaged” and “inconsequential in the sense of not 
leaving a lasting legacy of mutual rights / obligations in their wake” (pp. 49-50).  Mutual 
rights and obligations are the moral consequences that follow openness and vulnerability 
to an Other, or, in Bauman’s terms, “being for.”  “Being for” comes with risk and 
ambiguity, not preconceived consequences following contractual encounters. 
Imputed as professional through social interaction, the subject does 
professionalism.  There is no substance beyond the enactment.  People who do 
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professionalism do not choose or create a professional self; rather, they learn the social 
cues and contexts for doing professionalism.  Goffman (1959) writes,  
  
A correctly staged and performed scene leads the audience to impute  
 a self to a performed character, but this imputation – this self – is a  
 product of a scene that comes off, and is not a cause of it.  The self,  
 then, as a performed character, is not an organic thing that has a  
 specific location . . . ; it is a dramatic effect arising diffusely from a  
 scene that is presented, and the characteristic issue, the crucial concern,  
 is whether it will be credited or discredited. (pp. 252-253) 
 
 
George Falconer narrates the opening scene of A Single Man in third person to frame 
professional George -- Professor George Falconer -- as performance.  Taken as 
performance, the conspicuousness of professional relationship boundaries becomes as 
scrutable as scripted parts in a play that someone has authored.  One realizes that the 
stability of performance is vulnerable.  The perceived verity of a social construction can 
be undone.  
A professional’s constitution is complete when the performance comes across as 
believable or natural.  When assessing a person’s fit toward a particular role or position, 
we hear comments such as “she really has what it takes” or “he’s a natural” or “she has a 
real calling.”  When somebody seems to have “ideal qualifications” for a given role, 
Goffman (1959) refers to an impression of “sacred compatibility” (p. 46).  Necessary for 
creditability, a compatible or natural effect safeguards against strains or discontinuities in 
the performance.  While there is no essential professional—no such thing as 
“professional” outside of the enactment—the impression of “natural” professionalism 
persists. 
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 Viewers of A Single Man learn that George’s boyfriend and partner for many 
years died in a tragic automobile accident.  George deals with debilitating grief and 
depression; his world – his routines, habits and pursuits – is undone.  Meaning and 
significance drain away from previous activities, like teaching.  At the start of the film 
George dresses in professional attire, forcing a tired performance that no longer feels 
“natural” to him.  He exemplifies the “cynic” (Goffman, 1959, p. 18), who no longer 
believes in his own performance.  Eventually, George stashes a gun in his brief case, 
clears out his office and settles his financial affairs.  The viewer interprets this sequence 
of events as George’s intention to end his pain through suicide.  However, George’s 
forthcoming encounter with one of his students, Kenny, disrupts this ego-driven spiral 
toward death.   
 Kenny responds to Professor Falconer’s teaching and follows up classroom 
discussion by speaking with his professor outside of class.  After Professor Falconer has 
cleared out his office, he sits in his car in the college parking lot and anxiously eyes the 
gun in his briefcase.  At this moment, Kenny startles Professor Falconer by tapping on 
the driver-side window.  Falconer tersely answers, 
 
 “Yes, Mr. Potter?” 
 
[Kenny asks,] “Are you going somewhere, sir?” 
 
“That is usually why people get into their cars.” 
 
“No, I mean are you going on vacation or something?” 
 
“What?” 
 
“I saw you cleaning out your office.” 
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“What exactly is it that you want, Kenny?” 
 
“I was just hoping that we could get together for a drink sometime.” 
 
“And, why is that?” 
 
“I don’t know, sir.  Because I think you might like it.  And, because you seem as 
though you could use a friend.” 
 
“Oh, really?” 
 
“Yes, sir.  You do.” 
 
[pause] “Well, you may be right.  But, it’ll have to be another time.  I’m late.  
[pause] Thank you for the invitation.  And, thank you for the talk earlier … .”   
 
[Professor Falconer drives away.] 
 
 
 In this scene Professor Falconer and his student Kenny encounter one another 
outside of classroom staging.  The professional performance is more vulnerable to 
disruption on a less familiar, less equipped stage.  Although Professor Falconer initially 
maintains his scripted distance, he cannot deny the truth of Kenny’s statement, “… you 
seem as though you could use a friend.”  In that exact moment role boundaries become 
conspicuous and the interaction between George and Kenny shifts.  Professor Falconer 
slips—revealing a shadow of his former self, someone who could use a friend.   
 George’s interaction with Kenny demonstrates the possibility of love through 
breached professional relationship boundaries.  The possibility of love exceeds the death-
drive when teacher/student roles relax in momentary openness.  Linking psychoanalytic 
theory and Levinasian ethics, Todd (2003) describes connecting with an Other in such a 
way that the limits of the ego are exceeded. 
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Through love, the Other disrupts the stability of the ego, insofar  
 as the ego becomes extended, its identity challenged and called into  
 question in the very connection it establishes with the Other.  In this  
 sense, love lends itself to the conditions of commitment, whereby the  
 drive for connection involves a certain capacity for openness that  
 surpasses the ego itself. (p. 84) 
 
 
Relationship that pushes beyond the ego-driven limits of self-mastery creates space for 
non-rational care (or love) that is active and interpersonal, if not mutual.16     
 Later in the film, Kenny follows George into a bar near George’s home.  They 
share some Scotch and, in an agreement to live in the present moment, they cross the 
street onto a California beach for a moonlit swim “in the buff.”  Sexual tensions arise 
once they return to George’s house.  Present desire confounds George’s own sense of 
foolishness for having his student, now only wearing a towel, in his home.  When Kenny 
is out of the room, George declares himself, “pathetic.”  Looking weary and tired, he 
eventually falls asleep.  When he wakes up at 3 am, he finds Kenny asleep on the sofa 
safely holding and stowing away the gun that George had earlier contemplated suicide 
over.   
Breach of professional code is usually understood as moral failing deserving the 
guilt and shame that follow.  Looking guilty during an unscripted moment and shared 
connection with Kenny, George sees himself as “pathetic.”  When breaches of 
professionalism happen we rarely question codes of professionalism, because the codes 
seemingly provide “natural order.”  Rather than questioning routine norms and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Levinasian ethics emphasize asymmetry or non-reciprocity between Self and Other.  
Professional relationships also tend to be non-reciprocal.  However, Alexander and Charles 
(2009) trouble that notion by reporting that social workers in their qualitative study describe 
“awareness of the mutuality within their relationships with clients” (p. 5). 
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boundaries, the “good” professional feels “pathetic” and experiences self-doubt for 
stepping out of order. 
 In fact, codes at once become scrutable through breaches that rupture their 
seamless enactment.  Only by stepping off, or being thrown off, of the stage of do we 
recall the limits of the stage itself.  Only from where we land on the floor do we begin to 
notice the lights, the curtains, the props and all the various elements that support such a 
performance.  Outside the limits, we can begin to discern what Butler describes as 
“performativity.”  As cited in Sullivan (2003) performativity “consists in a reiteration of 
norms which precede, constrain, and exceed the performer and in that sense cannot be 
taken as the fabrication of the performer’s ‘will’ or ‘choice’ (1993b: 24, emphasis in 
original)” (p. 89).  I contend that professional identity, like gendered identity, can also be 
understood as performativity. 
As a student, Kenny is expected to perform the corresponding part with his 
teacher on the social stage known as school.  By approaching his teacher in the parking 
lot, by speaking to him in a personal manner, by following his teacher into a bar and 
going skinny-dipping with him, Kenny resists the narrow student role.  Professor 
Falconer, a bit out of sorts due to recent tragedy and his own despair, becomes open to 
Kenny as his well-practiced, professional performance has been derailed.  Both men 
reach openness with each other—each open to being changed by the other.  Openness to 
one another requires resistance to rote performance and generates the possibility of loving 
and becoming.   
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In [Thomas] Alexander’s paraphrase of Gadamer, ‘while I cannot  
go beyond finitude, I can go beyond my finitude in the moment when 
I become genuinely open to another. [. . . ] Through our capacity to  
love, we achieve a finite transcendence’ (1997:  340). (Alexander as  
cited in Hall, 2009, p. 57) 
 
 
 Being open to an Other and going beyond one’s own finitude involves risk.  Since 
professional code is seen as a “natural order,” breaches are taken as unnatural and 
immoral.  George and Kenny disrupt the “natural” authority and distance of 
teacher/student relations by meeting outside of the schoolyard—outside of proper 
surveillance.  George could be fired for “improper conduct.”  His desire for a student, 
who is thirty years younger, could be interpreted as deviance.  I am not arguing that abuse 
of power or position is okay or that such incidents should be covered over.  I am 
suggesting that power abuse is not the only possible interpretation of breached 
professional relation.  Breaking rules or disrupting the status quo can also be understood 
as resistance to a naturalizing order.  In the case of Kenny and Professor Falconer, one 
might argue that their presence together was already imbued with ethical signification.  
Kenny’s actions and Professor Falconer’s vulnerabilities opened a space for ethical 
possibility. 
 By staying with George on the night that he intended to kill himself, Kenny 
demonstrates a sense of moral intuition and commitment.  Before going to sleep he 
secures the gun that George carried with him throughout the day.  While George’s gun 
and implications of suicide were not part of the original novel by Christopher Isherwood 
(1964), the film provides heightened drama by inferring that Kenny may have “saved” 
George’s life.  Although this might sound like a heroic, Hollywood-scripted storyline, 
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Kenny did not plan to be heroic or moral.  He did not plan to “save” Professor Falconer.  
Rather, he risked openness.  Openness to the Other who stands in front of us germinates 
the possibility for moral action.  But, to become open to the Other, one must risk 
discontinuity and ambiguity; one must risk disrobing “regulatory fictions”17 under 
uncertain conditions that render one vulnerable. 
 Tom Ford’s film adaptation of Christopher Isherwood’s (1964) novel A Single 
Man beautifully discloses intimacy and care in student/teacher relations.  It defies the 
typical tropes of “heroic teacher/at-risk student” by positioning Professor Falconer as 
vulnerable, even suicidal.  Kenny resists playing the passive student, pushes back against 
Professor Falconer’s practiced, rigid performance and creates enough space for a certain 
openness to develop.  In a twist of the typical teacher-savior film (e.g. Dangerous Minds, 
Gran Torino, Freedom Writers), the student becomes responsible for the teacher.  This 
suggests “implied ethics” in human meeting and togetherness even in a professional 
world of procedures and regulations.  It reveals the moral potential that exists in relation 
to Others.   
A queer reading of A Single Man, such as the one that I have provided, 
demonstrates how queer theory can challenge ethical prescriptions and disclose ethical 
possibilities.  According to Schlasko (2006), queer theory critiques “all claims of 
normalcy, and the process by which the borders of the normal are defined and policed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 I borrow this phrase from Judith Butler’s description of gender norms.  As explained by Nikki 
Sullivan, “Ontologies of gender are integral to the production of these fictions that regulate ways 
of being and ways of knowing, and to the representation of these fictions as truth” (2003, p. 84).  
Through the proliferation of professionalism, I suggest that professional norms also function as 
“regulatory fictions.” 
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(Britzman, 1998; Green, 1996; Morris, 2000)” (p. 125).  Applicable to everday life, it can 
help us to “acknowledge the constructedness of meaning and identity and thus to begin to 
imagine alternative ways of thinking and of living” (Sullivan, 2003, p. 51).  By exposing 
“natural” professionalism as regulatory regime that validates performance over 
responsiveness and identity over action, we can begin to see more clearly how 
professional norms operate to diminish unscripted ethical possibility  
Summary 
 The vignettes I share in this chapter are important for bringing ethical abstractions 
and sociological theory into an experiential field of “being in the world.”  With these two 
vignettes I describe and interpret the actual (what is) rather than applying ethical norms 
(what ought to be) onto real-world situations.  Recognizing implied ethical signification 
within the hurried world of professional practice loosens the grip of prescriptive codes 
and opens possibilities for empirical study of ethics and, potentially, more responsive, 
pragmatic professional practice.  Locating moral knowledge in action rather than abstract 
theory foregrounds practitioner experience and elevates the values that are most relevant 
in particular situations.  As well, it pushes back against professional rationalization that 
constitutes, treats and protects whole populations but sometimes reduces “persons” to 
“objects of disregard” (Smart, 1999, p. 4).  As the study participants in my next chapter 
demonstrate, it sometimes takes the full person—not just professional duty—to 
participate in a situation ethically and responsively.
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CHAPTER V 
 CROSSING LINES, OPENING ETHICAL SPACE:   
 
PROFESSIONALS BECOMING PARENTS 
 
 
 Social workers and teachers rarely make the nightly news unless they are subjects 
of salacious stories that detail professional transgressions through sexual misconduct and 
broken boundaries.  Apparently, public outrage does not tire of sex scandal stories.  In 
light of hyper-coverage of “unethical” behavior among social professionals, I want to 
explore professional boundary transgressions from a different angle.  When someone 
moves from a professional role to a personal role with a student or client, is that 
unethical?  Many may respond, “It depends.”  What is to be said of teachers or social 
workers who break professional roles with young people in order to pursue parental 
roles?  What can we learn about ethical possibility or the limits of professional ethics 
code by exploring boundary transgressions that happen for seemingly “ethical” reasons?  
Are there professional costs for action that involves breaking with standard procedure 
pursuant of personal morality or responsibility?  I directed my attention to these questions 
while conducting interviews with teachers and social workers in order to better 
understand professional ethics in practice and operations of codes of ethics as tools of 
practice.
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 In the qualitative component of my dissertation study, I explore “positive 
boundary crossings” (Doel et al., 2010, p. 1884) in order to better understand how norms 
and codes are experienced in situations where the professional disregards some part of 
them.  All of my participants became parents or guardians to students or clients with 
whom they worked.  Professional boundaries are generally assumed to prevent 
professionals from becoming too personally involved with the people they serve.  
Qualitative inquiry helps me to describe the ethical sensibilities of professionals in 
situations where they act against some aspect of professional procedure.  Since I am 
interested in how professional ethics and codes of ethics might diminish ethical 
responsibility among professional agents, study of “positive boundary crossings” may 
reasonably provide descriptive material.   
 Doel et al. (2010) studied professional boundaries among social workers and 
found that a clear majority relied on their own senses when making choices and 
judgments with no reference to formal guidance or professional codes of practice.  
Similarly, in a Canadian study of social workers, researchers found that while “rules did 
serve as technologies to regulate and normalize practitioners’ behaviours, they were not 
monolithic in their consequences” (Weinberg & Taylor, 2014, p. 74).  Weinberg and 
Taylor (2014) also found that increases in rules tended to “promote ‘rogue’ or rule-
bending behavior” (p. 74).  Given that these studies point toward relatively minor 
oversight from ethics code, I designed an empirical research component to elaborate upon 
findings from prior studies.  If ethics code is confirmed to be relatively inconsequential to 
“boundaries” in practice, we can better understand what motivated or compelled 
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professionals to take on parental responsibilities and, thus, better understand ethics in real 
practice situations. 
Methods:  Qualitative Interviews and Phenomenological Sensitivity 
Bowen (2005) describes, “The main strength of qualitative research is that it 
yields data that provide depth and detail to create understanding of phenomena and lived 
experiences” (p. 209).  To understand the experience of relationship boundary 
transgressions and “ethics” embedded in professional action, I conducted in-depth 
interviews with professional teachers and social workers who became parents or 
guardians to their students or clients.  Conducting interviews allowed me to explore and 
gather experiential narratives (Van Manen, 1990, p. 66).  In talking with participants who 
crossed professional life / private life boundaries, I located ethics within lived, 
professional practice rather than set rules, principles or codes.  While the independent 
actions of my participants moved against the professional “grain,” participants were also 
formally socialized into professional ethics, which favors approved institutional 
procedure. Thus, their professional socialization (including identity development through 
institutional training, discourse and ethics codes) was apparently at odds with their 
common action – taking on a parental role with a client or student.  Does this action 
reveal a sense of moral responsibility against professional preferences for moral 
inaction?  What meaning can be found in participants’ stories?  Participants’ narrative 
and descriptive materials provide a site of inquiry for better understanding “moral 
knowledge” as “embedded in action” (Widdershoven and Van der Scheer, 2008, p. 25-
26). 
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Participants:  Social Workers and Teachers 
As an interdisciplinary study in professional and relational ethics, my dissertation 
crosses typical professional categories.  To organize my study, I chose to focus on an 
existing body of theory and literature concerned with “social professions,” professions 
rooted in social care, social control, education and advocacy (Banks, 2003; Baptista, 
2012).  Finding this designation more indicative of the common tasks of social work and 
education than “caring” or “helping” professions, which tend to include medical fields 
like nursing, I transferred “social professions” from its European origins to a U.S. 
context.  I decided that public school teachers and non-clinical social workers are 
representative of social professions in the United Statues.  I excluded clinical social 
workers because their professional knowledge base comes from clinical psychology and 
mental health practice.  Their therapeutic orientation to practice differs significantly in 
purpose and process from non-clinical social professions.  For example, in clinical work, 
the integrity of the therapeutic process is maintained through awareness of transference 
and countertransference18.  While I think that a clinical social worker and his or her client 
can choose to end a therapeutic relationship and enter a different kind of relationship in 
ethical ways, I wanted to avoid the complexities of therapeutic professions in the 
empirical part of my study.  Thus, clinical social workers were not eligible to participate.  
As well, my professional background is in education and social work.  When 
interviewing other teachers and social workers about professional ethics and practice, my 
familiarity with these fields (especially the discourse of ethics in these fields) was helpful 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The way in which the client’s feelings are directed onto the therapist and how the therapist 
might also direct feelings toward the client. 
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for developing rapport and understanding a common professional language.  Based on the 
aforementioned considerations, I chose to interview K-12 teachers and non-clinical social 
workers who became foster or adoptive parents to youth who they first met in 
professional contexts (see Appendix A for the full recruitment advertisement).  During 
the recruitment process I decided to allow “legal guardians,” as well as one informal / 
temporary care provider, to participate. 
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro Office of Research Integrity 
approved my study with “no more than minimal” risk to participants.  I created and 
shared materials for informed consent and measures for confidentiality.  I began 
recruiting for participants and wanted to identify a purposeful sample of four to six.  I 
intentionally selected a small sample because the interviews are only one component 
within this broader interdisciplinary project.  With somewhat narrow eligibility 
requirements, I selected participants with “lived experience” relevant to the focus of the 
study, who were “willing to talk about their experience” and who were diverse enough 
from one another to enhance possibilities of rich and unique stories of the particular 
experience (Polkinghorne; Van Manen, 1997)” (Laverty, 2003, p. 18).  To begin, I 
initiated a national recruitment strategy that included advertising through personal and 
professional networks, various foster care and adoption organizations, “LinkedIn” groups 
and various child welfare-related and professional listserves. 
Between March and June of 2014, I conducted seven semi-structured interviews 
with three public school teachers and four social workers.  The duration of each interview 
was approximately 60 to 75 minutes.  Most interviews were conducted over the 
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telephone, and two were conducted in-person.  I recorded and transcribed all of the 
interviews. 
I designed interview questions with two purposes:  to elicit experiential narratives 
of what happened and to inquire into how professional constructs (e.g. codes of ethics) 
may have figured into participants’ understandings of their experience.  In this sense, 
interviews had both a phenomenological slant (i.e. “prereflective experiential accounts”) 
as well as a hermeneutic one (i.e. ways phenomena can be understood) (Van Manen, 
2014, pp. 314-317).  Following my interview protocol (see Appendix B), 
phenomenological questions included: 
1. Tell me a little about how you came to become a social worker [or] teacher? 
2. Briefly, tell me a bit about your professional life as a social worker [or] teacher. 
3. I want to talk with you about your relationship with your foster [or] adopted child.  
I am mostly interested in your description and perception of how the relationship 
developed.  How did you first meet?  When?   
4. Talk a little about the nature of your professional role with [agreed upon 
pseudonym]? 
5. How did your relationship develop over time?  
(Probe for how the relationship felt and what responsibilities were felt.) 
6. When and how did you first realize you were becoming personally involved with 
[agreed upon pseudonym]? 
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(Probe for moment or markers that set this relationship apart from other 
“professional” relations.  What felt different?  What was circumstantially 
different?) 
7. Describe your thoughts, feelings and questions as you began to consider 
becoming the foster parent or adoptive parent of [agreed upon pseudonym]. 
Questions dealing with hermeneutic analysis of professional content and constructs 
included: 
1. Do you recall any education or training on professional ethics? 
 (If little response, probe with questions about conduct that might be considered 
 unprofessional and how that was learned.) 
2. How familiar are you with professional codes of ethics in your field?  What do 
you consider as the most important or useful aspects of professional ethics? 
3. As you became more personally involved with [agreed upon pseudonym], did you 
have any concerns that your professional role and duties may be compromised by 
your personal involvement? 
 If so, how did you go about addressing or resolving those concerns? 
(Probe for conversations with supervisors, colleagues, family, friends.  Was there 
any evidence of internal conflict or ambiguity about the shift from professional to 
personal?) 
4. At the time you were considering foster parenting or adopting, what was your 
understanding of “professional relationship boundaries”? 
5. Did you feel like you might be crossing a line?  Why or why not? 
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6. Did anybody else (colleagues, friends, family) think that you might be crossing a 
line? 
(Probe for social approval or disapproval or social feedback from both 
professional and personal circles.) 
7. Did you experience any professional costs or repercussions from moving from a     
professional role to a parental role with [agreed upon pseudonym]?   
8. How would you describe your ethical responsibilities in this situation? 
9. How has your perspective on professional relationship boundaries changed over 
time?   
10. Is there anything that I did not ask about that you’d like to share or that you think 
is important to my study? 
 I describe interviews as “semi-structured,” because I invited conversational 
exchange and asked unscripted questions for clarification and additional information.  
During all of the interviews I selectively shared information about my own experience 
with becoming a foster parent.  As stated on the interview consent form (see Appendix 
C), I explained: 
 
I am interested in how professionals experience ethics when a relationship 
shifts from professional to personal.  In 2002 I became the foster parent to 
a young man who I met while serving as his social worker.  Based on my 
experience of navigating professional norms and codes of ethics, I am 
interested in how others experience and understand similar situations.  By 
talking with others who have crossed professional life / private life 
boundaries in the process of becoming a foster or adoptive parent, I hope 
to explore and find meaning within complex issues of professional identity 
and ethical responsibility. In this dissertation, I explore the ethical 
dimensions of professional boundaries, codes and practices within the 
spaces of one-to-one encounter. 
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I chose to introduce and describe the study by acknowledging my personal connection to 
the topic.  Because I was familiar with my research topic through my own experiences, I 
was positioned closely with study participants.  Thus, my position was not that of a 
neutral, disinterested researcher.  Rather, by design, I intended to use my positionality 
and personal experience as a “starting point” for describing various aspects of the study 
phenomenon (Van Manen, 2014, p. 313). 
Researcher Position 
Reflection on my experience as a professional becoming a foster parent and my 
theoretical orientation informed how I treated participant narratives.  Prior to the 
interviews, I had never spoken with others who shifted professional involvement with a 
youth into parental involvement.  However, I had thought a lot about my experience, and 
my research questions were inextricably grounded in my experience.  As well, my 
personal narrative was immediately accessible and guided my line of inquiry into other 
experiential accounts of breached relationship boundaries.  Within my interview 
questions, I used language and phrases that reflected an active discourse (e.g. 
“inappropriate,” “crossing a line,” “professional ethics”).  While drawing from the 
discourse of professional ethics facilitated communication, it may have ascribed 
predetermined meaning onto my participants’ experiences.  For example, framing my 
inquiry in terms of “professional ethics” resonated with some participants, while others 
had not thought about their experience in terms of “ethics.”  I examine these discursive 
phrases and expressions in a later section of this chapter on ethical discourse.  
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While I found myself identifying with some aspects of participant narratives, I 
also tried to maintain a reflexive sense of self-awareness of my reactions to participant 
answers and descriptions.   Noting the various uses of the term reflexivity in qualitative 
research literature, Glesne (2006) understands it as meaning “… that you are as 
concerned with the research process as you are with the data you are obtaining” (p. 125).  
She continues to say, “you conduct two research projects at the same time:  one into your 
topic and the other into your ‘self’” (p. 126).  Concrete examples of my attention to 
reflexivity include written notations about my reactions during the interview processes, 
freewriting, and reflective journaling while conducting my research. 
Drawing from various personal narratives, including my own, I wanted to collect 
and analyze experiential materials to understand the experience under study and generate 
possible meaning.  The personal narratives within this study hold potential to speak back 
to a master narrative of professional discourse.  Corey (1998) claims the potential of 
personal narrative to “disrupt” and “rewrite” the master narrative.  He explains, “The 
personal narrative swings between the public and private, between what is said and what 
is thought, between the individual and society, between the regulations of language and 
the regulations of the body . . .” (p. 250).  As told by the “master narrative,” the 
phenomena of this study could be explained as “poor professional boundaries,” which 
precludes any ethical possibility in boundary transgression.  The “master narrative” 
would be the dominant professional discourse on ethics, roles and boundaries.  Based on 
my theoretical orientations, I anticipated that through their personal narratives, my 
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participants would have something different to say in response to prevalent ethical 
discourse in social professions. 
While my personal narrative is deeply relevant to my subject of study, ongoing 
reflexivity helped me maintain an open, receptive stance toward comments made by the 
teachers and social workers in my study.  According to Guba and Lincoln (2005), 
“Reflexivity … demands that we interrogate each of our selves regarding ways in which 
research efforts are shaped and staged around the binaries, contradictions, and paradoxes 
that form our own lives” (p. 210).  Upfront transparency about my personal connection to 
the study and ongoing reflexivity concerning my interpretation of participant interviews 
served as critical tools for tempering my voice in the process of research and 
representation.  Potential tensions and differing textures between my narrative, the 
narratives of my participants and my theoretical/philosophical lens required a research 
practice of ongoing reflexivity.  
Narrative Summaries, Coding, and Methodological Orientations 
 After transcribing all interview recordings, I wrote a two or three page narrative 
summary of the key ideas and issues raised by each participant.  Moustakas (1994) 
includes “individual textural description” as part of the process of analysis in 
phenomenological research.  He explains that verbatim transcribed interviews from each 
participant are used for developing textural descriptions of each participant’s experience 
(p. 133).  I refer to these as narrative summaries and developed them for multiple reasons 
and uses.  First, I wanted to gain deeper familiarity with lengthy interview transcripts via 
reduction into a descriptive story.  This practice helped me to find internal structure 
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within each interview and focus on pre-reflective experiential accounts.  Pouring through, 
reducing and summarizing material from each transcript also facilitated and deepened my 
familiarity with them.  Second, I wanted to represent each participant’s story holistically 
as much as possible.  While qualitative methods like coding and analysis treat data 
collectively and operate through composite, maintaining the holistic integrity of each 
story upholds narrative elements of human experience – including uncertainties and 
contradictions.  Chopped up and arranged into categorical themes, these human elements 
can be lost or fade into background.   Each narrative summary for my seven participants 
is available in Appendix D.  
 My third reason for writing narrative summaries involved augmenting the 
trustworthiness of my research through “member checking.”  Glesne (2006) defines 
“member checking” as “sharing interview transcripts, analytical thoughts, and/or drafts 
… with research participants to make sure you are representing them and their ideas 
accurately” (p. 38).  I sent each participant a copy of his or her narrative summary and 
asked that he or she review it and check for agreement with “how I represented your 
story, thoughts and comments.”  I requested that participants provide me with 
clarification about any inaccuracies.  Five of my seven participants responded to this 
request.  I adjusted and revised narrative summaries according to the feedback that I 
received. 
While writing narrative summaries, I also began coding interviews manually.  
Coding involved labeling and categorizing bits and segments of interview data and 
managing organizational schemes for codes.  Through processes of coding, recoding and 
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codeweaving, I identified themes and concepts through patterns of similarity.  Saldaña 
(2009) describes codeweaving as a “network of relationships between and among 
concepts” that is developed by considering “how individual components of the study 
weave together” (p. 36).  Following Saldaña’s (2009) explanation of coding as a 
heuristic, a means of discovery that leads to interpretation and analysis (p. 8), I did not 
treat my codes as analysis.  Rather interview codes led to themes, which led to an 
interpretive analytic process of writing and reflection.   
As previously noted, some of my interview questions included common phrases 
from professional ethical discourse.  These questions involved a priori constructs and 
concepts for participant consideration in order to develop specific information for 
analysis (Van Manen, 2014, p. 319).  For example, I asked participants about 
professional codes of ethics because that is a specific subject of my research question.  
Asking about codes of ethics helped me address the question:  “how did you experience 
the social messages and internalized constructions of professionalism and professional 
ethics within your decision to become a parent or guardian to a young person?”  
Other questions elicited open-ended description of participant experiences.  
Writing from a phenomenological point of view, Van Manen (2014) states: 
 
…[W]e are not primarily interested in the experiences of our so-called 
subjects or informants for the sake of being able to report on how this or 
that person experiences or perceives something.  Rather, the aim is to 
collect examples of possible human experiences in order to reflect on the 
meanings that may inhere in them.  (p. 313) 
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Given that my research questions concern both experiential description and meaningful 
interpretation, I attempt to balance both traditional qualitative inquiry with specific 
sensitivity toward phenomenological inquiry – questions of pre-reflective, experiential 
description.  With phenomenological interest I respond to the question:  “What is the 
experience of moving from a professional role to a parental role with a young person 
like?”  I also regard Van Manen’s (2014) understanding that the “phenomenological 
tradition” would not be “commensurate with abstracting, coding, and procedural 
approaches … looking for recurring concepts or themes; and so on” (p. 319).  Therefore, 
I attempt to use coding and analysis with sensitivity toward the descriptive meaningful 
accounts that participants share without doing purely phenomenological interviews or 
analysis.  In other words, I do not claim to use phenomenological methodology (e.g. 
eidetic reduction) but do draw analytical insight from phenomenological research and 
philosophy.   
 I developed three analytical categories for themes that resulted from coding.  
First, I contextually describe the situations of both the child and the professional.  What 
kinds of kids did professionals in my study adopt or foster?  In what occupational 
contexts did the professionals in my study become parents to these youth?  Second, I 
analyze general themes regarding actual experiences and my participants’ understandings 
of their experiences.  I identify three broad themes: (1) absence of choice; (2) sense of 
responsibility and (3) the ethical arc of rules.  Third, I write critical notes about the 
discourse of professional ethics that problematize and complicate interview data.  I 
consider discursive phrases or expressions to be meaningfully produced by and 
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constitutive of professional ethics.  I present all of these analyses in the following section.  
I conclude this chapter with three findings:  (1) Participants were not overly constrained 
or prevented from ethical action by professional codes of ethics or agency policies.   
Some participants had to maneuver around and navigate through concerns about dual 
relationships.  Given that all of my participants were recruited after taking on parental 
roles with former students and clients, this finding was expected;  (2) Bauman’s (1993) 
description of a nonrational moral impulse and moral responsibility seems resonant with 
participant descriptions in my study; (3) In order for statements of professional ethics to 
remain relevant to everyday professional practice, statements must engage with research 
on empirical ethics in professional practice.   
Professional and Child Contexts 
 Seven qualified study participants responded to recruitment advertisements and 
agreed to be interviewed.  I provide an overview of participant characteristics and 
“child/youth” descriptors in Table 1.  I used alias names for all participants, and adult 
participants provided all information pertaining to the youth.  Participant composition 
spread across a wide representation of work settings, providing a diverse sample of social 
professions.  Teacher participants included one former teacher who had moved into 
administration and one former administrator who had returned to teaching.  So, two study 
participants had professional experience as both administrators and teachers.  Social 
worker work settings included Child Protective Services (CPS) case management, 
community-based advocacy, residential mental health (non-therapist), and immigration  
case management.  One social worker also had teaching licensure credentials. 
	  
	   152	  
Table 1.  Select Characteristics of Study Participants and Youths 
Regional location Suburban midwest (1) 
Urban northeast (2) 
Northeast (2) 
Urban west coast (1) 
Rural southeast (1) 
Gender 3 males, 4 females 
Profession 4 social workers; 2 teachers; 1 school administrator 
Form of professional 
introduction 
“in my class” (2) 
“on my caseload” (4) 
“attended the school where I was principal” (1) 
Form of parenting Legal adoption (3) 
Licensed foster care (1) 
Legal Guardian (2) 
Informal/Temporary (1) 
Child / Youth descriptors • Betty and Veronica - 16 year old, “special needs” female in 
foster care and her 14 year old sister [adopted by Timothy] 
• Rick - 15 or 16 year old, undocumented male who needed 
guardian to stay in the U.S. [guardianship with Suzanne] 
• Pedro - 17 year old, undocumented male with chronic illness  
[adopted by Sylvia] 
• Jenny - 8 year old female whose mother was briefly 
hospitalized for mental health treatment [informal parenting 
with Michelle] 
• Chris - 9 year old male with behavioral issues in foster care 
[adopted by Josh] 
• Jason - 17 year old, homeless male who needed a legal guardian 
for immigration case [guardianship with Alexa] 
• John - 15 year old male who was homeless after his mother left 
town and his older brother was arrested [foster care with Mark 
and Liz] 
 
All participants provided all information pertaining to the youth.  Participant composition 
spread across a wide representation of work settings, providing a diverse sample of social 
professions.  Teacher participants included one former teacher who had moved into 
administration and one former administrator who had returned to teaching.  So, two study 
participants had professional experience as both administrators and teachers.  Social 
worker work settings included Child Protective Services (CPS) case management, 
community-based advocacy, residential mental health (non-therapist), and immigration 
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case management.  One social worker also had teaching licensure credentials. All 
participants were educated and credentialed in their professional fields, and several held 
graduate degrees (three with Masters of Social Work) and multiple teaching / school 
administration licensure areas. 
 Examination of the “child/youth descriptors” in Table 1 shows that they were 
mostly older children or adolescents with untenable living or residency arrangements.  
Three of the youth were in foster care or headed to foster care and two were 
“undocumented” residents in the U.S.  While each state has its own criteria for “special 
needs adoption” (the most vulnerable and difficult-to-place youth in need of adoption), 
most states qualify youth as “special needs” when they are older than six or eight and are 
members of an ethnic or racial minority group (Children’s Bureau, Child Welfare 
Information Gateway).  By that definition, all of the youth mentioned in this study qualify 
as “special needs.”   
 The youth for which professional care-providers crossed professional boundaries 
and roles were, by any assessment, in desperate need of help.  Some of their 
circumstances were potentially life-threatening.  Describing Pedro, a seventeen year old 
and newest addition to her CPS caseload, Sylvia explained, “He’s in a coma; he’s illegal 
and he has end-stage renal failure and he has no family and he has no money.”  
Reflecting a little further, Sylvia remarked: 
 
His situation was so horrible that I knew that he would die if I didn’t take 
care of him – this was not like TV where they may die.  He was going to 
die if I hadn’t taken him.  There was nobody in the world interested in 
taking that boy. 
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In a different situation, art teacher Suzanne described an undocumented student in her 
class whose father was dead and whose mother lived in Africa.  School administrator, 
Mark, reported on a fifteen year old former student who was suddenly homeless after his 
older brother was arrested.  All of my study participants found themselves in positions of 
relation to young people with overwhelming, almost incomprehensible, needs.  Some 
relationships went on for quite a while before the professional adult decided to pursue a 
parental relationship with the young person.  Others responded immediately before a 
relationship had even developed.  Sylvia, for example, met Pedro when he was in a coma 
in the hospital and brought him to her home as soon as he was discharged. 
 While desperate for help, the kind of help that was needed was not the regular 
assistance-by-procedure help routinely provided through professional service and duty.  
Feeling “helpless” in her case manager role, Alexa described: 
 
... [O]ne of Jason’s biggest obstacles was being homeless and everything 
that comes with that.  And, um, and you know, I have access to shelter and 
I have facilitated this housing and that housing and an independent living 
program and, and it was at a point that I could see that making referrals, 
talking to supervisors, doing the case work thing was not sufficient for 
him to become housed because what he needed was a different way of 
dealing with him and a different type of relationship and just a whole 
different type of support.   
 
 
As Jason’s immigration case manager, Alexa could piece together various referrals and 
services for Jason.  However, over time she lost faith in the efficacy of piecemeal 
services.  Her professional experiences with Jason led her to understand his need for a 
“different type of support.”  The kind of support he formally received—legal immigration 
services or housing services—belonged to a fragmented, commodified, professional 
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market of care.  While technically his needs were provided for, Jason lacked close 
relational support.  This became clear to Alexa as she continued to search for a potential 
legal guardian until Jason directly asked, “Why can’t you do it?  Why are you looking for 
somebody else?”  That is when Alexa said to herself, “Okay.  I need another job” in order 
to become Jason’s legal guardian. 
 The youth for whom professionals became parents were in dire circumstances 
with few to no options.  The professionals, seemingly competent and thorough in their 
professional duties, understood the proffering of professional care or help as an 
inadequate gesture in the context of the challenging needs of these youth.  So, these 
professionals moved to the periphery or “shadows” (Doel et al., 2010) of their formal 
professional identities and duties and pursued parental roles and relations with the young 
people in their charge.  In doing so they had to navigate professional structures (e.g. 
rules, supervision, operational processes, knowledge, ethics, etc.) in their specific work 
settings.  In the processes of navigating and maneuvering, they also demonstrated 
responsibilities through their actions to resolve real-life ethical problems.   
 When telling others that they intended to pursue parental relations with youths in 
their professional care, participants received feedback from their supervisors.  Feedback 
was quite varied.  Some received full support from their supervisors.  Suzanne’s Assistant 
Principal was the person who suggested that she consider adopting her art student, Rick, 
in the first place.  Sylvia’s CPS supervisor advised her to write “placed with a home” and 
close Pedro’s case file.  Josh described his supervisor as being “very supportive of me all 
the way around.”  Other supervisors were more reticent and presented formal 
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complications.  In Timothy’s case, the Special Education District Office wanted to move 
his student Betty to a different school and indicated that it would be “improper” for her to 
remain in Timothy’s classroom.  Timothy, who himself was a former school 
administrator, fought the recommendation to move Betty on the basis that she had 
experienced enough change in her life and switching schools would not be good for her.  
Timothy appealed to the district superintendent who helped negotiate an alternative 
solution wherein Betty could remain at her school without being enrolled in Timothy’s 
classroom. 
 Alexa, the only participant to resign from her job prior to becoming her client’s 
legal guardian, recalled her supervisor’s response when she explained why she was 
resigning.  She recalled that her supervisor questioned her (“Are you sure you want to do 
that?”) and implied that she might be ruining her career.  Alexa qualified this by 
emphasizing that there wasn’t anything specific that her supervisor directly said or did, 
but concerns about behaving “unprofessionally” were “implied.” 
 I also asked participants about feedback they received from family, friends and 
colleagues.  Again, participants received a wide range of feedback.  Feedback included 
strong support (“What a wonderful thing”) to general concern (“Do you know what 
you’re getting yourself into?”) to fear (“You don’t know anything about his family…; 
they could be drug smugglers; they could come in your house at night and slit your 
throat”) to abdication of responsibility (“It’s Mexico’s problem; just give him to 
Mexico”).  Timothy mentioned concerns about the perception of possible favoritism, 
particularly with parents, in the case of a teacher giving grades to his own kid.  As well, 
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Josh mentioned some colleague “friction” when someone suggested that he was “grocery 
shopping for a kid.”   
 The overall social or professional contexts in which study participants became 
parents might be described as generally supportive but cautious.  Concerns about the risks 
and uncertainties of committing to a parental or guardian role with “special needs” youth 
were voiced through feedback that cautioned or questioned personal involvement.  Such 
careful, cautionary messages should be expected in a society that calculates risk and sells 
security.  “Moral minimalism” (Stivers, 2004) and “disembedding mechanisms”19 
(Giddens, 1999/1990) shift confidence away from local, personal relation and relocate 
trust within abstract capacities of institutions (Smart, 1999, pp. 6-7). 
Theme 1:  “Something That Had to Happen” 
 Against the standard procedures and duties of their jobs and against vague 
cautions from colleagues, friends and family, members of social professions whom I 
spoke with for this study did get personally involved.  Not only did they get personally 
involved, they overwhelmingly recall having “no choice” but to get involved.  Described 
as an “overwhelming feeling” or “something that had to happen” or a “moral imperative” 
or “doing what needs to be done,” taking a parental or guardian role in the face of the 
needs of these young people happened, according to participants, in the absence of 
choice.  With one exception, most described feeling as if there was no choice to be made.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Giddens’s concept of “disembedding mechanism” deals with complex relations between 
familiarity and estrangement.  “The disembedding mechanisms lift social relations and the 
exchange of information out of specific time-space contexts, but at the same time provide new 
opportunities for their reinsertion” (1999, p. 489).  As considered here, one might be estranged 
from the local and familiar relationship through the construction of “professional” relations. 
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Only one participant described struggling with her choice, which stemmed from the 
countervailing perspectives of others.  Alexa explained, after thinking it over and 
discussing with others “… it was the shouldn’t, and I felt very strongly that I should.  
But, I felt that many other people felt that I shouldn’t and that might make it difficult for 
work.” 
 Josh retrospectively described his experience as including someone who was 
“supposed to be part of [our] family.”  At 25 years old and married, Josh had no plans to 
adopt and “wasn’t even considering biological children at that point.”  However, within 
three months of meeting Chris, a nine year old in a residential program for youth with 
emotional and behavioral challenges, the thought began to cross Josh’s mind.  He 
described feeling as if Chris was “supposed to be part” of his family and compared it to 
the feeling he had when he met his wife.  This feeling happened quickly and “out of 
nowhere” but was not “impulsive.”  Josh explained, “… it definitely wasn’t the first cute 
kid with a sad story I’ve worked with.  So, it wasn’t an impulsive thing, it was just a sort 
of an overwhelming feeling… .”    
 Other participants used similar language to describe their experiences.  The two 
following descriptions were offered after I questioned each participant about where his or 
her sense of responsibility came from in the situation.  With this question, I hoped to 
explore how participants understood sources of ethical action and responsibility.  School 
administrator Mark explained that there was nobody else to take him in and “… bottom 
line, it just felt right.”  Michelle worked in foster care / family reunification with Jenny 
and her mother.  When Jenny’s mother was hospitalized after a suicide attempt, Michelle 
	  
	   159	  
agreed to take care of Jenny temporarily (for about one month).  During our interview I 
specifically asked Michelle to describe her “ethical responsibilities” in the situation.  She 
reflected: 
 
So, I felt like, I really felt like I just didn’t have a choice.  So, I felt a very 
strong ethical responsibility because as I said I had no idea if the state 
were to get involved where it might place Jenny and what destruction and 
trauma that might cause her.  And the mother didn’t have any other family 
or friends at that point to be able to step in.  So, it was very clear to me, 
even though there was a little, I was a little nervous at first, and I wasn’t 
used to having a kid around all the time.  But, this is like something that 
had to happen … . 
 
 
Participants’ concurrence in describing “something that had to happen” or an absence of 
choice resonates with how I have described my own process of entry into foster parenting 
a former “client.”  On many occasions I have said that there was no decision to be made; 
it just happened.   
 While all participants demonstrated strong, descriptive verbal skills, they 
struggled to convey their experiences within the confines of rational explanation.  At the 
end of my interview with Michelle, she remarked, “Some of those questions I didn’t have 
a coherent answer to.”  Perhaps, the experience of getting personally involved was 
nonrational and, yet, participants were being asked to explain their experiences rationally.  
The following exchange between Josh and me demonstrates the incongruence of a 
logically coherent explanation and the nonrationality of Josh’s experience: 
 
Troy:  … that notion of staying distant and not getting too involved – um, 
did that come up at all for you? 
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Josh:  Um.  I wasn’t really able to do that.  I think that would be – you 
know, I think that’s how I knew that I needed to move forward.  I think 
that I was very aware that I was not going to be able to do that.  
 
Troy:  Okay. Yeah. 
 
Josh:  To stay completely on the sideline and to sort of treat it like any 
other case that I had been involved in.  I just, it was a very different 
feeling from the offset. 
 
Troy:  Can you describe – I’m sure you’ve thought about it a lot.  … do 
you have any words for exactly what it was about this kid that was 
different for you? 
 
Josh:  Yeah, um, you know I think there’s some sort of spark with him.  
You know, what he’s experienced in his life trauma-wise and what he’s 
been through, it’s absolutely amazing that he is the person that he is … 
 
Troy:  … Has your perspective on professional relationship boundaries 
changed at all since – through this experience? 
 
Josh:  Um.  I don’t think so, but I would say I think – I think that before 
this experience, I think that if you had asked me, um, about that type of 
situation, I would have a really hard time understanding it.  I think I would 
– I don’t know that I would say it was wrong or unethical but I think it 
would be hard for me to understand how that would transpire.   
 
 
Josh remarked that he was unable to stay on the sidelines.  Perhaps he was actually 
unable to stay within the rational center of professional ethics in the face of a nonrational 
moral demand.  Bauman (1993) claims, “Moral phenomena are inherently ‘non-rational’” 
(p. 11).  For Bauman something is “moral” only if it precedes considerations of “purpose 
and calculation” (1993, p. 11).  Josh successfully maneuvered within the rational center 
of professional ethics and boundaries by working with his colleagues to effectively end 
his professional relations with Chris and begin parental relations.  However, the initial 
“moral impulse” seems outside of the “learnable knowledge of rules”—with a “spark,” of 
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sorts—and more likely within the “moral self” that’s “constituted by responsibility” 
(Bauman, 1993, p. 11).   
Theme 2:  “Responsibility for a Child that Goes Beyond the Classroom” 
 Within the second theme of my analysis, my participants describe a broad sense 
of responsibility to the youths.  While participants were sensitive to professional 
responsibilities, they also acknowledged areas of overlapping human responsibilities.  
School administrator Mark put it this way:  “That’s my job and I have certain 
responsibilities and, yes, I’m expected to be professional and all that.  But also as a 
human being, I have responsibilities and as a father and a husband, I have certain 
responsibilities.”  In other words, Mark did not see professional responsibility as 
narrowly contained or separated from other responsibilities of social life.  The following 
remark from Timothy suggests agreement with how responsibilities and commitments cut 
across social contexts: 
 
There is no reason that a professional cannot do more than their job 
requires.  Ethical behavior dictates how you conduct yourself personally in 
your interactions with anyone you serve.  It is not to limit your 
commitment to only serve children within a professional capacity. 
 
 
While Timothy described an ethical responsibility that coexisted with “professional 
capacity,” the rational rules of professional ethics code seem to challenge that.  
Professional boundary rules, for example, “describe the boundary between what is 
acceptable and unacceptable for a professional to do, both at work and outside it…” 
(Doel et al., 2010, p. 1867).  Perhaps the move to impose rational boundaries can only 
brace professionalism against the impulsivity of moral action.  Bauman (1993) claims, 
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rationality cannot “… override moral impulse; at utmost, it can silence it and paralyse, 
thereby rendering the chances of the ‘good being done’ not stronger, perhaps weaker, 
than they otherwise would have been” (pp. 10-11).  While Timothy’s and Mark’s 
accounts do not necessarily speak to Bauman’s critique of rationality, they do describe a 
sense of moral responsibility that cannot be overridden or dampened by professional 
duty. 
 Just as Timothy described a “commitment” beyond professional capacity and 
Mark described human responsibility, Alexa talked about a “collective human ethical 
responsibility to each other” and an “obligation” to take care of each other.  Michelle 
mentioned a “moral imperative” and an orientation toward “social justice.”  The possible 
meanings of these phrases may be lost in their usage to explain or justify moral action.  In 
explaining experience, phrases that reflect principles, virtues and foundations substitute 
for the actual experience.  In this sense the aim of phenomenological research, to describe 
pre-reflective experience and possible meaning, becomes important.   
 Possible meaning of an experience may be better conveyed through description of 
the actual experience rather than through reflective categories of understanding (e.g. 
social justice) (Van Manen, 2014).  For example, I asked Alexa if there was a “marker” 
or “moment” when she started to realize that her responsibility toward Jason was 
becoming more personal.  Alexa recalled, “… there was a particular moment when he 
was beaten up pretty badly in the street and he called me right after to go with him to the 
police and the hospital.”  Recognizing her “ability to make a difference,” Alexa asked, 
“… why am I just sitting here watching terrible things happen when there is something 
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more useful I could be doing?”  Seeing Jason beaten-up, being called on by him and 
being present with him channeled Alexa’s pain and frustration.  If her limited 
professional role meant that she had to “step back and watch this happen” and had to be 
“helpless” in the face of Jason’s suffering, then she responded with a “strong desire” to 
“do something more to protect him.” 
 Alexa’s comments lead to a subtheme of the connection between responsibility 
and privilege.  Simply stated, recognition of one’s privilege gives rise to one’s 
responsibility to act.  With the “privilege of having the ability to provide what’s needed,” 
Alexa felt a strong “moral imperative to do it.”  She explained, “I had space; I had time; I 
had emotional availability.”  Michelle also connected “privilege” to responsibility.  
Reflecting on her decision to take in Jenny while Jenny’s mom was hospitalized, 
Michelle stated: 
 
Like to me, I felt like I had, um, the privilege in that situation of like 
having this apartment with this extra space for Jenny and just being able to 
– not having suffered what this mother had suffered and being able to step 
in as a community member and friend who helped her get through this 
time.  You know as a single mother dealing with all these issues.  So, I felt 
like, I really felt like I just didn’t have a choice.   
 
 
 To summarize, participants described responsibilities to the youth in their stories 
from perspectives and frameworks that layered over and beyond their professional 
identities and obligations.  Throughout the interviews participants explained their 
responsibilities with rational constructs like “privilege” and “justice.”  However, as 
Alexa’s story reflects, being in the presence of suffering initiated response outside of a 
rational order.  Alexa quit her job, left the social work profession for a while and went 
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through a period of unstable income when she decided to become Jason’s legal guardian.  
This gives credence to Bauman’s (1993) idea of a nonrational moral response.  In this 
sense, one is constituted through moral responsibility rather than constituting moral 
responsibility through oneself (p. 13). 
Theme 3:  The Ethical Arc of Rules 
 Participants described complex relationship to and interpretation of professional 
rules.  Rather than doing professional tasks by simply following rules, participants 
responded to rules situationally and questioned their purpose and how they might affect 
those involved.  In this sense, rules were examined critically.  The following reflection 
from Alexa provides introduction to the third theme:  the ethical arc of rules. 
 
… [I]f I feel there’s some rules I want to know why they’re there and 
what’s the purpose of them and do they help or do they not help and, you 
know, I believe in civil disobedience.  … [I]f there are rules that are not 
good, should we change them or should we break them or both? ... I think 
they can put a lot of space between the social workers and the people that 
we work with and kind of take away from humanity …  Like, how am I 
defining this relationship in my head, how am I defining it out loud or on 
paper and then like what implications does it have for humanity and 
everybody involved. 
 
 
For Alexa, the ethical arc of a rule expands well beyond the particular professional 
institution.  She suggested possible situations in which changing or breaking rules would 
contribute to “humanity.” 
 Other participants identified rule-subversion or rule-breaking within their 
narratives.  After Sylvia took Pedro from the hospital to her home, the case was closed 
and nobody followed up as was “normally” done.  Sylvia suspected this was because 
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Pedro was nearly eighteen years old.  Suzanne did not turn Rick over to the foster care 
system, because he could “end up anywhere” as a ward of the state.  She and her school 
wanted to keep him “in the school,” so she stepped in to pursue guardianship.  Michelle 
agreed to take Jenny to avoid a more disruptive, out-of-community placement with child 
protective services.  In each of these cases, procedural rules were subverted for reasons of 
better serving the child and community.   
 In other cases, rules were navigated or maneuvered.  Josh worked within 
professional concerns about dual relationships.  Josh recalled, “… because I was working 
in this house, um, and we all of course felt very strongly, he couldn’t come start doing 
visits to my house while we were still in that situation.  That wouldn’t have been 
appropriate in that context.”  Josh explained that home visits would not have been 
“appropriate” or “ethical” because other residents might perceive “special treatment” for 
Chris, and it might create “confusion” for Chris.  The treatment team resolved the issue 
by moving Chris into a temporary community-based foster home and out of the 
residential program so that he could start visiting Josh’s home as part of pre-adoption 
procedures.  Josh was pleased with the treatment team’s “solution” and describes it as an 
outcome of “creative thinking.”  
 Josh’s story reveals professionalism’s rational bias toward clearly defined roles 
and duties.  Professional rationalism generally functions to resolve ambiguity.  Josh’s 
relationship with Chris could not double-up as both “parent” and “team leader” in the 
residential program where Josh worked and Chris lived.  That kind of confusion “should” 
be resolved even if that meant moving Chris into a temporary placement.  Josh supported 
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how the concerns were resolved stating that Chris had a goal of moving into the 
community anyway and Josh, too, wanted to avoid potential confusion.  Nonetheless, 
might this be an example of the rational tail wagging the moral dog?  In terms of moral 
response, isn’t some confusion and ambiguity to be expected?  Bauman (1993) suggests 
that morality is incurably aporetic.  “The moral self moves, feels and acts in the context 
of ambivalence and is shot through with uncertainty” (1993, p. 11).  How, then, does 
professionalism’s rational bias interact with morality as Bauman describes it? 
 While addressing a range of critical issues regarding professional rules, rule-
following and rule-breaking, participants also provided examples of non-negotiable rules.  
Of these, prohibitions on sexual relations with a student or client were mentioned most 
frequently.  Even participants with substantial misgivings about professional rules agreed 
that some things were “out of bounds” and inherently harmful.  Professional codes and 
rules tend to be written around legalistic prohibitions.  The kind of child-focused 
involvement and moral commitment that my participants described was not inspired by, 
or sustained in, professional rules or ethics codes.  Nobody cited professional ethics as a 
source of affirmation on his or her way to becoming a parent.  Timothy expressed 
frustration with this aspect of professional rules.  He said, “Rules are written to enhance 
everybody’s life.  Rules are written to improve things.  They’re not made to catch things.  
That’s not what they’re for.”   
 In recent scholarship on “rogue” or “rule-bending” social workers, Weinberg and 
Taylor (2014) found that rule-abiding practitioners occasionally bent rules to manage or 
cope at work.  As well, practitioners who placed less value on the rules sometimes turned 
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to them for similar reasons.  They conclude by recommending that professional ethics 
refocus on the “situated nature of practitioners’ work and not solely on cognitively-based 
universal sets of principles such as those enshrined in ethical codes” (p. 84).  Based on 
my analysis of participant narratives and my own experiences, I concur with this 
recommendation.  The “ethical arc of rules” bends differently in each situation.  When 
asked to describe “professional ethics,” Sylvia declared, “Do what you can and if it’s 
unethical try to make it ethical.”  Like a ball compass in motion, looking for direction and 
spinning this way and that as it tries to orient itself, the ethically mindful practitioner 
must be aware of moving relations to everything else. Sometimes responding to the 
situation may lead to action that’s outside of professional procedure.  Michelle explained 
her decision not to contact Child Protective Services for Jenny:  “… getting the state 
involved is so clearly doing so much harm on so many different levels.  So, in that sense, 
I felt like I was able to ‘do no harm’ and respond to the situation.”  As a useful tool, the 
compass has to respond, spin around and find new orientations to “make it ethical.” 
Some Critical Notes about Ethical Discourse 
 Discursive practices have a powerful role in shaping experience and reality 
(Dybicz, 2012).  Ethics codes serve as depositories for “official” discourse (as determined 
by professional associations); however, discursive practices and “moral talk” occur in the 
geographies of professional practice—team meetings, supervision meetings, 
conversations between colleagues, media coverage of professional misconduct and so on.  
Brodwin (2013) explains that “moral talk” addresses “everyday experience” and is 
expressed “idiomatically in the midst of ongoing social life” (p. 15).  Moral talk and 
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normative ethics (codified ethics) are deeply interwoven and “co-produced” (p. 15).  
They also both contribute to forms of self-regulation within professional communities.  
Analysis of the discourse of ethics in professional life is an important area for further 
empirical research and future study. 
 As mentioned earlier, I introduced some predetermined phrases or expressions in 
my interview questions.  These included phrases like “crossing a line” and 
“inappropriate.”  These phrases are meaningful and familiar in the context and discourse 
of professional ethics.  Norms are coded into language.  Language must be decoded to 
identify and understand the operations of norms.  The use of the word “inappropriate” in 
the context of professional behavior—for example, “it is unethical for a teacher to have 
an inappropriate relationship with a student”—signifies social discomfort with 
student/teacher sexual involvement.  “Inappropriate” references a norm (prohibition of 
sexual relations) without naming it.  Drawing from Foucault, Dybicz (2010) explains: 
 
…[A] discourse is a linguistic structure (i.e. an alignment of signifiers) 
that acts as a template for ordering empirical knowledge in such a way as 
to conform to particular truth claims, and in so doing, facilitates the 
production of knowledge.  It determines the possibilities of what questions 
are to be asked in the search for truth, and consequently, the answers at 
which one arrives.  (p. 24) 
 
 
Thus, ethical possibility is connected to discourse.  We are challenged to imagine that for 
which we have no words.  Although I am not conducting a discourse analysis of 
professional ethics or a conversation analysis of my interviews, I want to share some 
critical notes about ethical discourse and discursive practices.  Notes about discourse are 
scattered throughout my dissertation.  Here, I specifically contextualize part of my 
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interviews into the dominant heteronormative discourse and address how the production 
of ethical discourse may constitute an ethical subject, in this case, the professional.   
 My examination of interviews for ethical discourse revealed content about sexual 
conduct.  When asked about professional ethics, Mark responded: 
 
You know the obvious thing is you don’t want to have, um, any type of 
relationship that’s inappropriate with students.  That’s the big, huge “no, 
no” – always has been, always will be and always needs to be, you know, 
a big “no, no” in terms of inappropriate relationships. 
 
 
When asked to clarify the meaning of “inappropriate,” Mark said, “It is sad, and to me 
very upsetting, but as you know sometimes educators choose to have sexual relationships 
with their students.”  In answering a question about “professional relationship 
boundaries,” Timothy brought up “cases against teachers” involving “dating situations.”  
While speaking of what is useful about ethics codes, Sylvia recalled an MSW colleague 
who had sex with a client and “lost” his job.  She queried, “I mean adopting is one thing 
but having sex with a child?”  In terms of the out-of-bounds, inappropriate or unethical, 
sexual conduct seemed to have a somewhat regular place in my interviews.  From a 
Foucauldian archaeological approach, which is concerned with description of regularities 
(Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 26), references to sexual conduct occurred regularly in 
discussions about professional ethics. 
 Describing Foucauldian archaeological research, Kendall and Wickham (1999) 
draw attention to how “statements and visibilities mutually condition each other” (p. 25).  
“Knowledge is composed of the sayable and the visible, or words and things.  … 
Foucault draws our attention to the dynamic, mutually conditioning relationship between 
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words and things” (p. 27).  Drawing from Cavanagh’s (2007) research on teacher sex 
scandals and queer pedagogy, media coverage taps into social anxiety and 
heteronormativity and contributes to making sexual conduct a highly visible aspect of 
professional ethics.  Barrett et al. (2012) report that popular media has recently focused 
on teacher misbehavior with stories of “sexual harassment of students by teachers and 
intimate relationships between teachers and students” (p. 890).  Media coverage of 
teacher sex scandals produces visibility, and that visibility produces statements about 
professional ethics.  In turn, professionals take up issues of ethics and boundaries within 
conditions of a discourse that already situates them. 
 Professional ethics codes operate similarly in that they too produce statements 
about ethics and create visibility.  In both cases of media coverage and codes, statements 
and visibilities produce ethical positions of professionals.  “The attempt to analyse the 
positions which are established between subjects in regard to statements focuses on the 
way statements produce subject positions – ways of being and acting that human beings 
can take up…” (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 27).  This matters because all of the 
predetermined phrases and expressions in my data are part of an archaeological field that 
produces subject positions.  In this sense, analyzing relationships between statements 
without focusing on the author’s particular meaning may be a useful analytic approach. 
 How might statements from participant interviews and narrative summaries reveal 
the conditioning of what is knowable or sayable?  We might look at Josh and Alexa’s 
different handling of dual relationships.  Both Josh and Alexa expressed concerns about 
having a dual relationship with a client.  Relationship boundaries are intended to “create 
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separation between the professional relationship and other relationships” for the purpose 
of avoiding situations where the client might be subject to harm and situations in which 
the practitioner might lose objectivity (Alexander & Charles, 2009, p. 7).  Josh said that 
he did not want “to do anything unethical or inappropriate in the context of work.”  He 
also described the likelihood of confusion that might arise in a dual relationship with 
Chris—having one role during the week at the residential program and a different role on 
weekends during home visits.  Alexa explained that it “would have been inappropriate to 
have dual roles with Jason, in that when I was at work I would be his case manager and at 
home I would be his parent. …[O]ne role would complicate the other inappropriately.”  
Josh worked to resolve the problem of a dual relationship within his professional setting, 
whereas, Alexa felt that she needed to quit her job to resolve concerns.  When asked if 
she felt like she might be “crossing a line,” Alexa replied, “Oh, yes.  Definitely.”  She 
explained her decision to quit her job and exit the social work profession saying “… 
maybe I didn’t have to [change professions] but it felt like I had to.”  
 For Alexa, the conditions of being a professional social worker were not workable 
with the guardian relationship that was developing with Jason.  She felt like she had to 
quit her job and leave professional social work.  To do otherwise would be crossing a 
line.  This feeling could be based in Alexa’s individual situation—something about her 
that caused her to perceive the situation as she did.  It could be related to her work setting 
climate and the kind of supervision she received.  It could be related to any number or 
combination of factors.  However, if we treat her statements, “it felt like I had to [quit]” 
and “I felt like I was ‘crossing a line’,” as a significant difference between her and Josh 
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(whose concerns were “alleviated” with the support of his supervisor), how might 
examination of discourse provide insight into this difference?  Paying attention to social 
norms and the discourse of child welfare and professional ethics may shed some light.   
 Josh was 25 years old when he and his wife decided to adopt nine-year-old Chris.  
Alexa was 28 years old and single when she chose to pursue guardianship of 17-year-old 
Jason.  The heteronormative, protectionist discourse of child welfare and clear rules about 
sexual conduct in the professional ethics discourse could account for some of Alexa’s 
feeling that she had to quit her job.  A married, heterosexual couple adopting a nine-year-
old is read differently than a single, young woman serving as guardian to a 17-year-old 
boy.  Referencing the work of Deborah Britzman, Cavanagh (2007) uses queer theory to 
challenge structures of normalization.  In her research, she focuses on student/teacher 
relationship in classrooms and describes a normative, heterosexual futuristic agenda (p. 
21).  Cavanagh’s attention to “school sex scandals” points toward both a normative 
agenda and public hysteria inscribed in professional codes that regulate “dual 
relationships.”   
 
The preoccupation with teacher accountability and ethical codes of 
conduct are, in part, legitimated through a public panic about the state of 
the school, the teacher, and sexual morality.  … [T]he panic about female 
teachers’ sexual immorality has functioned to legitimate new regulatory 
codes of conduct and unusually harsh punishments for professional 
infractions of a sexual nature even when they are not, according to the 
courts, criminal or otherwise illegal. (Cavanagh, 2007, p. 40) 
 
 
To be clear, I am not implying any sexual connotation to Alexa’s relationship with Jason.  
However, I am suggesting that the discourse of child welfare and child protection reads 
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“suspicion” onto that which is outside of narrowly-defined, heteronormative parenting.  
Is public suspicion simply the price of professional privilege?  How do suspicion and 
sexuality comingle at the cusp of professional relationship boundaries?  The regulatory 
gaze of professional ethics operates within discursive practices that push the non-
normative, or the queer, to the periphery and into the shadows.  Through the operations of 
professional ethics and discursive practices, abusive action and moral action are both 
marginalized and subject to becoming less visible, less sayable and less frequent within 
our social relations to one another. 
Limitations of Interview Materials 
 The interdisciplinary aspects of my dissertation study help me to pull together 
common ethical issues within two separate and distinctly codified professions.  Under the 
umbrella term, social professions, I collapse social work and teaching.  However, social 
work and teaching are different professions with different histories, knowledge-bases, 
skills, institutions, legal structures and ethics codes.  By grouping social workers with 
teachers, I did not intend to blur these real differences, yet there is some danger of 
conflation.  For example, the social workers more frequently expressed familiarity with a 
formal code of ethics than did the teachers.  In fact, none of the teachers expressed 
familiarity with the NEA Code of Ethics while most of the social workers had some 
familiarity with the NASW Code of Ethics.  Thus, by being more familiar, might social 
workers also be more affected by ethics codes than teachers?  A potential limitation of 
my study lies in the possibility of overstating commonalities between social work and 
teaching at the risk of disregarding substantive differences. 
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 Another limitation is that I only interviewed professionals who successfully went 
through with becoming parents.  One must presume that other professionals have felt 
similarly to my study participants and considered similar action but chose not to do it or 
met resistance and chose not to go through with it.  Perhaps in their professional contexts, 
more rigid understandings of professional boundaries were enforced.  Doel et al. (2010) 
found that employers and individual managers “… seemed to be a stronger reference 
point than the profession” or agency code (p. 1875).  To know empirically if “ethical 
responsibility shrinks under professional ethics code,” one would need to know the extent 
to which under similar circumstances professionals decide not to get personally involved.   
 As well, I am interested in experiences of negotiating professional identity and 
duty against relational, moral involvement.  By not having the perspectives or 
understandings of the youth also available, I can only address experiences as described by 
the (professional) participants.  It is likely that the youth would describe these 
experiences differently.  In the absence of youth perspectives, I have tried to describe the 
experiences of professional agents and possible meanings of those experiences. 
Research Findings and Summary 
 By conducting interviews with social professionals and analyzing statements and 
narratives empirically, I set out to better understand what professional boundary 
transgressions might say about professional ethics.  In my concluding remarks to this 
chapter, I begin thinking about how this embedded empirical study balances, 
complements or changes the social theory and moral philosophy that I have explored in 
previous chapters. 
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 In taking on parental roles did my participants feel bound-in or constrained by 
professional rules, codes or procedures?  I do not see a clear answer to that question, but 
my participants (who were participants because they did find ways to move from 
professional to parent) successfully worked through any constraints they may have 
encountered.  A few felt bound-in, but most navigated through institutionalized, 
professional constructs without leaving their professions.  Given the significant needs of 
the youths and challenging situations, participants felt as if there was no choice but to 
respond and did not limit their responses to the expectations of professional ethics or 
code.  Moral decision-making and action eclipsed professional identity even when 
decisions were made in professional contexts.  This seems to support Haidt and Craig’s 
(2004) notion of “intuitive ethics” in which people respond to moral dilemmas from an 
intuitive system.  Haidt and Craig’s meta-empirical study shows that in the face of 
suffering, the mind is able to develop an “intuitive” compassion/kindness response. “It 
seems that in all human cultures, individuals often react with flashes of feeling linked to 
moral intuitions when they perceive certain events in their social worlds:  when they see 
others (particularly young others) suffering, and others causing that suffering” (2004, p. 
58).  “Intuitive ethics” seems plausible in light of my participants’ description of an 
absence of choice.  Rather than struggling or deliberating over decisions, most recalled 
feeling as if there was no choice to be made.  If actions were initiated in some pre-
reflective response or moral impulse, then they were quickly supported after the fact with 
rational justification and explanation.   
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 My qualitative interview approach afforded many opportunities for rational 
justification and explanation of experiential materials.  However, by paying attention to 
both description of the actual event (what happened) and explanations (participants’ 
understandings of what happened), I tried to demonstrate sensitivity to pre-reflective 
description of phenomena. While participants’ descriptions of their experiences seem 
resonant with Bauman’s description of a nonrational moral impulse, such conclusions are 
outside the scope of my empirical methods.  Nonetheless, my participants pointed toward 
a sense of moral responsibility that was not overridden or dampened by professional duty.  
Responding as if one has no choice while simultaneously feeling uncertain or ambivalent 
may be markers of the “moral condition” (Bauman, 1993).  Further research with 
stronger phenomenological description of the “event” itself is needed. 
 My third finding relates situations of practice to codified rules.  My finding, that 
practitioners were critically and ethically responsive to the situations that they were part 
of, aligns with other studies that critique rigid professional rules and recommend more 
situationally-responsive and relevant forms of ethics (Alexander & Charles, 2009; 
Bagnall, 1998; Doel et al., 2010; Weinberg & Taylor, 2014).  In order for statements of 
professional ethics to remain relevant to everyday professional practice, statements must 
engage with research on empirical ethics in professional practice.  For example, 
Alexander and Charles (2009) found that participating social workers described 
“openness to mutuality and reciprocity in their relationships with clients” even when 
“subversive of social work practice norms, which warn against dual relationships” (p. 5).  
Alexander and Charles confirm jointly created, bi-directional and reciprocal relations in 
	  
	   177	  
professional practice and critique structures (i.e. codified prohibitions on dual relations) 
that impede the relational creation and re-creation of self (p. 10).   
 An ethical arc of rules cannot be a straight line that easily bifurcates professional 
from client or student.  As Doel et al. (2010) show, boundary zones are multiple and 
include professional, profession, agency, service user, personal morality, professional 
codes, agency policies, prevailing ideologies and cultural contexts.  Arcs bend and 
intersect in many directions.  My study participants were active agents in creating ethical 
situations.  As Sylvia said, “… if it’s unethical, try to make it ethical.”  She did not mean 
that one should simply follow the rules and procedures.  Rather, she meant that one must 
be situationally aware, responsive, adept and caring.  Doel et al. (2010) explain, “The 
relative absence of grey areas, the shadows, in agency policy documentation about 
professional conduct is in stark contrast to the reality of everyday practice …” (p. 1884).  
In fact, the peripheral shadows that are cast under an arc of rules are only navigated 
ethically by being more than professional—never less than or only professional. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION:  IMAGINING SOCIAL PROFESSIONS THAT   
MAKE IT EASIER TO LOVE20 
 
There is no intensity of love or feeling that does not involve the risk of 
crippling hurt.  It is a duty to take this risk, to love and feel without 
defense or reserve. 
  —William S. Burroughs in a letter to Jack Kerouac, May 24, 1954 
The Letters of William S. Burroughs:  1945-1959 
 
 
 In this dissertation I have reflected on my experience with professional “ethics” in 
social work and education and sought answers to the following central research 
questions: 
• How does modern, techno-scientific rationalism manifest in professionalism and 
professional ethics? 
• Do professional ethics and boundaries narrow space for being together in caring, 
responsible ways?  How might one’s sense of responsibility to another person 
shrink under professional procedure or good boundaries?   
• Does professionalism lower the stakes of professional relationship by restricting 
involvement?   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 My chapter title is adopted from the Preface of Freire’s (1994/1970) Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed where he mentions creating a “world in which it will be easier to love.” (p. 22). 
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• How do professionals experience potential friction between professional identity 
and human encounters that are emotionally charged, laden with complexity, and 
rich with ethical signification?  
I have explored the ethical dimensions of professional boundaries, codes and practices in 
spaces of one-to-one encounter by review of the literature, conceptual analysis using 
theory from care ethics and postmodern ethics, and qualitative study.  In this concluding 
chapter I summarize my findings to the research questions.  I also elaborate on 
implications within the social professions and offer recommendations for practice and 
further research.  I argue for the ethical potential of risk and recommend decentering 
rigid, static forms of professional “ethics,” prescriptions and rules.  Given how normative 
rules are archived in professional codes of ethics, I return to queer theory and suggest a 
political and aesthetic queering of ethics code.  I also open conceptual space for risk by 
discussing the ethical possibilities in freedom, commitment, and love—possibilities that 
are diminished under strict interpretations and adherence to ethics code.  By 
distinguishing active, social forms of ethical behavior from rule-following behavior, I 
believe that the ethical periphery represents a more reflective, more sensitive zone of 
professional practice and returns moral responsibility to the people who are in-relation 
and in-situation together. 
Summary of Findings to the Research Questions 
Norming Ethics  
 Most of Chapter Two described how professionalism developed as a modern 
project with modernist ideology.  I asked, “How does modern, techno-scientific 
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rationalism manifest in professionalism and professional ethics?”  The social professions 
built scientific/progressive epistemology (and discourse) with normative, teleological 
ethics into professional systems that operate according to market logics and State 
interests.  The prescriptive, codified ethics rendered and maintained by social professions 
reflect the modern ideology from whence they were produced.  Normative ethics, 
including professional codes of ethics, continue to shape an ethical center through 
discursive practices, “correct” procedures and legal protections.  Professionals are guided 
toward a rational center where correct procedures result in good practice.  The rational 
center of professional ethics may be taken for granted—fashioned as a measure of 
professional insurance and calibrated to market logics and government interests.  Within 
the social professions, the rational center facilitates the dislocation and commodification 
of care by delivering new forms of monetized, professional care.  As professional 
mechanisms, ethics codes help to maintain public trust, manage norms and contribute to 
State strategies for self-regulation.   
 I found that normative ways of professional behavior are located in codes of 
ethics.  However, formal codes are only depositories, where norms have been archived.  
Normative ways of professional behavior are present across a diverse range of forms—
from regimes of knowledge, to identity, to membership in a community, to policy and 
legal documents, and throughout discourse and language.  While codes contribute to an 
assemblage of regulation, many other forces are in play.  As well, normative ways of 
professional behavior are always performed or enacted in embodied expressions of being 
professional.  Consistent with recent literature on professional rule-bending, the ethics of 
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relationships, and boundary crossings, I found that members of social professions 
sometimes resist narrow or rigid ways of being professional with seemingly ethical, yet 
rogue, action.   
Narrowing What Counts  
 The entire endeavor to articulate and enforce ethical standards of professional 
practice faces numerous challenges and can never work comprehensively.  By way of 
standardization, “ethics” are inscribed in code as principles and rules.  As such, principles 
and rules may be rhetorical, educational, regulatory or aspirational (Banks, 2003).  As 
well, there are internal contradictions within sets of principles and rules.  As the 
narratives of several participants from my study reflect, aspirational principles for social 
justice may contradict regulatory rules against “dual relationships.”  I argue and 
demonstrate that professional codes of ethics, by process of standardization, necessarily 
regulate and restrict professional behavior and, thus, diminish ethical possibility.  
 I borrow Brodwin’s (2013) explanation of “ethics narrow” to characterize most 
elements of professional ethics code.  Brodwin defines “ethics narrow” as “obligations 
and duties”—a “subset of values that people feel compelled to realize” (p. 17).  Brodwin 
elaborates that “ethics narrow” is “… expressed in language that enjoins and prescribes, 
approves and prohibits, praises and blames” (p. 17).  The probabilistic thinking of “rule 
utilitarianism” is “ethics narrow.”  Within contemporary social work the logical extension 
of “rule utilitarianism” is demonstrated in regulation against conflict of interest that 
harms, potentially harms, or might be perceived to harm clients or colleagues (Reamer, 
2012).  As a result, rules prohibiting “boundary violations” and dual relationships are 
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codified.  Prohibition of “dual relationships,” justified in concern about conflicts of 
interest, is “ethics narrow.”  “Do no harm” is also “ethics narrow.”  While a principle of 
nonmaleficence has merit and can inform rules intended to prevent action that is always 
harmful, it may also foreclose possibilities between risk and ethics.  While presumably 
preventing harm, rules that try to assure nonmaleficense may also truncate 
unconventional or risky involvement and partnership.  
Lowering the Stakes 
 Serving to prevent harm toward those under the care of professionals, codes might 
be helpful to curb abuse of power but contribute little toward recognizing the moral 
potential of engaging with another person.  Bauman (1995) suggests that designing an 
ethical code can prevent evil from being done by replacing moral choice with obedience 
or disobedience (pp. 3-4).  While normative code is reasonably successful in limiting 
abuse, like sexual misconduct that is largely agreed upon by frontline practitioners, the 
unbounded possibilities of ethical responsibility exceed the scope of normative code.  
 Beneficence (prioritizing the well-being and interests of the Other over one’s own 
interests), self-determination (protecting individual autonomy and choice) and 
nonmaleficence (doing no harm) anchor the ethical principles and duties of ethics code 
among social professions.  However, as I discussed in Chapter Two, such principles 
cannot be rationally justified in universal terms.  Although principles can be codified in 
language and dressed up as foundational truths, they are more porous and less stable than 
the gatekeepers of professional enterprise are prepared to acknowledge.  More 
importantly, these principles leave a lot out.  Ethics are not generally thought of as the 
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simple absence of harm.  If “do no harm” forecloses the risk of harm, we are then playing 
with less than a full spectrum of ethical possibilities.  Bauman’s “moral impulse” 
involves risk; Noddings’ active, relational care involves risk; a Levinasian ethos of 
responsibility involves risk; a Foucauldian aesthetic of freedom involves risk; mutual, 
two-way relationship involves risk.  Most basically, love involves risk.  If social 
professions are just jobs—standard services subject to the rational exchange of the 
marketplace, then risk minimization and product standardization are effective business 
strategies.  Then, lowering the stakes of professional relationship by restricting 
involvement makes “business sense.”  However, if social professions have moral or 
vocational significance beyond commerce, they must be willing to engage affirmatively 
with the uncertainty of ethics.  They must be willing to raise the stakes. 
Practicing on the Periphery and Crossing Boundaries 
 How do professionals experience potential friction between professional identity 
and human encounters that are emotionally charged, laden with complexity, and rich with 
ethical signification?  Despite my description of a strong, rational, normative center, 
professionals continue to bend rules and explore the peripheral shadow lands.  They 
operate in contexts, which “… variously enable and constrain their responses, including 
to rules” (Weinberg & Taylor, 2014, p. 77).  Against structuralist descriptions of 
professionals presented in Chapter Two, postmodern analyses trouble notions of core 
essence, fixed identity and a predetermined future.  Professional subjectivities and 
identities are fluid and sometimes splash against and through centripetal forces.  In the 
midst of changing events and circumstances, professionals are situated in differing 
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subject positions (Weinberg & Taylor, 2014).  Along their paths to becoming parents, the 
teachers and social workers from my study realized responsibilities beyond their 
professional roles.  They described “mismatches” between available professional services 
and the kind of ethical responsibility that various situations demanded.  As I shared in the 
previous chapter, Alexa described becoming aware of a mismatch by asking, “… why am 
I just sitting here watching terrible things happen when there is something more useful I 
could be doing?”  She also described a growing awareness that Jason needed a “different 
type of relationship” and “a whole different type of support.”  The possibilities of a 
different relationship and a different type of support freed Alexa and Jason to move into a 
more personal, guardian relationship.  Within a situation of “changing events and 
circumstances,” Alexa’s actions were not determined by a fixed professional identity.  
Rather, her subject position changed along with her ethical responsibility. 
 Critique of uni-directional relationships that have been pre-defined through 
professional authority has been a central component in my dissertation study of ethics in 
the social professions.  From the beginning I have been interested in how the organization 
of ethics and social professions affect one-to-one relationship.  I have described the 
constructs of professionalism as limiting or binding relationships under modern, 
rationalist, capitalist ideologies.  I particularly have described how professional ideology, 
discourse and structure limits the ethical possibilities of relationship.  I also want to 
acknowledge the possibilities for more open, mutual relationships in social professions. 
 The imperative to protect the public from professional powers and to engender 
trust contributes to a “technical and bureaucratized approach to relationships,” but 
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relationships with clients and students are “personal as well as professional” (Alexander 
& Charles, 2009, p. 9).  Sometimes professionals experience reciprocity of care from 
clients and students.  However, as Alexander and Charles (2009) report, being open to 
mutuality or reciprocity with clients or students is often experienced as “subversive of 
social work practice norms, which warn against dual relationships” (p. 5).  Treating 
relationship as “static and standardized” rather than “dynamic and variable” (p. 18) 
confounds the very meaning and potential of relationship.  As discussed in Chapter 
Three, “Clients are not only potential victims of inappropriate relationships or the 
fortunate recipients of positive relationships initiated and led by social workers.  Clients 
also lead the relationship by providing invitations and setting boundaries regarding 
desired closeness and intimacy” (Alexander & Charles, 2009, p. 18).  I want to 
underscore the significance and relevancy of bi-directional relations.  In context of the 
relationship between Professor Falconer and student Kenny in A Single Man (2009), 
Kenny reversed the distant, inconsequential performance of Professor Falconer by 
insisting on involvement.  Although initially hesitant and resistant, Professor Falconer 
becomes open to Kenny in a momentary evening of unscripted spontaneity.   Viewers of 
the film witness the potential of Kenny’s active participation in the relationship as Kenny 
reaches the Professor’s vulnerabilities and unsettles his deep isolation.   
 Openness, mutuality and bi-directional participation were also evident in my 
qualitative research on professionals becoming parents.  As Alexa performed her role as 
case manager, she searched for a potential legal guardian for Jason.  Alexa recalled that 
Jason eventually asked her, “Why can’t you do it?  Why are you looking for somebody 
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else?”  Through these questions, Jason actively participated in reshaping their 
relationship.  He was not just a helpless client with needs on her caseload.  Rather, he was 
actively creating possibilities in their relationship.  Special Education teacher Timothy 
also participated in my research and recalled that “lots of kids” had asked him to adopt 
them over the years but something had always “got in the way.”  Then, one day, his 
student Betty who was in foster care asked, and he was “in a place to do it.”  So, he did.  
Clearly, the sense of mutual openness in these relationships led to questions of 
commitment and moral significance for professionals, students and clients alike. 
 In summary, openness to bi-directional relationship, mutuality and “elastic 
boundaries” can infuse professional practice with innovation and creativity.  As well, it 
may help to redefine ethical practice from narrowly following normative prescriptions 
and standard routines to looking more broadly for ethical possibilities within the strengths 
of human relations and negotiations. 
Queering the Code 
 In Chapters One and Four I briefly discussed the potential of queer theory for 
troubling or breaking open assemblages of natural order.  Given that dominant 
professional discourse, knowledge and power maintain and naturalize professional ethics 
code, I am interested in unsettling such productions of stability.  I am not interested in 
unsettling the codes of ethics in social professions just to be destructive or critical or to 
take one more whack at professions that are already under attack or to deny the 
importance of guidelines or protections.  Rather, I believe that unsettling and 
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destabilizing some of the most deeply submerged sediments of codified ethics will help 
bring needed oxygen into the moral imaginations of professionals. 
 Queering a professional code of ethics can be both a political and an aesthetic 
practice.  A political queering challenges constructions and reifications of normalcy 
(Shlasko, 2006).  An aesthetic queering describes a particular way of reading a text that 
“‘queers’ both text and reader” (Shlasko, 2006, p. 124).  I have initiated a queer reading 
of professional ethics in this dissertation by taking up the “difficult space” between a 
signifier (ethics code) and the signified (professional agent) (Britzman, 1998, p. 213).  In 
this case, code breaches or boundary crossings point toward something “queer” that has 
happened to the signified (1998, p. 213).  In this concluding chapter, I extend my 
queering of code a bit further by addressing how professional knowledge (expertise) 
demarcates the unthinkable and, thus, the limitation.  I also use queer theory to highlight 
the importance of action over the actor, doing ethics over being ethical. 
 The kind of ethics that is codified by social professions is a form of knowledge.  
Producing knowledge renders what is thinkable and also marks the limits of thought.  The 
unthinkable is not an “originary or innocent state” but, rather, an “effect of knowledge” 
(Britzman, 1998, p. 214).  In other words, ignorance of ethical possibility is an effect of a 
statement of ethics.  If social professions want to maintain space for ethical possibility, 
they should reconsider a rule-based form of ethics code.  Social professions can designate 
new space for discussion of ethics and moral responsibility and also maintain rules of 
conduct that make no claims on ethics. 
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 To illustrate, consider the following excerpt from the Code of Professional 
Practice and Conduct for North Carolina Educators (1998): 
 
The educator … maintains an appropriate relationship with students in all 
settings; does not encourage, solicit, or engage in a sexual or romantic 
relationship with students, nor touch a student in an inappropriate way for 
personal gratification, with intent to harm, or out of anger.  
 
 
In this excerpt the concept of “appropriate relationship” is identified by an extended 
definition of what counts as “inappropriate.”  Inappropriate is known as sexual or 
romantic relationship and harmful touch.  Participants in the qualitative portion of my 
study confirmed similar understandings of “inappropriate.”  While “inappropriate” is 
known, “appropriate” is less known.  Similarly, “unethical” is stated in code in a manner 
that obscures or limits how we understand “ethical.” 
 Those who interpret codes of ethics often focus on statements about the 
inappropriate and the unethical.  Codes seem most instructive for telling professionals 
what not to do.  As such, ethics are understood as a static state of knowing or being 
professional (maintaining professional identity), and violations of ethics are understood 
as actions.  As long as the defined “unethical” actions are avoided, we are being ethical.  
This demonstrates how ethics codes function as Bauman’s (1995) adiaphoric social 
action as discussed in Chapter Three.  Being ethical involves participation in a stable 
professional identity, and following routine procedures and knowledge.  Doing ethics is 
more active and fluid; doing ethics requires involvement and reflection.   
 The Statement of Principles from the International Federation of Social Workers 
includes an example of how a more dynamic and active conceptualization of ethics might 
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be reflected in code.  One of the statements of professional conduct recommends the 
following guideline:  “Social workers should foster and engage in ethical debate with 
their colleagues and employers and take responsibility for making ethically informed 
decisions” (International Federation of Social Workers, 2004, p. 4).  Such a statement 
recognizes the limitations of fixed rules of conduct and encourages a more active, 
ongoing process of ethics.  Processes of ethics might resemble Josh’s experience, as 
described in Chapter Five, of thinking creatively with a team of colleagues to resolve 
concerns about having a dual relationship with Chris. 
  As I suggest in this section, queering the code (both politically and aesthetically) 
opens space for moral imagination and ethical possibility.  By reorienting ethics as an 
active process, rather than a condition of being or knowing, professional practice might 
become more just, generous and creative.  
Decentering Professional “Ethics” and Opening Space for Risk and Love 
  Finding ways to open more space for risk and love in professional “ethics” is a 
critical issue for my conclusion.  Ethical possibility is much broader, and much less 
certain, than the rational center of normative professional ethics.  As one of my central 
research questions, I asked, “Does professionalism lower the stakes of professional 
relationship by restricting involvement?”  Based on my theoretical and empirical study, I 
have shown that involvement is restricted and the stakes of relationship are lowered, 
presumably to protect the public, regulate practitioners and ensure the stability of the 
profession through uniform standards.  Without denying the importance of such 
protections and regulations, what is diminished or squeezed to the periphery by lower 
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stakes?  To respond to this critical question, I identify two ethical possibilities that are 
diminished by strict adherence to professional articulations of ethics.  These include the 
possibilities of freedom and commitment. 
The Possibility of Freedom 
 As teacher and social worker subjects, our full sense of human agency and 
freedom can be limited and diminished by normative professional ethics.  While we 
commit ourselves to professional goals and values, we also act from an inner, vocational 
calling that is both singular and social.  My use of “calling” simply refers to the 
intentions that speak to and give meaning to our work.  It is singular in that it is uniquely 
part of an individual’s process of becoming—“as unfinished, uncompleted being in and 
with a likewise unfinished reality” (Freire, 1994, p. 65).  It is social in that we are always 
born into existing social relations (which include power relations).  When quelled by 
rules and prescription, our actions may become separated and alienated from vocational 
freedom.  Because we, as agents of social professions, are located between mechanisms 
of social control and some sense of moral responsibility to students or clients, we are 
likely to experience “moral pain” or chronic distress over incompatible goals (Freud & 
Krug, 2002a, p. 476).   
 Freedom, as a way of being and as a way of pursuing possibility, allows us to live 
more authentically21 (Dybicz, 2010, p. 31).  Foucault (1997b) describes freedom as a 
condition that one is not born into but must be created to initiate the possibilities of 
ethics.  “Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics.  But ethics is the considered form 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See Heidegger (1930), The Essence of Human Freedom. 
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that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection” (p. 284).  Through reflective and 
social processes, caring for oneself opens ways for resisting self-subjugation while also 
opening possibility for new ethical relations.  Foucault’s aesthetic of freedom is 
particularly relevant to the lived experiences of social professionals whose autonomy has 
been undercut by bureaucratic, managerial forms of neoliberal politics.   
 In his study of front line social workers and psychiatrists, Brodwin (2013) 
provides rich description of what practices of freedom and reflection might look like: 
 
When a social worker or psychiatrist discovers that the usual gesture of 
work subverts her own ideal self-image, she inaugurates a moment of 
moral reflection.  At the same time, it is a momentary refusal of the 
sedimented values of the treatment setting and its dominant recipes for 
action.  She carves out a small zone of freedom in the midst of workplace 
rules and professional norms. (p. 19) 
 
 
Small zones of freedom and ruptures within daily professional routine, rather than 
being patched over or disregarded, should alert us to gaps between what is and 
what is possible.  Brodwin goes on to describe how momentary practices of 
freedom usher changes in one’s relationship to oneself.  He claims, “… [S]he 
partially reformulates herself as an ethical subject” (p. 20).  As ethical subjects, 
professionals must sometimes exercise “elastic boundaries” (Zerubavel, 1991, p. 
122) in order to grow the possibilities that extend beyond professional identity.  In 
doing so, we open much needed space for ethics. 
The Possibility of Commitment 
 Exercising freedom of choice and creating “small zones of freedom” invite the 
possibility of commitment.  However, commitment is encumbered by postmodern 
	  
	   192	  
ambivalence.  Under complex, fractured and privatized niches and markets, professional 
transactions are temporal and fragmented.  We no long have personal doctors; we have 
health care providers that change as rapidly as insurance networks reorganize for 
maximum profit.  Privatized child welfare services outsource case management to private 
companies who then contract with additional agencies for supplemental services.  The 
organization of jurisdictions within social professions tends to float responsibility by 
dividing and subdividing through continuous specialization.  Thus, even the basic norms, 
principles, and rules of professional ethics are reduced to “simple exchange of courtesies” 
(Bauman, 1995, p. 56) and commercial transactions.  The possibilities of caring and 
committed ethical relations are impossibly diminished within circuits of constantly 
changing parts and pieces.  
 Differentiating between ethics and morality, Bauman (1995) reserves ethics to 
signify fixed conventions that are imposed by external authorities.  Accordingly, moral 
response is an unpredictable, nonrational act of responsibility and commitment toward 
someone.  Bauman continues to describe barriers toward realizing moral responsibility in 
postmodern conditions that feature episodic and fragmented encounters with others. 
Bauman points out that “life lived as a succession of episodes is a life free from the worry 
about consequences” (p. 5).  Inconsequential relations also free us from worrying about 
responsibilities toward others.  I contend that professionalism and the “ethics” that 
support it organize dominant social fields (e.g. an economy of care) such that possibilities 
for moral response and commitment are minimized.   
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 Whereas moral commitment is located in connection between two people, human 
service and educational programs operate as if relationships are secondary or 
inconsequential to outcomes.  They operate with interchangeable parts (e.g. one licensed 
practitioner is as good as the next) and reduce the risk of harm by limiting involvement.  
Bauman classifies this form of togetherness as “being-with.”  He describes, “Being-with 
is a meeting of incomplete beings, of deficient selves; in such a meeting, highlighting is 
as crucial as concealing, engagement must be complemented by disengagement, 
deployment of some resources must be paired with withdrawal of others” (1995, p. 50). 
In professional terms, those are the rules of “boundaries.”  
 I am interested in social organization that creates more space for Bauman’s sense 
of moral response and commitment—what he calls “being for.”  However, I do not take 
up a strong sense of Bauman’s “being for” (or Levinasian ethics) as an ideal for 
professional practice.  Bauman (1995) clearly states that “nothing” can induce or 
anticipate “being for” in any “probabalistic’ way” (p. 52).  Consequential moral 
commitments cannot be planned or programmed into happening.  They would only grind 
against the gears of professionalism’s rational center.  Thus, they cannot serve as ideals 
of professional practice.  Nonetheless, social professionals can be more thoughtfully 
aware of the “strong” sense of moral commitment and recognize how it might present as 
“out of bounds.”  Freud and Krug (2002b) reflect that “good deeds” sometimes “represent 
situations in which social workers, far from being exploitive, are so deeply committed to 
clients that they are willing to risk transgressing regulations, thus putting themselves at 
risk.” (p. 489).   
	  
	   194	  
 Rather than reacting with admonition, suspicion or correction, social professionals 
might understand moral commitment as a rare and powerful possibility within the social 
processes of being involved in the lives of others.  These rare and powerful possibilities 
were repeated throughout the stories I gathered in	  my qualitative research.  I found that 
social professionals, who show up as persons in the intimate spaces and raw realities of 
others, feel as if “something has to happen” and they are “responsible” for making it 
happen.  These professionals know that they may be the only support, quite literally the 
only one present, in their students’ and clients’ lives.  As noted in Chapter Five, Sylvia 
took in Pedro because she “knew that he would die” if she did not take care of him.  
Sylvia initially met Pedro around 1985 and, as family, she continues to care for him thirty 
years later.  Just as the participants in my qualitative research made parenting 
commitments without knowing where such commitments might lead, members of social 
professions should recognize the moral content of such commitments so they can be 
better supported when they occur.  In doing so, they will contribute to the discourse of 
professional ethics by opening it to the greater possibility of commitment. 
Implications and Recommendations 
  Normative professional ethics have been archived in formal codes, but they take 
place in life through discursive practices.  Discursive practices demonstrate power 
relations in the manner that they circulate, coalesce and reinforce each other in a socially 
constructed world.  “In this process, reified structures arise and thus non-discursive 
elements begin to contribute to the discourse”  (Dybicz, 2010, p. 36).  By point of 
illustration, we can examine the concept of “professional.”  Derivative concepts of 
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“professional”—professional knowledge, boundaries, and expert services—are given 
“social reality” and “practical embodiment” (Bruner, 1986, as cited in Dybicz, 2010, p. 
36).  Practical embodiment through credentials, codes, and laws (for example) reifies 
“professional” and, thus, particular ways of understanding the world begin to dominate 
(Dybicz, 2010).  More so than professional code alone, the coalescence of discursive 
practices around professionalism restricts and diminishes ethical possibility.   
 Those who participated in the qualitative component of my study generally 
expressed vague familiarity with the NEA or NASW Code of Ethics.  However, 
participants’ statements reflected and participated in an ethical discourse of 
professionalism through ubiquitous phrases like “do no harm,” “inappropriate,” “child-
focused” and “crossing a line.”  Such concepts operate in the everyday world of 
professional life and reify larger systems of professionalism.  I find these discursive 
practices more powerful, vital and relevant in professional life than ethics code by itself.  
Thus, I recommend further research into discursive practices and ethical meanings among 
social professionals.  Understanding how established discourse shapes the telling of our 
own narratives helps us to recognize the complexity of lived experience.  Rossiter (2005) 
summarizes, “Discourse analysis accesses questions that help make social contradictions 
visible, and it opens conceptual space regarding one’s position within competing or 
dominant discourses” (p. 15). 
 I also recommend that research focus on the life-worlds of frontline practitioners.  
Following Brodwin’s (2013) model of ethnographic study of ethical decision-making in 
community psychiatry, descriptive research in education and/or social work could 
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provide a more holistic, more textured understanding of ethics in practice than is 
currently available.  “Moral talk” among colleagues, what is said in team meetings and 
supervision meetings, and agency policies have potential to disclose how professional 
agents make meaning and navigate through ethical matters.  Given the current economic 
and political pressures on education and social services, such research could reveal a 
great deal about the conditions of social professions in these precarious times. 
 My third recommendation for further research includes additional study of 
“positive boundary-crossings” (Doel et al, 2010).  Such study could contribute to 
philosophical and pragmatic thinking about “shadow” areas of professional practice.  
Positive boundary-crossings reveal occurrences where regulatory norms yield to some 
other, more subjective sense of ethics, mutuality or responsibility.  Doel et al. (2010) 
suggest that personal moral codes and religiosity are strongly influential.  Weinberg and 
Taylor (2014) found that practitioners turn to their own values, personal history or 
significant role models to “cope with the ambiguities of the system” (p. 80).  Among 
participants from my qualitative research, Sylvia, Michelle and Alexa referred to “social 
justice” as an underlying framework that informed their actions.  Any such “outside” 
framework could unsettle the norms of official professional routine and procedure.  
Additional study of positive boundary-crossings, such as teachers and social workers who 
become parents to youth without acting parents, may add pragmatic insight to a 
professional terrain that has been morally stunted with managerial techniques, 
standardized procedures, legal maneuverings and scores of metrics designed to neutralize 
risk.  Greater understanding of positive boundary crossings may lead to the possibility of 
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acknowledgement of loving, mutual relations that are not automatically labeled as 
abusive in cases where no abuse has occurred.   
  Pragmatic approaches may also help to link established empirical research with 
practice.  For example, Avery (2010) points toward substantial research that shows 
successful youth development is strongly associated with having at least one ongoing, 
long-term relationship with an adult.  Child welfare services are charged with finding 
permanent homes for older youth in foster care.  “Permanency” is more likely to happen 
with family members or “fictive kin”—significant adult relations of non-biological 
kinship.  Since the most continuous, adult relationships for older youth in foster care may 
be held with their teachers or social workers, a pragmatic solution could involve 
recruiting teachers, school administrators or social workers to become foster or adoptive 
parents.  Among the foster care agencies participating in Avery’s research (a federally-
funded project through the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services), staff 
members received training with the possibility of becoming parents themselves (2010, p. 
405).  I have found other scattered efforts around the country to recruit teachers into 
foster parenting for students who need permanent, stable homes.  In Massachusetts, the 
Fall River Foster Care Support Task Force expressed interest in seeing teachers support 
students outside of the classroom by becoming foster parents (Facey, 2010).  In 
Brooklyn, the You Gotta Believe! organization serves older youth in foster care by 
locating a person who cares about them (including former teachers) and supporting those 
relationships (Miller, 2013).  The San Francisco Unified School District and the San 
Francisco County Human Service Agency collaborated to establish schools as 
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“communities of support” for students in foster care.  One of their goals included 
recruiting adoptive and foster families from “targeted school sites” (Our Community, Our 
Children).   
 These initiatives pragmatically ask, “What works for older youth in foster care?” 
and “What do we need to do to make it happen?”  In this sense, there are direct linkages 
between research, policy and practice.  These initiatives also resist rigid mental categories 
that make distinctions between parents and teachers into social facts.  In these seemingly 
minor examples, the foundational dividing practices of professionalism (student/teacher, 
teacher/parent, social work/education) are negotiated and reconfigured.  Zerubavel (1991) 
reminds us that innovation and creativity are processes of a “flexible mind” that soften, 
and sometimes transgress, mental partitions.   
Closing Thoughts 
 This dissertation study represents my attempt to acknowledge and explore the 
ethical periphery of professional practice.  My study has been informed by experiential 
narrative, including my own, and explored through the theoretical possibilities of 
postmodern thought and ethics.  The dominant technologies and rational metrics of the 
late twentieth century have found homes within the social professions.  Subject to 
considerable economic and political forces, knowledge production in social work and 
education has fixed a spotlight on efficient, affordable and replicable practices with 
measurable outcomes.  Meanwhile, people meet each other, spend time together and 
develop relationships.  Meanwhile, teachers and social workers show up in the 
complicated, sometimes difficult, lives of others.  Some practitioners set aside the 
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equipment that they have been handed—performance rubrics, codes, and guidelines—and 
initiate “small zones of freedom” where they can mutually engage with the persons in 
front of them.  This is the ethical periphery of professional practice.  This is where 
professionals drive children home after school or bake birthday cakes for kids in foster 
care or … become their parents.  Outside of the spotlight, this is where the possibilities of 
commitment and love are able to grow. 
 In the Preface to Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Freire (1994) asks that his writing 
be remembered as helping to create a “world in which it will be easier to love” (p. 22).  Is 
it possible to imagine social professions—education and social work—helping to create a 
world in which it will be easier to love?  Social professions and those who occupy them 
are held so closely to daily operational tasks that it is easy to forget what it all means.  
Practitioners of social professions who become lost in nonstop management routine are in 
danger of becoming Sisyphean archetypes.  Lost in the minutiae of daily tasks, creating a 
world in which it will be easier to love is only reflected in the flicker of a distant star.  
Thus, members of social professions need to look up.  They need more time and new 
equipment—telescopes and satellite images—to remind them of distant constellations, 
mysterious galaxies and unknown possibilities.  They need ethical inspirations rather than 
ethical prescriptions if they are to contemplate the possibilities of creating a world in 
which it will be easier to love.
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APPENDIX A 
 
RECRUITMENT ADVERTISEMENT 
 
 
Email or Listserve Recruitment 
Study – Crossing Lines:  Professionals Becoming Parents 
Troy A. Martin, Principal Investigator 
	  
	  
	  
Teachers	  &	  Social	  Workers	  –	  Participate	  in	  a	  Research	  Study	  
	  
	  
If	  you	  are	  a	  K-­‐12	  teacher	  or	  a	  social	  worker	  who	  became	  the	  foster	  parent	  or	  
adoptive	  parent	  to	  a	  child	  who	  you	  met	  in	  a	  professional	  context,	  you	  are	  
invited	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  research	  study	  affiliated	  with	  The	  University	  of	  NC	  –	  
Greensboro.	  	  This	  study	  seeks	  to	  describe	  the	  experience	  of	  shifting	  from	  a	  
professional	  role	  to	  a	  personal	  /	  parental	  role	  by	  exploring	  ethical	  and	  professional	  
aspects	  of	  that	  experience.	  	  Participants	  will	  be	  interviewed	  one	  time	  
(approximately	  90	  minutes)	  with	  the	  potential	  for	  follow-­‐up	  questions	  (not	  to	  
exceed	  an	  additional	  45	  minutes).	  	  If	  interested,	  please	  contact	  Troy	  Martin,	  MSW,	  at	  
tamartin@uncg.edu	  or	  919-­‐259-­‐6933.	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APPENDIX B 
 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
 
Interview Protocol 
Crossing Lines:  Professionals Becoming Parents 
Troy A. Martin, MSW; Principal Investigator 
Dr. Kathy Hytten, Faculty Advisor 
 
1. Professional Background 
 
1a. Tell me a little about how you came to become a social worker [or] teacher? 
 
1b. Briefly, tell me a bit about your professional life as a social worker [or] teacher. 
 
1c. Do you recall any education or training on professional ethics? 
      (If little response, probe with questions about conduct that might be considered 
 unprofessional and how that was learned.) 
 
1d. How familiar are you with professional codes of ethics in your field?  What do 
you consider as the most important or useful aspects of professional ethics? 
 
2.  Professional relationship to parental relationship (conspicuous boundaries?) 
 
 “I want to talk with you about your relationship with your foster [or] adopted child.  I 
am mostly interested in your description and perception of how the relationship 
developed.” 
 
       2a.  How did you first meet?  When?  2b.  Talk a little about the nature of your 
professional role with [agreed upon pseudonym]? 
 
       2c.  How did your relationship developed over time?  
              (Probe for how the relationship felt and what responsibilities were felt.) 
 
       2d.  When and how did you first realize you were becoming personally involved with 
 [agreed upon pseudonym]? 
 
(Probe for moment or markers that set this relationship apart from other 
“professional” relations; What felt different?  What was circumstantially 
different?) 
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3. Professional Identity 
 
       3a. Describe your thoughts, feelings and questions as you began to consider  
 becoming the foster parent or adoptive parent of [agreed upon pseudonym]. 
 
3b. As you became more personally involved with [agreed upon pseudonym], did you 
have any concerns that your professional role and duties may be compromised by 
your personal involvement? 
  
 If so, how did you go about addressing or resolving those concerns? 
 
(Probe for conversations with supervisors, colleagues, family, friends; was there 
any evidence of internal conflict or ambiguity about the shift from professional to 
personal?) 
 
    3c. At the time you were considering foster parenting or adopting, what was your 
understanding of “professional relationship boundaries”? 
 
    3d.  Did you feel like you might be crossing a line?  Why or why not? 
 
 
    3e.  Did anybody else (colleagues, friends, family) think that you might be crossing a 
line? 
 (Probe for social approval or disapproval or social feedback from both professional 
and personal circles). 
 
    3f.  Did you experience any professional costs or repercussions from moving from a     
professional role to a parental role with [agreed upon pseudonym]?   
 
    3g.  How would you describe your ethical responsibilities in this situation? 
 
    3h.  How has your perspective on professional relationship boundaries changed over 
time?   
 
4.  Additional 
 
4a.  Is there anything that I did not ask about that you’d like to share or that you think is 
important to my study? 
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APPENDIX C 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT GREENSBORO 
CONSENT TO ACT AS A HUMAN PARTICIPANT 
 
Project Title:  Crossing Lines, Opening Ethical Space: Professionals Becoming 
Parents 
 
Principal Investigator and Faculty Advisor:  Troy A. Martin, MSW and Dr. Kathy Hytten 
 
Participant's Name:  
 
 
 
What is the study about?  
You are invited to participate in a research study that explores the experience of 
professional social workers and teachers who have become foster parents or adoptive 
parents to children who they initially met in a professional context.  This dissertation 
research is being done as part of my PhD work in Educational Studies at the University of 
North Carolina – Greensboro. This is a research project.  Your participation is voluntary. 
I am interested in how professionals experience ethics when a relationship shifts from 
professional to personal.  In 2002 I became the foster parent to a young man who I met 
while serving as his social worker.  Based on my experience of navigating professional 
norms and codes of ethics, I am interested in how others experience and understand 
similar situations.  By talking with others who have crossed professional life / private life 
boundaries in the process of becoming a foster or adoptive parent, I hope to explore and 
find meaning within complex issues of professional identity and ethical responsibility. In 
this dissertation, I explore the ethical dimensions of professional boundaries, codes and 
practices within the spaces of one-to-one encounter.   
 
Specific research questions include:  
Does professionalism lower the stakes of professional relationships by restricting 
involvement?   
What is professionalism without trust, and what is trust without risk?   
Does an ethics of “do no harm” leave any room for close, committed relationship?   
Does professionalism encourage us to risk little and, thus, diminish potential for more 
involved, more intimate forms of human interaction? 
 
Why are you asking me? 
I am asking you to participate because you have voluntarily identified yourself as a 
professional teacher or social worker who became the adoptive parent or foster parent to 
a young person you met in a professional context. I believe that your story can contribute 
to a fuller understanding of how ethics and professional identity inform being with others 
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in practice. 
 
What will you ask me to do if I agree to be in the study? 
I will request a one-to-one interview with those who agree to participate.  (Remote 
interviewing through Skype or other technology is possible.) I expect one-to-one 
interviews to last about 90 minutes.  
You may be asked to participate in a follow-up interview or follow-up communication.  
In such cases, I will request a follow-up interview or email exchange to clarify or ask 
questions about our initial interview.  You can decline to participate in follow-up 
activities if you choose to. 
Talking about professional ethics and behavior can involve sensitive topics and potential 
for you to feel some distress when discussing these topics.  I expect the potential for 
stress to be minimal, and you can end the interview at any point by telling me you want 
to end the interview. 
 
Is there any audio/video recording? 
I will ask for your permission to audiotape all interviews.  Because your voice will be 
potentially identifiable by anyone who hears the tape, your confidentiality for things you 
say on the tape cannot be guaranteed although I will try to limit access to the tape as 
described below.  
 
I will store audio recordings in locked file cabinet in my home office.  Aside from a third-
party transcriptionist, I do not anticipate anyone else listening to the recording.  After my 
designee or I have completed all transcription activities, all voice recordings will be 
erased.  Written transcriptions will not contain identifying information. 
 
Those who do not wish to be recorded can decline, and I will only take written notes.   
 
What are the risks to me? 
The Institutional Review Board at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro has 
determined that participation in this study poses minimal risk to participants.  Some of 
the questions you are asked might make you feel emotional and you may choose not to 
answer or withdraw from the study at any time. 
 
If you have questions, want more information or have suggestions, please contact Troy A. 
Martin, Principal Investigator, who may be reached at 919-259-6933 or tamartin@uncg.edu 
or Dr. Kathy Hytten, Faculty Advisor, at  336-256-1378 or kahytten@uncg.edu. 
 
If you have any concerns about your rights, how you are being treated, concerns or 
complaints about this project or benefits or risks associated with being in this study  
please contact the Office of Research Integrity at UNCG toll-free at (855)-251-2351. 
 
Are there any benefits to society as a result of me taking part in this research? 
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Benefits to society may include increased understanding of ethical complexities within 
the everyday, lived-space of professional relationships.  Professional schools and 
associations, in particular, may benefit from better understanding the negotiations and 
considerations of "ethics" in practice.  A descriptive, empirical account of ethical 
negotiations may inform how ethics are conceptualized, understood and taught within 
professional schools and associations. 
 
Are there any benefits to me for taking part in this research study? 
There are no direct benefits to participants in this study. 
 
Will I get paid for being in the study?  Will it cost me anything? 
There are no costs to you or payments made to you for participation in this study. 
 
How will you keep my information confidential? 
All information obtained in this study is strictly confidential unless disclosure is required 
by law.  Absolute confidentiality of data provided through the Internet cannot be 
guaranteed due to limited protections of internet access.  Please be sure to close your 
browser when you are finished so no one will be able to see what you have been doing. 
Voice recordings, notes and written communication gathered during the course of the 
research will be stored in a locked metal cabinet the Principal Investigator’s home office 
or, if electronic files, on a password-protected computer in the Principal Investigator’s 
home office.   
All participants will be assigned a pseudonym, which will be used on all documentation 
and recordings (except the consent form and a master list linking pseudonyms to real 
names).  As well, at the start of our interview, I will ask you to select a pseudonym to be 
used in lieu of your foster or adopted child’s name in order to preserve his or her 
confidentiality.  While identifying information about your child will not be part of my 
data, the pseudonym may appear in quotes and references in the data. 
After successful transcription, voice recordings will be erased.  All materials with 
identifiable information (e.g. email communication) will be deleted (electronic files) or 
shredded within 150 days of the date of the date next to your signature on this consent 
form.  Notes and transcripts, stripped of all identifying information, will remain in the 
Principal Investigator’s custody. Consent forms will remain in the Principal 
Investigator’s possession for a minimum of three years and will be kept in a locked metal 
file cabinet.  A master list linking the pseudonyms to the participants' real names will be 
stored separately from the data and consent forms in Dr. Hytten's (faculty advisor) 
UNCG office in a locked, metal filing cabinet for a minimum of three years. 
 
What if I want to leave the study? 
You have the right to refuse to participate or to withdraw at any time, without penalty.  If 
you do withdraw, it will not affect you in any way.  If you choose to withdraw, you may 
request that any of your data which has been collected be destroyed unless it is in a de-
identifiable state. 
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What about new information/changes in the study?  
If significant new information relating to the study becomes available which may relate 
to your willingness to continue to participate, this information will be provided to you. 
 
Voluntary Consent by Participant: 
By signing this consent form you are agreeing that you read, or it has been read to you, 
and you fully understand the contents of this document and are openly willing consent to 
take part in this study.  All of your questions concerning this study have been answered. 
By signing this form, you are agreeing that you are 18 years of age or older and are 
agreeing to participate, or have the individual specified above as a participant participate, 
in this study described to you by 
 
.  
 
 
Signature: ________________________ Date: ________________ 
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APPENDIX D 
 
NARRATIVE SUMMARIES 
 
 
Interview A -- Timothy, suburban Midwest, USA  (Date - 3.8.14, telephone) 
 
Timothy recently retired from his professional career with 17 years of experience as a 
teacher and 13 years of experience as a school administrator (vice principal and 
principal).  He recalls wanting to be a teacher when he was a kid and pursued studies to 
be a special education teacher.  [Lines 11-81]  Aside from three years of his teaching 
career, Timothy worked with “special needs” students, many of whom (“maybe half”) 
were in foster care and/or lived in foster care facilities.  [Lines 181-197] Timothy shared 
this to explain his familiarity with foster care and to justify his concerns/opinions about 
the foster care system.  (“Foster care is not a great place; you know it; I know it.” [Lines 
1145,46]) or (“foster care place … It didn’t impress me too much.  You know they were 
nice people but, you know what I’m saying; it’s not home” [Lines 212-214]) 
 
Timothy was Betty’s math teacher when he met her.  Betty was 16 years old and her 
sister Veronica was 14.  Veronica was not in Timothy’s class but he did have some 
contact with her through “individual education plan” (IEP) meetings.  [Lines 159 – 175; 
Line 379]  During the course of their teacher/student relationship, Timothy recalls being 
unimpressed with her foster care placement and giving her “little things” that he’d bring 
into class.  He describes her as “very nice.”  At some point Betty asked Timothy to adopt 
her, and her foster care worker did contact him about it. [Lines 211-227]  Timothy 
describes Betty’s foster care worker with positive regard and says that she approached the 
issue in a “nice,” “non-threatening, non-pressure way.” [Line 257-58]  Timothy and his 
wife had considered becoming adoptive parents previously.  Timothy explains, “Lots of 
kids had asked me to adopt them over the years.” [Line 202-03]  But, Timothy’s 
obligations as a principal, lack of time and the high needs of kids in foster care prevented 
them from going forward with adoption.  [Lines 204-210]  With a more relaxed schedule 
after moving back into the classroom and leaving his principal position, Timothy says 
that they moved forward with adopting Betty and Veronica because it was “a different 
time of life” that turned toward focusing on “home and heart.” [Lines 387-89] 
 
Timothy first met Betty in his classroom in September 2011.  On April 18, 2012 Betty 
and Veronica left the foster care facility they were living at and moved in with Timothy 
and his wife, who at that time were their foster parents.  They became their adoptive 
parents on November 20th 2012.  [233-237; 503-504] 
 
In the lead-up to Betty’s foster placement and adoption with her teacher (Timothy) and 
his wife, the Special Education Services District Office became involved and indicated 
that it may be “improper” because of Timothy’s role as her teacher.  The District Office 
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proposed moving Betty to another school as a solution. Timothy responded, “Do not 
move her to another school.  She’s had enough change in her life.” [Lines 517 – 522] 
 
The District Office then suggested that Timothy become a substitute teacher in the 
building for the rest of the year (April – June, 2012), and somebody else would be 
assigned to the classroom to be the teacher.  At this point Timothy appealed to the 
District Superintendent who he describes as a “friend” and a “buddy.”  [508-509]  He 
remarks, “I had had enough so I called the Superintendent.  I said, ‘You know what?  I 
worked hard to develop good relations with these kids and to yank me out of there – for 
what?  What are we gaining here?  Help me.  I don’t get it’.” [532-535] 
As Timothy understands, the Superintendent then helped “broker” [617] an outcome.  
Betty moved to a next-door classroom where a different teacher assumed professional 
responsibilities for her.  In actuality, Timothy continued to provide curriculum for Betty 
by giving it to the next-door teacher.  The next-door teacher could have “thrown it in the 
trash” [568-569] but, rather, agreed with it and took responsibility for grading.  [563-566]  
As well, Timothy agreed that he would move into a “resource room” the following school 
year, so he would have no “professional obligation” to Betty at all.  [557-559] 
 
Timothy expressed frustration with how the Special Education Services District Office 
responded to the situation.  He says, “I never felt like I was crossing a line, and I think 
even the special ed. department’s issues were done in a way that were less child-focused 
than my personal level of child-focus is.  You know, we’re here to serve children and 
anything we do that truly improves their lives is good.”  [Lines 696-700]  He also 
remarks, “Nothing extreme happened here and it seemed like people were only looking 
for extreme answers in the beginning.”  [629-631]  He explains that he may have 
“overreacted” to his own surprise because he thought, “You oughta be happy that two 
more kids are in a better spot. What?  Are you idiots?  You know?  I mean they just won.  
They won, I tell you.” [800-803]  
 
Timothy contextualizes the situation by explaining that these “18-32” classrooms that 
serve kids with “different needs” [637] grade students on “work effort but not on meeting 
the particular statewide academic standards.”  [642-644]  He adds that he might 
understand the problem of a perception of favoritism in a different kind of class – a 
“calculus class,” for example.  [652]  He says that such perceptions might be especially 
“troublesome” to an administrator who deals with parents who are “competitive” and 
“conscientious of all possible advantages.”  [656-660]  Upon reflection, Timothy does 
recall the possibility of negative parental perceptions regarding his “parent” role with 
Betty.  He recalls a parent who remarked, “Don’t you feel funny giving grades to your 
own kid?” and reflects, “…in retrospect, I may be able to better understand why they 
were so distraught about it.”  [675-676; 683-684]   
 
Timothy believes that his district administrators likely were focused on “moving up” and 
getting to the top.  His colleagues with strong “achievement attitudes” may have felt 
“threatened” when somebody like himself (who was a former administrator and stepped 
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away from it) reflects a counter perspective –“achievement is good, but, you know, 
there’s other things that’s more important.  [718-730]  He accuses his administrator 
colleagues of not “standing up and being strong for kids” but, rather, taking the “fastest, 
easiest way to get where they wanted to go.” [743-745]  Nonetheless, Timothy was 
pleased with the outcome for Betty and himself.  He says, “So, I think it was everybody 
won, because you didn’t pull me from the classroom and, at the same time, you didn’t 
take Betty and move her to another high school….” [624-626] 
 
Having been familiar and close to young people in foster care, Timothy and his wife had 
been thinking of and planning toward eventually adopting children from the foster care 
system.  [869-876]  Timothy expressed an interest in being an advocate for foster youth 
who are aging out of the system [1207] and relayed first-hand observations of foster 
youth who were “educationally deprived” [1135] due to a lack of parental advocacy.  As 
well, Timothy identifies several examples of conducting himself with interest in his 
students’ personal lives.  He provides birthday cakes, which he often baked himself, for 
his students.  [915-926]  He has taken kids home during holidays if the kids didn’t have a 
“home to go home to.”  [1022-1023]   
 
He summarizes his “ethical responsibilities” by saying “… you take on more 
responsibility for a child that goes beyond the classroom, that I don’t think that delves 
into an inappropriate area.  I think that it’s a natural part of life.” [861-864]  Timothy also 
remarks, “Like, I just thought I was doing what I do.  You know how you make the 
decision to do something, you just do it.” [756-758]   
 
Timothy draws lines between appropriate and inappropriate involvement with students.  
For example, he used to drive one of his students, Reggie [alias], home.  One day he 
drove Reggie to one of his former foster care facilities so he could visit with some people 
who were “like a mom to him.” [330-341]  At the same time, Timothy indicates that it is 
“bad” to “take kids to the mall and start to hang out with them.” [926-928]  He reports 
being “disturbed” by teachers who do “harmful” things. [894-896]  Timothy understands 
differences between reasonable risk and risk that may cause harm.  He recalls one of his 
first professional mentors as saying, “There’s no growth without risk” and explains, 
“Anytime you go to change something, you risk a problem.” [966-975]  He considers the 
importance of the “do no harm statute” [987] as doing something or “… using our 
influence that in the end will hurt the development of that child to become a full, rich 
human being.” [989-990] 
    
Timothy sees professional codes of ethics as dealing with “liability style issues more so 
than caring style issues.”  [1059-1060]  He remarks that most professional ethics training 
and education happens “on the ground as you go.” [101]  He does include “outside 
relationships with kids” [108-109] and “improper relationship with a student” [114-115] 
as part of the basic understanding of professional ethics.  He sees formal ethics codes in 
education as dealing with how to conduct yourself and “moral turpitude rules” [143-144].  
He goes on to provide a critique of too many rules.  He explains, “Rules are written to 
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enhance everybody’s life.  Rules are written to improve things.   They’re not made to 
catch things.  That’s not what they’re there for.  That’s not policy.  They ought to have 
policy in there that gets people to do the right thing, you know.”  [1087-1091]  
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Interview B – Suzanne, urban Northeast, USA   (Date - 3.20.14, telephone) 
 
Suzanne has been a teacher in city schools (middle school, high school and special 
education) for 27 years.   [Lines 40-56] 
 
Suzanne met Rick as a student in her ninth grade art class but had heard about him from 
her Assistant Principal prior to his enrollment in her class.  [97-113]  Suzanne’s Assistant 
Principal knew that she had been “certified as a foster or adoptive parent” in 2003 and 
suggested that she consider adopting Rick.   Another colleague also told her Rick’s story 
and how he “needed a guardian.” [114-125]  Rick, who was 15 or 16 years old at the 
time, was not “documented” and had received legal advice (from a pro-bono legal 
organization that had visited the school) to “find  a guardian” as a first step. [134-141]  
His father had recently died and his mother lived in Africa.  At the time Rick lived with 
“some guys in their 20’s from his country” and “worked for them.” [159-164] 
 
Suzanne and Rick’s school did not want to turn Rick over to the foster care system 
because he could “end up anywhere” as a ward of the state. [141-143]  After deciding to 
try to become Rick’s guardian, Suzanne told Rick she’d like to talk with him.  When he 
came to her later in the day, she asked, “Would you like for me to be your guardian?  
And he said “yes.” [127-129] 
 
On the advice of Rick’s lawyer, Suzanne moved Rick into her house when another 
“boarder” moved out.  [148-151] Rick lived with Suzanne throughout his four years of 
high school and currently stays there when he is home from college.  He remained in her 
art class after moving in with her and, eventually, took another art class with her [166-
175; 305] 
 
Suzanne reports having boarders in her house often:  “It wasn’t a big deal because I’m 
used to having people in and out of my house. … It felt natural.  I used to have couch 
surfers … It’s like that – just hanging out with a couch surfer. … Only I was responsible 
for him.  So, it’s kind of like a combination of buddy/parent.” [182-194]   
 
Suzanne and Rick spent a year in and out of family court, and she became his legal 
guardian after a year.  A “legal guardian” relationship was all that was needed for Rick to 
receive a “green card”; adoption was not needed. [212-228]  The school system did not 
get involved in any aspect of the process.  [205-207]  Suzanne explained other rules that 
school employees have to follow.  She says, “Let’s say your driving in your car and you 
see a student at a bus stop or something; you’re not allowed to pull over and put him in 
your car; … you can’t have them in your house.  But, you can become their parent.  I find 
that really odd.” [246-253] 
 
Suzanne received support from her administrators and colleagues and says that concerns 
about “professional relationship boundaries” or grading bias “… never came up.” [286-
309]  When asked about formal training on professional ethics  or professional codes of 
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ethics, Suzanne responded that she is not familiar with formal materials on professional 
ethics and explained, “… there’s not a lot of talk about that.”  When asked about her own 
sense of professional ethics, she said, “I’ve never given it any thought.”  [59-80]   
 
When asked about her felt sense of ethical responsibility to Rick, Suzanne summarized:  
“I just was doing what needed to be done – going to court and, um, getting the paperwork 
done.  You know, um, making sure he had enough money … just stuff that you do as a 
parent of a teenager.” [323-330] 
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Interview C – Sylvia, urban West Coast, USA    (date - 3.29.14, in-person) 
 
Sylvia is a retired social worker (with an MSW) and teacher. [Lines 10-13]  Sylvia 
identifies as Spanish-American with ancestral ties to Cabeza de Vaca and geographic ties 
to northern New Mexico and southern Colorado.  [37-53]  Her social work career 
includes working for a Veteran’s Administration Hospital, a child care resource service, 
child protective services (CPS) and adult protective services (APS).  [64-86] Sylvia 
explains her professional interests in social work by relating them to “social change” and 
“social justice” and cites AIDS work and work related to Mexican Americans and women 
as examples. [19-25] Describing CPS work as “exhausting hard, hard work” that 
sometimes required evening work, Sylvia left social work for a teaching career after 
having children. [96-104]  She has retired from teaching second grade after 16 years but 
continues to serve as a substitute teacher. 
 
Pedro was seventeen-years-old when he appeared on Sylvia’s CPS caseload.  At the time 
he was “in a coma … illegal ...” with “… end-stage renal failure … no family … and no 
money.” [207; 195-200]  Five or six days after being “dropped” at the hospital, Pedro 
emerged from the coma and Sylvia met him as a new “client.” [203-212]  Sylvia says that 
her “heart” immediately “went out to him.” [219]  She had a favorable impression of him 
(“intelligent … charming … sweet … funny … smart” [220-231]) and began to develop a 
“nice relationship.” [229-230]  Her efforts to find a foster home for him did not yield 
positive results [223-224], and he was about to be discharged from the hospital with no 
place to go. [226]  So, Sylvia brought Pedro home. [236] 
 
When initially asked about her employing agency’s response, Sylvia said she didn’t tell 
people because she did not want to be “criticized.”  [283-284]  Then, she recalls that it 
was her supervisor who advised her to write “placed with a home” in the case file.  She 
then closed the case, and nobody followed up with questions about where he was placed 
as was “normally” done. [293-298]  Sylvia suggests that because Pedro was only six 
weeks from his 18th birthday, there were no legal or official papers filed pertaining to his 
placement. [275-278]  Eventually, after Pedro’s 18th birthday, Sylvia and her family 
adopted him. 
 
Initially, Sylvia expected that Pedro might not be with her family much beyond his 18th 
birthday.  He was very sick and required dialysis three times per week, so health care and 
health coverage were the pressing concerns.  Sylvia had to go to court to help him receive 
medical coverage, which was complicated since Pedro was an undocumented resident.  
[238-249]  With Pedro’s “life in the balance,” Sylvia’s quick action and social work 
advocacy mattered to his survival. [258-259] 
 
Pedro was from Tijuana, Mexico and attended school in San Diego.  Sylvia described a 
“bond” with Pedro that was partially tied to understandings through some shared 
ethnicity.  She also described him as more caring, helpful and well-mannered than some 
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of the other ten children in her family (“five natural, … two step and … three adopted” 
[106-107]) [335-346].  In short, Sylvia felt a sense of “identification” with Pedro. [362] 
 
When asked about the response of her colleagues, Sylvia indicated that they expressed 
“fear” for her but also respected her work and credibility.  [451-468]  Due to Pedro’s high 
needs and the number of other children in the family, some people “thought it was not a 
good idea.” [474-480]  As well, some indicated that Pedro should be “Mexico’s 
problem.”   Sylvia explained her response:  “What else are we going to do?  … two days 
later he’d be dead.  If you don’t have dialysis three times a week and something builds up 
in you, then you just die.  So, it wasn’t a thing where you could send him back to 
Mexico.” [482-492]  Sylvia also stated, “His situation was so horrible that I knew that he 
would die if I didn’t take care of him.” [642-643] 
 
When reflecting on professional ethics and the NASW Code of Ethics, Sylvia recalls the 
“golden rule” … “try to do people like you would want to be done.” [133-134]  She 
remarked, “… Do what you can and if it’s unethical try to make it ethical.  You know, 
you have to do what you can do to get the job done.” [119-121] 
 
When considering unethical conduct, Sylvia brings up breaking confidentiality, sex with 
a minor or client [162-170] and taking in kids for the purpose of getting their social 
security benefits. [566-567] 
 
When asked if she ever felt as though she might be crossing a line, Sylvia reflected on the 
amount of power she had in the situation.  She recalled the phrase – “the rescuer can 
become the persecutor” and acknowledged the potential for abuse or exploitation. [533-
545] 
 
When asked about her “ethical responsibilities” in the situation, Sylvia described 
“raising” Pedro, “preparing” him for life in the U.S., “teaching” him and “treating him 
right.” [577-596] 
 
Sylvia indicated that she thinks it’s fine (and common) for teachers to foster or adopt kids 
in their classes.  However, when asked about “clinical social workers” adopting or 
fostering clients, she anticipated feeling out of her depth (“I don’t know anything about 
clinical.”) and deferred to the “do no harm” tenet.  She indicated, “ I don’t think I could 
adopt a child under those circumstances.” [669-686] 
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Interview D – Michelle, urban Northeast, USA   (date - 3.30.14, telephone) 
 
Michelle received professional education in social work and has an MSW but does not 
always “identify” as a social worker. [line 74; 353-354]  She is a member of a listserve of 
“radical” social workers who share similar ideas and approaches to social work. [365-
367]  Michelle’s professional career has included (1) advocacy / community organizing 
work at a small non-profit focused on child welfare and (2) case management work with 
family court child welfare cases (i.e. defending parents).  [68-79]  At the time of this 
interview Michelle was not employed.  She reported that she quit her case management 
position after feeling “burned out” and “depressed” with case management and child 
welfare direct service work.  [81-85] 
 
Michelle met Jenny and her mother in March, 2011 [224] in the context of doing 
curriculum development and community outreach for a pilot group for families who had 
been reunified recently from foster care. [179-185]  Jenny was about to turn eight.  [195] 
Michelle described not feeling “really crazy about” Jenny initially and preferring to work 
with adults. [196-200]  Michelle and Jenny’s mother formed a relationship that continued 
through a book discussion group after twelve weeks of family group ended.  Jenny’s 
mother also continued involvement with Michelle’s agency by participating in a weekly 
support group for parents. [233-234] Since Jenny’s school and home were also in the 
same neighborhood where Michelle lived, she and her mother would spend some time at 
Michelle’s house.  (Jenny would use the computer and her mother and Michelle would 
talk or do “organizing work.”) [204-216] 
 
In January, 2012 Jenny’s mother attempted suicide and checked herself into a hospital.  
She asked Michelle to take Jenny until she was better. [235-246]  Child Protective 
Services (CPS) were no longer involved in the case, and Michelle’s supervisor indicated 
support.  (The agency advocated for “community-based child welfare.”) [247-251]  Since 
Michelle and Jenny were already familiar with each other and to avoid a more disruptive, 
out-of-community placement with CPS, Michelle agreed to take Jenny.  [259-264]  
Michelle (and her sister who also lived at her house) kept Jenny for about a month.  
Michelle described that the arrangement had minimal impact on Jenny and “didn’t seem 
to affect her.” [264-282, & email] 
 
Michelle’s work flexibility and support from her sister eased some of the challenges of 
taking Jenny in.  Michelle describes initially feeling “nervous” and “worried” about the 
open-ended arrangement (i.e. not knowing how long Jenny would live with her). [290-
303]  In retrospect, Michelle reflects: “It really was like the stars aligned in the situation.  
You know like the flexibility, the help of my sister, the proximity of Jenny’s school to my 
home and to my job.  … [T]he separation was lessened hopefully with her mom coming 
over all the time and even sleeping over ….”  [474-480] 
 
When asked about how she thinks about her “ethical responsibility” in the situation, 
Michelle references her “privilege” in the situation.  She cites having an apartment with 
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“extra space for Jenny” and “… not having suffered what this mother had suffered … as a 
single mother dealing with all these issues.” [480-485]  Michelle reflects:  “So, I felt like, 
I really felt like I just didn’t have a choice.  So, I felt a very strong ethical responsibility 
because as I said I had no idea if the state were to get involved where it might place 
Jenny and what destruction and trauma that might cause her.  And the mother didn’t have 
any other family or friends at that point to be able to step in.  So, it was very clear to me, 
even though there was a little, I was a little nervous at first and I wasn’t used to having a 
kid around all the time.  But, this is like something that had to happen ….” [485-493] 
 
When asked to describe the “transition from a professional role to a parental role,” 
Michelle expressed some dissonance with professional identity.  She described her 
workplace environment as “non-traditional” and not “very professional”  [349-353] and 
said that the executive director was “pretty radical in a lot of his beliefs.”  [384-385]   
Michelle concluded, “I wouldn’t say that I thought of myself in a very professional way.”  
[395-396]  Stating exceptions for “romantic or sexual boundaries,” Michelle indicated 
that “boundaries” were not that important in her work role, which was more “community 
focused.” [386-390]  Michelle also disagreed with prohibitions on personal disclosure 
with clients under the directive of professional boundaries.  She said, “I’ve always had a 
problem with that because I feel like if I’m interacting in someone’s community in this 
role, that it’s only human that they’d want to know a little bit about me.  You know, I’m 
not going to put myself on a pedestal and think that I shouldn’t disclose anything at all.  I 
might be asking a lot of really personal questions, you know, about people’s lives.  So, 
why shouldn’t I become a human being and share a little bit about myself if it’s, you 
know, relevant?” [131-138] 
 
When asked to consider an ethical imperative of “do no harm,” Michelle draws  
distinctions between following standard procedure and doing harm.  “Well, I mean in this 
particular situation and the context of this situation that we’re talking about I felt like I 
was not doing harm by [not] reporting or following up with the CPS because I saw the 
trauma that the mother and the daughter had gone through because of the past experience 
with CPS.  So, I guess in that sense working in child welfare, getting the state involved is 
so clearly doing so much harm on so many different levels.  So, in that sense I felt like I 
was able to do no harm and respond to the situation.” [432-439]    
 
Michelle’s perspective of practice is rooted in a “social justice” orientation [49] and 
informed by understanding “systemic issues” that contextualize individual problems in 
terms of “what they are up against in society as a whole.” [442-446]  Michelle speaks to a 
potential tension between having a “grasp of our own identities” and “working toward 
systemic change” that can result in further doing “… harm to the situation that we’re 
trying to change.” [447-451]    
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Interview E – Jason, New England, USA    (Date - 4.2.14, telephone) 
 
Jason worked his way into a supervisory position in social work/mental health but has no 
formal schooling in professional social work.  He earned a college degree in music 
performance. [Lines 62-63]  With work experience with youth at summer camps, Jason’s 
early professional career started with working “one-on-one with youth with emotional 
and behavioral challenges in a community-based setting.” After a couple years, he 
became a transition case manager at a juvenile rehabilitation center.  Then, he became a 
“team lead” (supervisory role) in a residential program for youth with emotional / 
behavioral challenges. [75-103]  Jason describes a “very positive” experience with 
working professionally with families and youth and feeling “proud” to have been part of 
the organization he worked with.  After moving into a supervisory role, he worked more 
directly with “a lot of really burnt out staff.”  He found these conditions more 
“challenging” and cites it as a reason for leaving direct social work practice. [135-144] 
 
Jason met his adopted son, Chris, at the residential program where he was team leader.  
Chris was nine-years-old.  After being separated from his biological parents at four-
years-old, Chris had been through a series of unstable placements and failed reunification 
efforts.  [249-255]  Jason held a supervisory role in the “house” where Chris resided; he 
led groups and participated in daily activities and routines.  [198-209]  Jason also served 
as Chris’s “mentor,” which meant spending extra time together and occasional outings.  
[221-227]  While interacting in the therapeutic setting, Jason did not act in the capacity as 
Chris’s “therapist.” [211-213] 
 
At 25 years-old and married, Jason had no plans to adopt and “wasn’t even considering 
biological children at that point.”  [265-268]  However, within three months of meeting 
Chris the thought began to cross Jason’s mind.  He describes feeling as if Chris was 
“supposed to be part” of his family and compares it to the feeling he had when he met his 
wife. [232-242]  This feeling happened quickly and “out of nowhere” [268-269] but was 
not “impulsive” [241].  Jason explains, “… it definitely wasn’t the first cute kid with a 
sad story I’ve worked with.  So, it wasn’t an impulsive thing, it was just a sort of 
overwhelming feeling …” [240-242]   
  
Jason began to discuss the possibility of moving into a parental role with Chris with his 
wife and his supervisor just three to four months after meeting Chris; Jason describes 
both of their responses as “supportive.” [263-280]  The conversation then moved forward 
to Chris’s treatment team.  The treatment team identified a concern about Jason having a 
dual relationship with Chis.  Jason recalls, “… because I was working in this house, um, 
and we all of course felt very strongly, he couldn’t come start doing visits to my house 
while we were still in that situation.  That wouldn’t have been appropriate in that 
context.” [286-294]  Jason explains that home visits would not have been “appropriate” 
or “ethical” because it could lead other residents toward a perception of “special 
treatment” for Chris, and it might create “confusion” for Chris.  [383-393]  Jason 
connects these concerns to the ethical principle of acting in the “best interests of the 
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client.”  [383-384]  The treatment team resolved the issue by moving Chris into a 
temporary community-based foster home and out of the therapeutic group home so that 
he could start visiting Jason’s home as part of pre-adoption procedures.  Jason was 
pleased with the treatment team’s “solution” and describes it as an outcome of “creative 
thinking.” [297-309]  Jason explains, “…[T]here was no longer that conflict of I’m 
suppose to have this professional role and I’m also considering this parental role.” [337-
338]  He continues, “I think because we handled it very … openly and as professional as 
possible.  We were all very, very aware of that and going out of the way to find a way to 
allow for visits and that sort of thing without him being part of my professional life … .” 
[370-373] 
 
At the time of the interview, Chris was 13-years-old and the fully adopted son of Jason 
and his wife. 
 
When asked about reaction from colleagues, Jason describes some “friction.”  Jason 
recalls hearing about a colleague who said that he had taken the job to “grocery shop for 
a kid.”  He adds that he never fully understood the “anger” and resentment from some of 
his colleagues. [349-359]  Jason does not recall any “ethical” concerns about “crossing a 
line” but describes receiving advice that he was “very young” and didn’t necessarily 
know what he was getting himself into. [362-365]  Regarding family and friends, Jason 
describes feeling supported by the “folks that mattered.”  [442]  He expects that some 
cautionary advice from family and friends came from the stigma attached to a child who 
has been in a “high-end mental health” facility. [431-432] 
 
When asked about professional codes of ethics, Jason emphasizes that actions should be 
taken for the “best interest of the client” and should have a “client-centered focus.” Jason 
also recalls “specific things” like “not accepting a gift and not sharing personal 
information.” [179-190]  Regarding his relationship with Chris, Jason remarks, “I was 
acutely aware of it in a professional setting and not wanting to do anything unethical or 
inappropriate in the context of work.” [530-532] 
 
Jason describes some aspects of the transition from professional relations to personal 
relations with Chris as feeling “strange.”  He specifically describes being aware of limits 
to expressing affection in professional life.   He remarks, “… as a parent you know on a 
Saturday morning the kid comes and gets in the bed with you.  That’s a normal thing – 
like he wants to cuddle or whatever.  If you’re in a professional setting that’s about the 
most odd and that would be extremely inappropriate.” [405-418] 
 
When asked about how he dealt with the expectation of distance and “not being too 
involved” with clients, Jason describes being aware that he was not going to be able to 
stay on the sidelines with Chris.  He says, “… it was a very different feeling from the 
offset.” [482-490]  Jason recalls “some sort of spark with him” [494] and being drawn to 
him, in part, because of his “unbelievable resilience.” [516-517]   Reflecting upon this, 
Jason recalls something that his supervisor said to him:  “Sometimes kids pick their 
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parents.”  [545]  Of his experience with Chris, Jason shares, “So, I think it hasn’t changed 
my ethical perspective but certainly my understanding of becoming a parent – how 
sometimes that looks very different than the traditional route.” [545-548] 
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Interview F – Alexa, Northeast, USA   (Date - 4.19.14, telephone) 
 
Alexa chose to study social work after graduating from college and working with youth 
for a couple of years. She earned an MSW with a “group work” concentration.  Her 
interests and experiences in social work include international human rights and   youth 
work. [Lines 91-103] She describes a “social justice” orientation to social work.  [110-
111]  Alexa has led groups and provided “informal counseling” at a youth education / 
drop-in center; she has also worked as a case manager in an organization that provides 
immigration legal services to youth.   
 
Alexa met Jason while serving as his case manager in immigration legal services.  She 
was the first social worker in an organization that was staffed mostly with attorneys.  
[162-167]  Jason was seventeen and homeless with no connections to the surrounding 
area after being “plopped down” there by immigration authorities.  Her job involved 
connecting Jason with healthcare, mental health services, housing, etc.  Alexa explains 
that Jason had been “kicked out” of various shelters and housing.  She gradually began 
doing “more and more counseling type stuff” with him and found “trust” issues and a 
history of “an incredible amount of trauma.” She describes, “… after several months 
went by I was the only person that was consistently in his life besides his lawyer.” [176-
196] 
 
At twenty-eight-years-old, Alexa had previously thought about adopting or fostering 
older adolescents but had no active or immediate plans to pursue it.  [206-209]  Alexa 
describes the “moment” when she began to feel more personal responsibility toward 
Jason:  “… there was a particular moment when he was beaten up pretty badly in the 
street and he called me right after to go with him to the police and the hospital.”  
Recognizing her “ability to make a difference,” Alexa asked, “… why am I just sitting 
here watching terrible things happen when there is something more useful I could be 
doing?”  [213-220]  The meaning of that moment channeled  Alexa’s pain, frustration 
and feeling “helpless” in the face of Jason’s suffering.  She recognized that the 
professional, standard operating procedure was not enough.  She describes, “… I have 
access to shelter and I have facilitated this housing and that housing and an independent 
living program and, and it was at a point that I could see that making referrals, talking to 
supervisors, doing the case work thing was not sufficient for him to become housed 
because what he needed was a different way of dealing with him and a different type of 
relationship and just a whole different type of support.” [226-245] 
 
As Alexa searched for a potential legal guardian for Jason and his immigration case, he 
asked her, “Why can’t you do it?  Why are you looking for somebody else?” [252-259]  
This is when Alexa said to herself, “Okay.  I need another job,” in order to become 
Jason’s legal guardian.  Within six months Alexa pursued study in a different profession 
and took a new job in that field.  [262-272]  Once she resigned her case management 
position, Jason moved into her home, and Alexa filed papers for legal guardianship 
(which were eventually awarded).  [333-339] 
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Alexa decided that she needed to switch jobs and professions based on her own 
understandings and those of co-workers and social worker peers.  From her case manager 
role, Alexa describes “knowing” that she should not and could not take Jason into her 
home.   After thinking it over and discussing with others, Alexa explains, “It was the 
shouldn’t, and I felt very strongly that I should but I felt that many other people felt that I 
shouldn’t and that might make it difficult for work.” [250-252; 294-304] 
 
At the time of my interview with Alexa, Jason had recently turned twenty-one—the age 
at which legal guardianship terminates.  Although they have discussed legal adoption, 
Alexa indicates that “he’s not ready for that.”  Jason continues to live with Alexa, and she 
describes their relationship as “moral adoption.” [344-352] 
 
In the context of her connection with Jason, Alexa describes a “very strong, personal 
ethical responsibility” to him.  [314-315] When asked about ethics, she talks about a 
“collective human ethical responsibility to each other,” [316] an “obligation” to take care 
of each other [416] and “a personal responsibility to do what we can.”  [419-420]  She 
includes the possibility of self-sacrifice as part of ethical responsibility.  [413]  She also 
cited her own “privilege of having the ability to provide what’s needed.”  She explains, “I 
had space; I had time; I had emotional availability; I had some understanding … practical 
tools to do so.  And, I think that, you know, if you do have that then there’s a moral 
imperative to do it.” [477-484] 
 
During the process of transitioning from a professional role to a personal / parenting role, 
Alexa recalls “a couple” of colleagues and social work friends who were “very 
supportive.”  [398-401]  Concerns that were expressed by colleagues were explained as 
being “scared” about what might “go wrong” [375-377] and general concerns that Alexa 
didn’t know what she was getting herself into. [395]  Alexa thinks that the concerns 
expressed by her supervisor (an attorney) were more focused on her career – “not too 
much direct, you know, ‘that’s wrong’ or ‘that’s unprofessional’ but … implying it.” 
[388-389]   
 
When asked, Alexa confirmed that she felt like she was “crossing a line.” [368-369]  She 
explained her decision to quit her job and exit the social work profession:  “… I just had 
this idea in my head that, you know, if I quit this job so that Jason can come live with me 
and then I apply to another social work job and they’re like ‘why did you leave there?’ 
and then they’re gonna call my references and then they’re gonna be like ‘you’re crazy 
and we’ll never hire you’.” [297-301]  At a later point in the interview, Alexa adds “… 
maybe I didn’t have to [change professions] but it felt like I had to.” [425-426]  (Alexa 
notes that since then she has “come back” and currently holds a position in social work.) 
[428-431] 
 
When considering “professional ethics,” Alexa thinks about doing “what is right” and not 
causing any “harm.”  When asked about “unprofessional” actions, Alexa includes 
anything that is “hurtful” or anything that is done for self-benefit rather than the client’s 
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benefit. [139-153] When specifically asked about “professional relationship boundaries,” 
Alexa indicates that some are necessary while others may not be.  Regarding her 
situation, she explained, “I think it would not have been appropriate for me to become 
Jason’s guardian and have him live with me while I continued to work at that job. … I 
think that would be crossing an inappropriate line …” [492-497]  At the same time, when 
asked, she confirmed that she experienced “professional costs and repercussions.”  Alexa 
explains that she changed professions, took a pay cut and went through a period of “very 
unstable” income. [423-427] 
 
Finally, when asked how she might want professional social work to be different based 
on her experience, Alexa indicated “more critical thinking” and “questioning.” [439; 448]  
She explains, “… I am somebody who, if I feel there’s some rules, I want to know why 
they’re there and what’s the purpose of them and do they help or do they not help, and, 
you know, I believe in civil disobedience.  … if there are rules that are not good, should 
we change them or should we break them or both?” [441-447]  She continues by 
reflecting on “distancing” practices in clinical social work.  “I think they can put a lot of 
space between the social workers and the people that we work with and kind of take away 
from humanity …” [450-452]  Alexa suggests that professionals consider how they are 
defining relationships in their heads, out loud and on paper and ask, “what implications 
does it have for humanity and everybody involved?” [455-457] 
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Interview G -- Mark & Liz, Southeast, USA  (Date – 6.13.14, in-person) 
 
Mark and Liz are married to each other and live in a rural area in the Southeast of the 
United States.  Both have had life-long careers in education.  Mark describes coming 
from a family of educators.  Over his professional career he has been a middle school 
teacher, a principal, a curriculum director, an assistant superintendent and a 
superintendent (his current position).  He remarks that he had a goal to become a 
principal from “early on.”  [Lines 37-49]  Liz’s professional career has included teaching 
exceptional children, teaching elementary school and working as a curriculum specialist.  
[73-94]  They both have many years and extensive histories of working in public 
education. [142-143] 
 
Mark was the principal of a middle school when he met John, a student at the middle 
school.  Mark became familiar with John in the context of dealing with his conduct 
problems, which were ongoing throughout 6th, 7th and 8th grades.  Mark describes 
behavior such as acting out, disrespect toward teachers and fighting.  [278-283; 428-429]  
Mark recalls, “… I suspended him out of school; I assigned him to in-school suspension; 
I talked to his mother; I took him home because he was being disruptive on my campus. 
… It was a relationship build on him getting in trouble all the time and me having to 
provide discipline.” [283-287]  Mark also recalls that John was a little different from 
other students who got into a lot of trouble because he showed “remorse.” [293-295] 
 
Once John moved on to high school he struggled academically and his home life became 
increasingly unstable.  John played high school football and was connected to a network 
of coaches and parents of other players.  Mark had friends who were also part of this 
network in their small-town setting and received regular updates about John.  [484-486; 
535-536]   In March of John’s freshman year, he became homeless after his mother 
moved out-of-state. [497-498; 561]  As temporary and informal living arrangements 
began to fall through, Mark received a phone call from a friend who reported that John 
had “nowhere to go.” [545-546]  Mark and Liz were active foster parents; Mark 
contacted the Department of Social Services, and a Judge placed John with them on that 
day. [547-549]   
 
Mark recalls that John was “not happy” when Mark explained to him that he was to come 
and live with his family.  [575-578; 616] Mark offered, “You can stay here as long as you 
need to.”  [620] John stayed with Mark and Liz through his remaining years of high 
school.   Mark and Liz attribute knowing John’s history as part of the reason the 
placement was successful.  [666]  They also regard ongoing support from his football 
coach and teachers as creating a “village” effect. [690-693; 718] As “advocates for 
education,” they also helped him focus on passing his high school classes and graduating. 
[666-685]  
 
By the time John graduated from high school, Mark was the acting Assistant 
Superintendent of the school district.  He does not recall concerns about his dual 
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relationship (professional and parental) with John.  Mark explains, “I don’t remember 
being worried about it impacting my professional career or anything in terms of 
professionalism, because I think the members of that community where I was principal – 
they knew our story.  They knew we were foster parents.” [762-772]  Mark and Liz have 
one biological child, four adopted children and have taken care of numerous foster 
children. [887-898]  Mark states, “She and I are just geared toward kids and taking care 
of kids.” [926] 
 
When asked to elaborate on the “responsibility” that he felt toward John, Mark explains 
that there was nobody else to take him in and “… bottom line—it felt right.” [923-924; 
931]  He adds, “I kind of felt sorry for him in school.” [916] 
 
When asked if he would have taken on a parental role with John had he still been John’s 
principal, Mark answers affirmatively, “I would have done that.” [952-953]  He 
elaborates, “That’s my job and I have certain responsibilities and, yes, I’m expected to be 
professional and all that.  But also as a human being, I have responsibilities and as a 
father and a husband, I have certain responsibilities.” [947-951] 
 
When asked about “professional ethics,” Mark lists confidentiality, prohibitions on 
“inappropriate” relationships with students and “hiring ethics” as aspects that stand out to 
him.  Liz brings up social media and “not friending students outside of school” so as to 
maintain “professional” relations rather than “personal” ones. [184-187]  Mark also refers 
to North Carolina’s Professional Code of Ethics for Educators and suggests that it should 
be referred to more frequently. [223-229] 
 
When asked what they think of other teachers who may “cross a line” to move form a 
teacher role to a parental role with students, Mark and Liz respond with caution.  Liz 
cautions that nobody will be able to fill the parental void that some students experience. 
[1005-1021]  Mark’s answer reflects an administrative perspective:  “You were hired to 
be the student’s teacher and not the student’s parent…” [980-981]  He also cautions that 
parenting kids from unstable family backgrounds is not easy [983] and not a “Hollywood 
fairy tale.” [1003]  Mark regards his situation with John as an exception rather than the 
rule of professional responsibility.  He states, “… it is our job ultimately to teach and 
educate these kids and to guide them in terms of some type of character development.  
But, ultimately, it is someone else’s role and responsibility to serve as the parent for 
them, for these kids.  Now, it just so happens in this case, he had no more parents.” [991-
995] 
 
